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ABSTRACT
Biology, Culture, and Environment: The Struggle 
For Hegemony in Arizona
by
Sondra Kae Cosgrove
Dr. Willard Rollings, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f History 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This is an examination o f the various cultural groups who have attempted to extend 
hegemonic control over what is now the state o f Arizona. Each chapter focuses on the 
ways different societies adapted to the region’s challenging environment; paying particular 
attention to those that sought to integrate their neighbors into their own socioeconomic 
systems, whether by force or through negotiation. The rise and fall of the indigenous 
Hohokam civilization marks the first phase in this struggle for hegemony, while conflicts 
between Spaniards and Indians characterize the second. The third, and so far, final cycle 
concludes with Euro-Americans seizing the region from Arizona’s Hispanic and Native 
Americans residents.
A brief preface introduces this work’s underlying, interdisciplinary methodology, while 
the body of the text proceeds chronologically from prehistory to 1886. The first chapter 
examines the various prehistoric people who took up residence in Arizona. It describes 
how the Hohokam Indians were able to adopt a sedentary lifestyle and then translate their
111
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subsistence success into political power. The chapter concludes with the collapse of 
Arizona’s prehistoric political economy due to climatic change. Chapter two then 
provides an overview of the conflicts, beginning in the seventeenth century and continuing 
into the early nineteenth century, between Athapascan Indians and Spanish colonists. 
Throughout this period, both groups endeavored to exert control over the Southwest’s 
trade economy, yet each blocked the other’s efforts.
Chapter three analyzes the American ideology of Manifest Destiny and its role in 
westward migration; while the arrival o f Americans in the Southwest and their successful 
quest to capture Arizona’s resources is the focus of the remaining chapters. A brief 
summation then concludes this work.
IV
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PREFACE
Human occupation of what is today the state o f Arizona stretches back for thousands 
of years. For most of this time, however, the region’s inhabitants were nonliterate and 
therefore left no written records detailing their thoughts, beliefs, or important life events. 
While this lack of documentation does pose a formidable challenge to writing even a 
partial state history, it fortunately does not create an impenetrable barrier. Instead, it 
merely necessitates utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, conversant in alternative forms 
of evidence, to integrate this community into the larger, historical fabric. As such, this 
examination of Arizona, from prehistory to 1886, will rely heavily on a range of non- 
historical sources. These include the archaeological record as well as theoretical models 
from disciplines such as paleoanthropology, psychology, and cultural anthropology.'
The field o f paleoanthropology, in particular, offers tremendous investigative
' This synthetic approach is particularly popular in the field o f  psychology where proponents seek not 
only universal cognitive processes but also the means for determining how fixed biological traits interact 
with known ecological domains to produce varied, yet reliable behavior. Research psychologist Mike 
Knight writes, "An egregious error we have made in doing science in psychology is to think o f  prediction 
as synonymous with predicting the future. It is possible to formulate hypothesis that make specific 
testable predictions about the p a st . . .  In the speculative approach, one first discovers a psychological 
mechanism, and then one speculates about what adaptive problem it evolved to solve. The approach 
advocated here is the reverse: first, one uses existing and validated theories from evolutionary biology to 
define an adaptive problem that the human mind must be able to solve, and then deduce what properties a 
psychological mechanism capable o f  solving the problem must have. It is a constrained and predictive 
approach, rather than a compilation o f  post hoc explanations tor known phenomena.” See Mike Knight, 
"Functional Darwinism: A Cognitive Science Paradigm," Psychological R ecord  44, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 
44. See also Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Genes, People, and Language (New York: North Points Press, 
2000), 32, who concurs, “Multidisciplinary research provides, in a way, a sort o f  replication o f  an event, 
which is generally possible only in experimental science.”
VI
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assistance in interpreting the prehistoric and protohistoric periods. Because paleo­
anthropology is an integrated discipline, it brings together under one conceptual umbrella 
theories from physical anthropology, archaeology, paleontology, and geology. Paleo- 
anthropological models o f human behavior, therefore, consist of a range of independently 
verifiable variables, which makes them more reliable than nonintegrated hypothesis. Such 
variables include primary biological traits that are common to all Homo sapien sapiens, 
secondary learned behaviors that are known to exist in both past and present human 
cultures, and ecological data gathered through scientifically rigorous, environmental 
surveys.^
Among the primary biological traits found in paleoanthropological models are 
bipedalism, non-specific, omnivorous digestion, opposable thumbs and dexterous fingers, 
and the capacity to think symbolically. Such attributes have predictive value as they 
produced the behaviors that set humans apart from other species and linked individuals 
into symbiotic groups. These capabilities allowed humans to travel long distances while 
carrying objects and infants; they produced the ability to process and consume many types 
of food from a wide range of ecosystems; and they imparted the acumen humans needed 
to create tools with which to compensate for absent appendages and diminished physical
 ^David F. Bjorklund and Anthony D. Pellengrini explain, “Biologically primary abilities are those 
that have undergone selection pressure and evolved to deal with problems faced by our ancestors. 
Language and simple quantitative ability . .  . would be examples. In contrast, biologically secondary 
abilities do not have an evolutionary history but are abilities that are instilled in children by their cultures 
to deal with new ‘ecological’ problems unknown to forebears . . .  Their novelty reflects a new application 
o f  biologically primary abilities for purposes other than the original evolutionary-based function." See 
David F. Bjorklund and Anthony D. Pellengrini, The Origins o f  Human Nature: Evolutionary 
Developm ental Psychology  (Washington D. C.: American Psychology Association, 2002), 125. See also 
Milford FI. Wolpoff, Paleoanthropology, 2d ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1999), 146, 159, 163.
V ll
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attributes—such as claws, fangs, and great strength/
More advanced biological features include complex cognition, which allowed for 
behavioral plasticity, and vocal communication, which facilitated prolonged childrearing as 
well as integrated social living among adults. When combined, these two traits made it 
possible for humans to reason about the past and future, to pass accumulated knowledge 
on to ofifepring, to mediate conflicts, and to migrate beyond their natal African environ­
ment without having to wait for natural selection to alter their collective physiology."*
In examining these more advanced human features, the field of psychology provides 
great insight as it offers analytical tools for deconstructing human thought processes and 
clues as to how different social and physical environments have shaped human intellectual 
development. Because of this, psychological models are useful for generating plausible 
ranges o f behavior within known settings. For instance, psychological theories reveal 
likely human reactions to events such as habitat degradation and territorial encroachment 
by aggressive outsiders. In addition to this, the field also provides the means for 
understanding behavior that may appear to be irrational, yet in fact it makes rational, 
evolutionary sense.^
 ^The evolution o f  an organism is constrained by the amount o f  energy it can reasonably extract from 
its environment. Every organ and appendage requires a certain amount o f  calories to function; the larger 
and more complex, the more calories required. Thus, if  an organism selects for a large brain or heart, 
there must be reduction in other areas to offset the greater amount o f  energy consumed by the specialized 
feature. Human evolution selected for a large brain and in the process gave up defensive appendages such 
as claws and strength from overly large muscles. In the end, the larger brain was the better choice as it 
created technological appendages to compensate for what was not selected. See John C. Cartwright, 
Evolutionary Explanations o f  Human Behavior (New York: Routledge Press, 2001).
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, "Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer," 1997, 
< http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html.(17 September 2003), Online book. See also 
Bjorklund and Pellengrini, 80, 96, 100.
’ Bjorklund and Pellengrini, like many others, argue that whatever, in a broad sense, increases 
reproductive success is rational behavior for a species. See Bjorklund and Pellengrini, 262.
V lll
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Psychological studies show that human behavior is rational when it ensures the short­
term survival o f the individual. Examples of this would include the theft o f a relative’s 
food to avoid starvation or the killing of an ally who momentarily threatens a person’s 
wellbeing. As both actions address immediate problems, each would be rational, 
regardless o f the fact that they could ultimately lead to lethal retaliation by an offended 
party.^
Psychologists also identify behavior as rational if in the long-term it achieves some sort 
of reproductive benefit. An example o f this would be a hunter who divides his kill 
amongst his kinsmen with full knowledge that his behavior will reduce the amount of meat 
immediately available for his own family. In the present his dependents will have less 
sustenance, but in the fiiture, he assumes, they will have more as those who received meat 
will feel obligated to reciprocate equally when the roles are reversed. This outcome may 
not always occur, yet a sufficiently high success rate will ensure that the behavior 
continues.’
Human behavior can even be rational when it leads to immediate, individual death. In 
these instances, humans sacrifice themselves for first-order kin, such as siblings and 
offspring, by denying their own biological drive to survive. This trait, known as altruism, 
baflfied Charles Darwin as it ftew in the face o f his theory of species reproduction. Why,
" Ibid, 193.
’ Kristen Hawkins, "Is The Meat the Hunter's Property?: Big Game, Ownership, and Explanations o f  
Hunting and Sharing," in Human Diet: Its Origins and Evolution, ed. Peter S. Ungar and Mark F. Teaford 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 29-35; Cartwright, 5.
IX
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he pondered, would a fit individual sacrifice him or herself for a companion? The answer, 
Darwin found, lay in the fact that humans will seek not only to perpetuate their own 
genetic code, but will also seek to save others who share their biological inheritance. Over 
time, humans have even come to view the perpetuation of cultural inheritance as a 
sufficient reason for sacrificing one’s own life for that of a compatriot.*
Beyond the organic components o f human behavior lay secondary traits that, when 
understood, also aid in reconstructing human history. The field o f anthropology lends 
assistance in interpreting these behaviors; the sum of which anthropologists call culture.
In general, cultural behaviors include all those that humans create to live in specific 
physical and social environments, such as religious rituals, courtship practices, and a wide 
variety of actions that fall under the heading of manners. While not as predictive as other 
paradigms, cultural theories are still useful as they clarify behavior not readily elucidated 
by biological or cognitive models.^
Tlirough their study o f cultural behavior, anthropologists have also discovered the 
most enduring forms of human social organization, with the first and foremost being the 
familial band. This grouping of thirty to fifty relatives appears to have developed 
naturally, early in human social evolution and remained the preferred combination for 
thousands of years. It was not until the agricultural revolution began in approximately 
10,000 B.C.E. that population density increased sufficiently to necessitate new social
Ralph L. Holloway, "Toward a Synthetic Theory o f  Human Brain Evolution," in Origins o f  the 
Human Brain, ed. Jean-Pierre Changeux and Jean Chavaillon (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995), 42-5; 
Robert Hinde, Why Gods Persist: A Scientific Approach to Religion  (New York: Routledge Press, 1999), 
180-1; Wolpoff, 95.
’ Jonathan Haas, "Cultural Evolution and Political Centralization," in From Leaders to Rulers, ed. 
Jonathan Haas (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001), 13.
X
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configurations. Once this happened, anthropologists argue, new sociopolitical entities 
such as tribes, chiefdoms, and eventually states began to appear with a concomitant 
redistribution of decision-making power and access to resources. While these scholars 
disagree over the finer details o f how each familial band negotiated the transition from one 
social grouping to the next, in their broad interpretations, there is enough agreement to 
generally predict how particular human societies managed social change."*
As with any historical undertaking, even one that draws assistance from a variety of 
disciplines, a certain amount o f speculation invariably plays a role in developing 
conclusions. This is true for this study, yet even here, conjecture will be grounded in three 
sound, interconnected premises; a brief review of which will reveal their veracity. The 
first is that regardless of time or place all humans will devote a portion of their time and 
energy to acquiring nutrition, shelter, and reproductive security. Therefore, any 
examination o f human life will uncover evidence of these biologically derived activities. 
This evidence, which can range from artifacts such as flint scrappers to various types of 
food debris, will then offer insight into a society’s daily activities."
The next assertion is that not only do we know that all humans will seek to meet their
Morton Fried, The Evolution o f  P olitical Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology (New York: 
McGrav/ Hill, 1967), 61-4; Robert McC. Netting, “Population, Permanent Agriculture, and Politics: 
Unpacking the Evolutionary Portmantueau,” in The Evolution o f  Political Systems: Sociopolitics in 
Small-Scale Societies, ed. Steadman Upman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 22-3, 237- 
42; Steadman Upman, “Decoupling the Process o f  Political Evolution,” in The Evolution o f  Political 
Systems: Sociopolitics in Small-Scale Societies, ed. Steadman Upman (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, I990),I2; Fried, 153, 177, 186, 229; Cavalli-Sforza, 96-9.
" Robert Hinde, 17-8, states, “We all have similar sets o f  goals such as food, security, sex, [and] a 
need t& make sense o f  the world . . . These and other basic human propensities can reasonably be 
assumed to be present, to varying degrees, in all individuals . . .” Jonathan Haas also states, 13-5, 
“People o f  different culture respond to their unique environments in similar ways with a relatively tightly 
defined range o f  variability.” See also Bjorklund and Pellegrini, 262-3.
XI
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basic biological needs, but we also know how physiology restricts the ways humans fulfill 
those need. For instance, while humans can eat many types o f food and adapt to many 
different environmental settings, there are limits to what they can digest and ecosystems in 
which they can survive, (e.g., humans cannot extract nutrients fi'om many forms of non- 
organic matter, and they cannot endure without sufficient supplies o f water). These 
restrictions are all the more rigid for groups that possess only simple forms of technology, 
as they have more difficulty manipulating their surroundings. Thus, if ecological setting 
and level of technology are known variables—which they can be with a fair degree of 
certainty through dendrochronology and the archaeological record—it is possible to 
generate plausible narratives that describe how particular humans fed, sheltered, and 
reproduced themselves.'^
And lastly, due to the evolutionary selection in Homo sapien sapiens for a large brain 
over other traits that facilitate solitary living—such as appendages that serve as defensive 
weapons—humans must live in groups to ensure proper juvenile maturation and to 
decrease the likelihood of premature death among all members. Consequently, any 
historical study of normal humans will find evidence of some form of bonded living. While 
humans may express this trait in a variety o f ways, in every society there will be a basic 
distribution of power and resources as well as mechanisms for suppressing
" Arthur S. Keene, "Nutrition and Economy," in The Analysis o f  Prehistoric D iets, ed. Robert E. 
Gilbert and James H. M ielke (Orlando: Academic Press, 1985), 156-9, 175, 180; Patricia A. Gilman, 
Wandering Villagers: P it Structures, M obility and Agriculture in Southeastern Arizona, Anthropological 
Research Paper, no. 49 (Phoenix: Arizona State University, 1997), 8-9.
XU
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egocentric tendencies in favor of community cohesion."
In summation, to integrate all of Arizona’s inhabitants into a larger historical 
framework, this study will employ an interdisciplinary approach suited for uncovering and 
interpreting a wide spectrum of human behavior. To this end, it will purposefully 
emphasize Arizona’s prehistoric and protohistoric periods, and will seek to integrate 
within the storyline the perspectives o f later-arriving immigrants who also lacked written 
communication skills. It will utilize a wide variety of methodologies, theories, and models 
to create a three dimensional narrative that does not categorize subjects as “advanced”, 
“simplistic,” or “barbaric.” Nor will it pander in suppositions that imply that biology or 
culture predestined some groups to triumph over others. Instead, it will proceed under the 
assumption that each historical figure is equal to all others and that history is a composite 
of thousands of minute, highly contingent variables, which could have produced hundreds 
of alternative endings.
As I finish, I would like to thank all those people who assisted me in this process. My 
family deserves much of my gratitude. They never wavered in their support, even when I
Studies from a variety o f  fields substantiate this assertion; the most current comes from the field o f  
developmental psychology. This research demonstrates that human phenotype and cognitive capabilities 
derive from a combination o f  specialized biological features and generalized mechanisms created through 
childhood interaction with social and physical environments. It shows that to accommodate our specie’s 
large brain and cranium, evolution selected for human infants who arrived premature and helpless and 
then spent an extended and intensive childhood learning from adults which biological behaviors to 
express and in what form that expression should take. Evolutionary biologists and geneticists also show  
the even after childhood, humans require group living to survive. Through statistical analysis Cavalli- 
Sforza, 30, documents that individuals in a society require access to approximately 500 other individuals 
to avoid interbreeding. See also Bjorklund, 21, 100; and Richard B. Lee, “Primitive Communism and the 
Origin o f  Social Inequality,” in The Evolution o f  P olitical Systems: Sociopolitics in Small Scale Societies 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 245. Lee states, “Despite our seeming adaptation to life 
in hierarchical societies, there are signs that humankind retains a deep rooted desire for a sense o f  
community. All theories o f  justice revolve around these principles, and our sense o f  outrage at the 
violation o f  these norms indicates the depth o f  its gut-level appeal.”
X lll
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was certain that I would never complete this project. While writing is often a lonely 
endeavor, this study is as much the product o f the careful editing of my colleagues, as it is 
my own. To my fellow graduate students, I say thank you. Lastly, I would like to thank 
my committee members for standing by me and seeing me through to the end of my 
journey. My life certainly would have been much more trying without the guidance of 
these fine scholars.
XIV
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CHAPTER 1
INDIGENOUS ARIZONA AND THE FIRST 
COMPLEX CIVILIZATION 
At some point between 40,000 and 20,000 B.C.E.' the earth entered into a new glacial 
cycle causing a worldwide drop in ocean levels. As a result, a land bridge appeared 
connecting Eurasia with the Americas. This event allowed humans to migrate from what 
is now Siberia into what is currently Alaska. Once in North America these migrants 
encountered the massive Laurentide glacier covering all o f present-day Canada and the 
Cordillian ice sheet spread across the landscape west of the Rocky Mountains.’
After squeezing between these two giant mountains o f ice, some families eventually 
arrived in the region that is today the Great Plains of the United States. There they
' 1 will use the date markers B.C.E. and C.E. to the historic periods; I will then only state the date.
2 Conclusive data links Amerindians with Siberians in Cavalli-Sforza, 82-3, 140. A new theory, 
backed by osteological evidence, has begun to challenge the exclusivity o f  the land-bridge interpretation 
and posits that humans from southern Asia or possibly Australia arrived in the Americas earlier than the 
Siberian migrants. As human morphological features are the product o f  both genetics and environment, it 
will take more than variations in bone structure to displace the accepted hypothesis. Studies o f  DNA  
sequencing show little connection between south Asia and the Americas. According to Cavalli-Sforza, 
“Genetic tests put the first m igration into the A m ericas at about 32,000 years ago. External 
characteristics are unreliable as they are influenced by both genes and by the environmental conditions o f  
the individual’s development; they change rapidly in response to factors such as nutrition and external 
temperature.” See also Stuart J. Fiedel, Prehistory o f  the Am ericas (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 44-51; Steve Connor, "Does Skull Prove That First Americans Came From Europe," 
Independent on the Web, 3 December 2002,
<http://news.independent.co.uk/world/science_medical/story.jsp?story=358001>(20 September 2003); 
"Human Skulls Are 'oldest Americans," British Broadcast Network on the Web, 3 December 2002, 
< http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/sci/tech/2538323.stm.>(20 September 2003).
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discovered a lush biome with abundant vegetation and herds o f large herbivores. After 
months of trekking over bleak snow-covered terrain, they were probably much relieved to 
find such an oasis. In the process o f adapting to their new home, these first Americans 
created an innovative cultural complex that paleoanthropologists identity as the Clovis 
tradition. In general, Clovis society consisted of small familial bands, governed by rules of 
reciprocal exchange, which foraged widely and hunted large animals when the opportunity
arose.’
For years researchers explained the Clovis aptitude for big-game predation by 
emphasizing cultural traits that supposedly imparted extraordinary skill to their hunters. 
Recent studies, however, have abandoned this approach and now explain Clovis prowess 
in light of evidence that humans will shun energy-expensive behavior unless assured of 
achieving some sort of benefit."* Thus, with only simple forms of technology, current 
investigators argue, pointing to subsistence practices alone as being key to Clovis hunting 
skill is mistaken, as the Clovis clearly lacked the tools needed to substantially improve 
their predation success. As such, it is necessary to also examine the American
 ^ Waldo R. Wedel, Central Plains Prehistory: Holocene Environments and Cultural Change 
(Lincoln; University o f  Nebraska, 1986), 39-42; Daniel G. Landis, Life On The Line: Archaic, Cohonina, 
a n d  Sinagua Settlem ents in Western Arizona, Soil Systems in Archaeology, no. 19 (Tucson: Soil Systems 
Publications, 1993), 34-5.
'* Adrienne Zihlman, "The Paleolithic Glass Ceiling: Women in Human Evolution," in Women in 
Human Evolution, Qd. Lori D. Hager (New York: Routledge Press, 1997), 99; Victor A. Carbone and 
Benne C. Kul, "Preservation o f  Plant and Animal Remains," in The Analysis o f  Prehistoric D iets, ed. 
Robert I. Gilbert and James H. Mielke (Orlando: Academic Press, 1985), 3, 12-33; Alison Wyle, "Good 
Science, Bad Science, or Science as Usual?: Feminist Critique o f  Science," in Women in Human 
Evolution, ed. Lori D. Hager (New York: Routledge Press, 1997), 29-55; Keene, 72-4, 159.
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environment to accurately determine what enhanced the Clovis’ ability to kill large game/ 
Aceording to the most plausible environmental hypothesis, the Clovis excelled at 
hunting due to American herbivores evolving for thousands of years apart from humans. 
Because of this, they were slow to recognize hunters as predators and for at least a few 
generations did not react to humans by fleeing. Any time and energy hunters expended in 
pursuit o f these large animals, then, would have likely resulted in a successful kill. Hence, 
each felled animal would have reinforced the notion that hunting was a reasonably efficient 
means for acquiring nutrition as well as other animal by-produets.^
With secured access to a high quality food souree, the Clovis thrived and spread 
beyond the Plains. The conditions sustaining their economic bonanza could not last 
forever, though, and finally came to an end when the Pleistocene gave way to the 
Holocene epoch at approximately 10,000 B.C.E. This climatie transition shifted global 
weather patterns and brought inereasing aridity to many parts o f the Amerieas. The result
’ Until recently, many paleoanthropologists argued that hunting was the basis o f  human social and 
physical evolution. Their bias resulted from an over reliance on the fossil record, which tends to only 
preserve durable artifacts such as bones and flint. As it is much harder to find preserved remains 
indicative o f  gathering activities, current paleoanthropologists now also take into consideration 
ethnographies that demonstrate that up to 70 percent o f  a band’s food comes from vegetation and small 
prey. For more on this, see Donald C. Johanson and Maitland A. Edey, "Why did Lucy Walk Erect?," in 
The B iological Basis o f  Human Behavior: A C ritical Reader, 2d ed.. Advances in Human Evolution 
Series, ed. Robert W. Sussman (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999), 86-101.
* In low technology societies every activity expends physical energy that must be replenished.
Humans in such groups must think ahead to ensure that they do not spend more energy than there is food 
available to erase their caloric deficit. The riskiest type o f  nutrient acquisition for humans is big game 
hunting as it expends large numbers o f  calories without a guarantee o f  recouping calories. Therefore, only 
when the risks are lower and the benefits more assured, will humans focus more intently on this form o f  
procurement. See Wayne D. Carroll et al.. Background Paper: H istorical O verview O f  The Southern 
Forest Landscape A nd A ssociated  Resources,<  http://wwwlsrs.fs.fed.us/sustain/report/histrynf.htm>(13 
November 2003), Clemson University Forest Resource Department; Martha Tappen, "Deconstructing the 
Serengeti," in M eat Eating & Human Evolution, ed. Craig B. Stanford and Henry T. Bunn (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 15-26; Blaire Van Valkenbugh, "The Dog Eat Dog World O f Cam ivory:
A Review o f  Past and Present Carnivore Community Dynamics," in M eat Eating & Human Evolution, ed. 
Craig B. Stanford and Henry T. Bunn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 101-121.
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was leaner habitats. No species felt the consequences of this change more than the large 
herbivores. By selecting for large bodies, evolution had enabled them to withstand attacks 
by deadly Pleistocene carnivores, yet this also made them vulnerable to extinction should 
the calories available from the environment drastically shrink. When this happened at the 
onset of the Holocene, the large, hulking bodies that had served them well for thousands 
of years became a fatal liability.’
As their domain contracted, many large animals began to starve to death. With 
gestation among these species often lasting for more than twelve months and adolescent 
sexual maturation taking ten to fifteen years, remaining members were physically unable to 
replace their departed companions before they too succumbed. Ultimately, numerous 
giant species went extinct worldwide, with an almost complete disappearance in the 
Americas. In response to losing this prime food source, the Clovis created a new lifeway 
known as the Folsom Culture, which placed a greater emphasis on plant foraging, 
scavenging, and the hunting of small animals.*
Similar to the rest o f North America, the transition to the Holocene substantially 
altered the climate o f what is today the Southwest o f the United States. During the 
Pleistocene the local climate had been mild, with little fluctuation between summer and 
winter. Such conditions encouraged a proliferation o f both food and nonfood resources. 
Resident Clovis bands took advantage of this richness by traversing the area in large.
 ^ Scott A. Elias, The Ice-Age H istory o f  Southwestern  Park, 1997, 
< http://www.cpluhna.nau.edu/People/paleoindians.html>(10 September 2003).
* Robert S. Thompson and Katherine H. Anderson, Clovis Point: Past Climate A nd Vegetation 
Changes In The Southwestern United States,
<http://geochange.er.usgs.gov/sw/impacts/biology/pastclim>(10 September 2003); Linda Cordell, 
Archaeology o f  the Southwest, 2d ed. (San Diego; Academic Press, 1997), 90.
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mobile bands that foraged for an array o f plants and hunted a variety of large and small 
animals. When the giant herbivores began to die out in the early years o f the Holoeene, 
these families adopted the new Folsom tradition. Folsom cultural strategies then 
predominated in the Southwest until approximately 5000 B.C.E. when the increasingly 
arid climate once again forced the emergence of new desert cultures that focused even 
more on extensive foraging and small animal predation. These traditions included the 
archaic Amargosa, San Dieguito, Chiricahua, and Cochise.^
Throughout the Southwest, summers became hotter, winters cooler, and rainfall more 
varied. Archaic families survived by maximizing returns from their topographically diverse 
homeland, which included arid flatlands, riverine basins, jagged plateaus, and chains of 
alpine mountains. Now, instead of ranging widely over the horizontal landscape, they 
traveled over shorter, more vertical distances in a seasonal round that coordinated 
staggered lowland to upland harvests. As families moved from one ecological zone to the 
next, they foraged for drought-tolerant grasses, seeds, and fruits, while hunting both 
desert and mountain adapted animals."*
In addition to reorganizing their economic behavior. Southwestern peoples also altered
’ Laurance D. Linford, Archaeological Investigation in W est-Central Arizona, Archaeological Series, 
no. 136, ed. John F. Robertson (Tucson: Arizona State Museum, 1979), 32; Landis, 33; Elias, 
"Paleoindian And Archaic Peoples.”
Terah L. Smiley, "Paleo-Ecological Evidence," in The Cochise Cultural Sequence in Southeastern  
Arizona, ed. E.B. Sayles et al.. Anthropological Papers o f  University o f  Arizona, no. 42 (Tucson: 
University o f  Arizona Press, 1983), 20-5; Bruce B. Huckell et al.. O f Marshes and M aize: Preceram ic 
Agricultural Settlem ents in the Cienega Valley, Southeastern Arizona  (Tucson: University o f  Arizona 
Press, 1995), 24-5; William W. Wasley, "Environmental Setting," in The Cochise Cultural Sequence in 
Southeastern Arizona, ed. E.B. Sayles et al.. Anthropological Papers o f  University o f  Arizona, no. 42 
(Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1983), 6-16; Mark R. Hackbarth, Archaic and Hohokam  
Occupation o f  the M ayo Boulevard Project Area in Northeastern Phoenix, Arizona  (Phoenix: City o f  
Phoenix Parks, Recreation, and Library Department, 1998), 9.
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their social structures to fit the new environmental constraints. With food more dispersed, 
they replaced aggregating in extended, femilial groups that exploited big game with 
smaller, nuclear bands that judiciously partook o f resources from more limited territories. 
To hedge against drought-induced femine, they still maintained widespread trading 
contacts, yet now they only rendezvoused with distant family members when abundant 
food sources would allow. Ultimately, the result of this increasing social atomization was 
a higher degree of isolation that promoted cultural differentiation."
Between 9000 and 2000 B.C.E., these small archaic bands drifted away from one 
another with some traveling into what is today Arizona. These first inhabitants scattered 
across the region until almost every human-fiiendly niche had a resident population.
Those who made their way into the eastern Mogollon Mountains lived mainly in the 
upland environs, which, unlike the valleys, had numerous small springs and streams. Over 
time, they conformed to the limits o f their habitat by relying more heavily on mountain 
resources during the summer and maintaining extensive trading contacts with groups 
outside their climatic zone during the winter.*’
Farther north, above the Mogollon Rim on the Colorado Plateau, streams and rivers 
were even more unreliable as they could disappear one year and then overflow the next
“ M. Steven Shackley, "Range and Mobility in the Early Hunter-Gatherer Southwest," in Early 
Formative A daptations in the Southern Southwest, ed. Barbra J. Roth, Monographs in World History, no. 
25 (Madison: Prehistory Press, 1996), 7; Huckell, 1.
National Park Service, Double Adobe Site,
<http://tps.cr.nps.gov/nhl/detail.cfh?ResourceId=86&ResourcedT(3 September 2003); Richard Ciolek- 
Torrello, "Sites o f  the Early Formative Period," in Early Farmers o f  the Sonoran Desert: Archaeological 
Investigations a t the Houghton R oad Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson: 
Statistical Research, 1998), 229; Eric J. Kaldahl, "Climate, Vegetation, and Dendrochronology," in Living 
on the Edge on the Edge o f  the Rim: Excavations and Analysis o f  the Silver Creek Archaeological 
Research Project, I993-I998 , ed. Barbara J. M ills et al., Arizona State Museum Archaeological Series 
192, vol. 1 (Tucson: Arizona State Museum, 1999), 11-5; Huckell, 14.
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with devastating floods. Likewise, rain often neglected the region for months on end and 
then would suddenly reappear in the form of thunderbursts that selectively drenched small 
areas while leaving vast spaces bone dry. Such conditions made life tenuous and 
unpredictable yet did not deter settlement. Once migrating bands discovered the region’s 
sandstone aquifers, which drained watersheds fi’om farther to the north, they began 
congregating near relatively stable and productive alluvial fans.*’
Residents o f the south-central basins were very fortunate as their lowlands valleys 
offered generous supplies of water from the Santa Cruz and San Pedro Rivers as well as 
an above average ten to twelve inches o f rainfall per year. This moisture supported plant 
species ranging from the desert agave to the mountain piflon pine, which supplied 
residents with ample amounts o f carbohydrates, while scores o f rabbits, deer, and various 
small rodents provided fat and protein. The territory’s topography also contributed to a 
secure way of life, as the basins were narrow enough to allow for the gathering of a 
variety of upland foods within a day’s walk o f lowland water sources.'"*
In the central valleys, along the perennial Salt and Gila Rivers, it was not a lack of 
water that restricted human habitation, but instead the relatively wide expanses that 
separated lowland water supplies from more plentiful upland foods. This distance made it 
more time consuming, and thus costly, to move between riverine and alpine resources. 
Resident families therefore either had to travel extensively or establish stable villages
" Jeffery S. Dean, Chronological Analysis o fT seg i Phase Sites In Northeastern Arizona, Papers o f  
the Laboratory o f  Tree-Ring Research, no. 3 (Tucson; University o f  Arizona Press, 1969), 15, 87.
Paul R. Fish, "The Hohokam: 1,000 Years o f  Prehistory in the Sonoran Desert," in Dynam ics o f  
Southwestern Prehistory, ed. Linda S. Cordell and George Gumerman (Washington D. C.: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1989), 22; Huckell, 2.
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close to the rivers and then periodically dispatch band members to live and gather food in 
the adjacent mountains. Over time, riverine bands also entered into trade alliances with 
families living in the east who were looking to exchange upland commodities for lowland 
products."
Inhabitants in the far west faced the greatest challenge as they lived in one of the 
Southwest’s harshest ecological zones. Their territory encompassed the lowest, and 
therefore, hottest part of the Sonoran desert, where fresh water, apart from rivers such as 
the Colorado and Gila, was so scarce that in many places it was nonexistent. To 
overcome this obstacle, archaic bands had to carefully establish residences in a variety of 
locations to ensure maximum access to seasonal resources, while concurrently shielding 
themselves from extreme high and low temperatures as well as recurrent floods. In the 
northwest, bands also had to contend with numerous steep-walled canyons, which made
Connie L. Stone and Todd W. Bostwick, "Environmental Contexts and Archaeological Correlates; 
The Transition to Farming in Three Regions o f  the Arizona Desert," in Early Formative A daptations in 
the Southern Southwest, ed. Barbara J. Roth (Madison: Prehistory Press, 1996), 19; Rein Vanderpot, Eric 
E. Klucas, and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, eds.. From the D esert to the Mountains: Archaeology o f  the 
Transition Zone The State Route 87-Sycamore Creek Project (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1999), 95-6; 
Eric Eugene Klucas, "Round Valley," in From the D esert to the Mountain: A rchaeological Transition 
Zone The State Route 87-Sycamore Creek Project, ed. Rein Vanderpot, Eric Eugene Klucas, and Richard 
Ciolek-Torrello, Technical Series, no. 73, vol. 1: Prehistoric Sites (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1999), 
85.
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travel and therefore the search for food and water that much more difficult."
Despite these and other challenges, archaic groups throughout Arizona persevered and 
eventually began to thrive. They were so successful that by approximately 3500 B.C.E. 
their varying subsistence strategies had raised population levels to the limits of the region’s 
carrying capacity. When this happened, the largest groups began to routinely find it 
impossible to escape localized drought or poor harvests without encroaching on their 
neighbors. This dilemma led some southern families to search for and eventually discover 
a low-cost means for increasing their food supply without having to expand their territory: 
plant cultivation."
Living as they were on the peripheiy of the Mesoamerican periphery, these southern 
bands maintained trading contacts with people in modern-day Chihuahua and Sonora, who 
had acquired and adapted com and squash to make them amenable to desert, floodwater
" William Price wrote, “These Indians seem very destitute, and it is miraculous how they are enabled 
to secure an existence in this barren waste o f  a country. They say they rely on grass seeds and mescal; we 
did not see even a rabbit in several hundred miles o f  the country they occupied.” See William R. Price, "A 
Scout Among the Havasupai and Hualapais Indians," in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. 
Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 227. While stationed in northern Arizona, 
American Charles King also wrote o f  the plateau region, “From northwest to southeast run great parallel 
ranges o f  sterile mountains, like waves o f  the stormiest sea— only that the farther you get into the 
northeast and northern sections o f  the territory the more abrupt, jagged, and precipitous they become; the 
more tumultuous is the upheaval, and from broad valleys lying deep and sheltered between, you come 
upon narrow, tortuous canyons, so deep, so narrow that while it seems possible to hurl your hat across the 
widest o f  the lot, you look down into depths unfathomable, and by winding ‘goat trails’ and hours o f  
dizzying climbing and sliding, sometimes on all fours, you manage to cross.” See "On Campaigning in 
Arizona," in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, I865-I890 , ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 2001), 162; Joan S. Schneider, “Project Background," in O f Stone and Spirits: Pursuing 
the Past o f  Antelope Hill, Technical Series, ed. Joan S. Schneider and Jeffery H. Altusch, no. 76 (Tucson: 
Statistical Research Publishers, 2000), 14; Landis, 40.
"  Chester A. Shaw and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, "Research Design," in Early Farmers o f  the 
Sonoran Desert: Archaeological Investigations at the Houghton R oad Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard 
Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1998), 42; Ofer Bar-Yesef, "From Sedentary Foragers to 
Village Hierarchies: The Emergence o f  Social Institutions," in The Origins o f  Human Social Institutions, 
Proceedings o f  the British Academy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 50; Huckell, 2-3, 16.
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farming.'* With reliable rivers, adequate rainfall, and nearby mountains that allowed 
groups to tend gardens without abandoning upland foraging, these southern families had 
the conditions necessary to adopt domesticated crops without having to drastically alter 
their subsistence methods. If adopting such plants had required more than modest 
changes, it is very likely that they would have seen this option as too risky and rejected it, 
but this was not the case.’^
After being adopted in the south, domesticated com and squash spread through 
kinship trading networks to other areas possessing conditions amenable to cultivation. In 
the mountainous regions just to the north of the San Pedro River, families living in suitable 
basins imitated their southern kin by augmenting their available lowland resources with 
small gardens. Due to their greater likelihood of experiencing drought, however, they 
continued to rely mostly on wild, upland foods. Similarly, bands residing in higher 
elevations had to contend with a short frost-free growing season. Thus, like their lowland 
kin, they adopted horticulture, but protected themselves from crop failure by continuing to 
devote a lion’s share o f their energy to foraging and trading with lowland partners. 
Paleoanthropologists identify this new mixture o f subsistence strategies characteristic of
Carla R. Van West and William L. Deaver, “Introduction, in El M acayo: A Prehistoric Settlement 
in the Upper Santa Cruz River Valley, ed. William L Deaver and Carla R. Van West, Statistical Research 
Technical Series, ed. Jeffery H. Altschul, no. 74 (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2001), 5; Steven D. Shelly, 
“Osteological Description on the Macaw Skeletal Remains,” in El M acayo: A Prehistoric Settlem ent in 
the Upper Santa Cruz R iver Valley, ed. William L. Deaver and Carla R. Van West, Statistical Research 
Technical Series, ed. Jeffery Altschul, no. 74 (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2001), 128.
”  Stephen Plog, "Agriculture, Sedentism, and the Environment in the Evolution o f  Political 
Systems," in The Evolution o f  P olitical Systems: Sociopolitics in Small-Scale Sedentary Societies, ed. 
Steadman Upman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 182-3.
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eastern Arizona as the MogoUon tradition/"
Over time some of these MogoUon farmers migrated northward onto the Colorado 
Plateau, carrying with them their domesticated plants and horticultural know-how. The 
Plateau’s arid and unpredictable environment, however, necessitated modifications. The 
end result was the emergence of dry farming techniques that maximized the region’s high 
water table and hedged against locaUzed crop failure through multi-zone plantings. At the 
time it seemed that this new, sparse society would be ephemeral and destined to fade 
away; yet, in looking back, it is plain to see that this was not a trivial settlement. On the 
contrary, these hardy migrants’ descendents would one day become the Western Branch 
of the fabled Anasazi culture.^'
Unlike the southern and eastern vaUeys, which were suited to floodwater farming, the 
central basins offered an ideal setting for irrigation horticulture as they hosted two large, 
perennial rivers fiUed with ample supplies o f water and soil-replenishing silt. Bands Uving 
along the GUa River were the first to adopt this more intensive and thus dependent form of
Huckell writes that catastrophic freezes occur at the higher elevations on average every thirteen 
years. See Huckell, 135-7. In 1875, Army surgeon L.Y. Loring wrote o f  this region, “The soil is 
cultivated to a slight extent, and their [Coyotero Apaches] method o f  cultivation is o f  the simplest 
description . .  .It is observed that they now cultivate more land than formerly, when they were not under 
government subjection.” See L.Y. Loring, “Report on [the] Coyotero Apaches,” in Eyewitness to  the 
Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Meehanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 193. See also 
Stone and Bostwick, 18; Kaldahl, 21-24; Stephen Plog, 182-3; Huckell, 12-3; Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 
"Sites o f  the Early Formative Period," in Early Farming in the Sonoran Desert: Archaeological 
Investigations at the Houghton R oad Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson: 
S tatistical Research, 1998), 230.
R.G. Matson, "The Spread o f  M aize to the Colorado River Plateau," Archaeology Southwest, no. 13 
(1999),http://www.cpluhna.nau.edu/Research/spread_of_maize.htm(!0 September 2003); Laurie 
W einstein, "Introduction," in N ative Peoples o f  the Southwest: N egotiating Land, Water, and Ethnicity, 
ed. Laurie Weinstein (Westport, Conn.: Bergin & Garvey, 2001), 4-5; Richard Ciolek-Torrello, "Summary 
and Conclusions," in Early Farmers o f  the Sonoran Desert: Archaeological Investigations at the 
Houghton R oad Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1998), 
276.
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cultivation by minimizing risks associated with crop failure. They did this by reinforcing 
upland trade contacts and by actively nurturing wild plants in the surrounding deserts.
Due to this ingenuity, these riverine bands were the first to produce a consistent surplus of 
food, which eventually allowed them to settle in permanent villages. Once established, 
these sedentary farmers then started down the path to become Arizona’s first complex 
civilization: the Hohokam.^^
As would be expected, bands living in the far west had the most difficulty adopting 
crops as low rainfall, ephemeral streams, and long distances separating fertile lowlands 
fi'om upland resources fimstrated their efforts. Even along the Colorado River farming 
was precarious due to its regular and often violent floods. Groups who managed to 
cultivate domesticated plants protected themselves by maintaining extensive trading 
contacts and by continuing to rely on desert-adapted gathering and hunting techniques. 
Families who decided to forsake crops persisted in a mobile existence and reaped 
peripheral benefits by trading with riverine settlements along the Colorado River and in the 
Hohokam basins. Paleoanthropologists identify this last cultural tradition as the Patayan.^^
Susan K. Fish and Paul Fish, "Prehistoric Environment and Agriculture Among the Hohokam o f  
Southern Arizona," in N ative Peoples o f  the Southwest: N egotiating Land, Water, and Ethnicity, ed. 
Laurie Weinstein (Westport, Conn.: Bergin & Garvey, 2001), 29-32; Ciolek-Torrello, “Summary,” 275; 
McC. Netting, 59-60; Donald E. Weaver, Investigations Concerning The Hohokam Classic P eriod in the 
Lower Salt R iver Valley (Phoenix: Arizona Archaeological Society, 1977), 11.
Later accounts o f  life on the river illustrate the difficulties the Indians faced. According to the 
commander o f  Fort Mojave, established in 1859, “The surrounding country is a desert except in the river 
bottoms and sloughs [,] chiefly below the post where the Indians are able to raise some Corn, Beans, [sic] 
melons, and pumpkins after the overflow in May and June. The C hief [sic] reliance o f  the Indians 
however is the mesquite bean. The mountains on either side o f  the river are barren and destitute o f  
timber, springs o f  water are seldom found, and the sterility o f  the country is apparent in every direction as 
far are the eye can reach. See Irene J. Brenan, ed.. Fort M ojave, 1859-1890: Letters o f  the Commanding 
Officers (Manhattan, KS: M A/AH Publishing, 1980), 95; Landis, 39-40; Joan S. Schneidfer, "Project 
Setting and History," in O f Stone and Spirits: Pursuing The Past o f  Antelope Hill, ed. Joan S. Schneider 
and Jeffery H. Altschul (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2000), 14.
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Regardless of the level at which different groups practiced horticulture, unprocessed 
com was not sufficiently nutritious to allow even part-time formers to rely on it as a 
dietary staple. Those who tried would have experienced the ravages of malnutrition due 
to a lack of protein and essential amino acids such as lysine and tryptophan, as well as 
deficiencies in niacin, calcium, and iron. Consequently, Arizona’s prehistoric inhabitants 
did not reduce their reliance on wüd plants until they acquired domesticated legumes and 
advanced food processing techniques. This occurred around 1 C.E. when Mesoamerican 
beans and ceramic boiling pots traveled up the same southern trade routes that com and 
squash had arrived along years earlier. '^*
Legumes provided protein and the amino acids tryptophan and lysine, while ceramic 
cooking vessels allowed for boiling, which released com’s nutritious inner core and 
leached minerals into the resulting gmel. Once these additions to domesticated food 
production took hold, southem fomilies living where water supplies minimized the risk of 
crop failure and nearby mountains allowed for quick trips to upland zones, slowly began 
expanding their gardens. Then, as before, once these peoples adopted this more 
dependent form of subsistence, related bands living in adjacent territories slowly copied 
their innovations.^^
As domesticated foods became prominent in the Southwestem diet, farming families 
discovered that they would need to save an adequate supply of seeds fi-om one year to the 
next to allow for future crops. t^Tiile storage pits and basketry were already established as
Stephanie M. Whittlesey, "Ceramics," in Early Farmers o f  the Sonoran D esert: A rchaeological 
Investigations o f  the Houghton R oad Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard Cioleck-Terroiio (Tucson: 
Statistical Research, 1998), 163-4; Huckell, 112; Gilman, 8-9, 12-3, 112.
Ibid.
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means for caching foods, neither method proved reliable for the type of moisture-free and 
vermin resistant storage that seed-corn required. ' Some innovators eventually realized that 
the same ceramic pots that were capable of withstanding boiling water could be altered to 
make them almost airtight. Onee this happened, these bands then began storing not only 
seeds but also surplus food.^"
From approximately 200 to 600 C.E., bean cultivation, pottery technology, and other 
accoutrements of sedentary living spread throughout Arizona. As each group adopted 
these innovations, new cultural forms began to appear that ranged from minor 
modifications of older traditions to dramatic new lifeways. In the Eastern Mountains, on 
the Colorado Plateau, and in the western deserts, where rain was unpredictable and either 
frost or scorching heat plagued the growing season, change was minimal as families added 
beans and ceramics, but continued to rely mainly on foraging and hunting for meeting day- 
to-day needs.^’
In the southem basins alterations were more pronounced as floodwater gardens 
expanded, yet even here families did not become overly dependent on crops, as they still 
feared drought-induced shortages. As a result, they buffered against possible crop failure 
by continuing to devote some of their time and energy to older foraging and trading 
practices. The most dramatic and sweeping transformation appeared along the Gila and 
Salt Rivers where bands expanded and elaborated their irrigation networks and in the
Huckell, 14-5; Whittlesey, 138, 161, 163; Gilman, 8-9.
Chester W. Shaw and Ciolek-Torrello, 42; Eric Eugene Klucas and M. Kyle Woodson, "The Camp 
Creek Area," in From The D esert to the Mountains, ed. Rein Vanderpot, Eric Eugene Klucas, and 
Richard Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1999), 85.
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process reorganized their sociopolitical system to form Arizona’s first complex society/*
These myriad variations in regional subsistence practices derived mainly fi’om 
environmental constraints, yet they also emanated fi'om choices groups made as they 
evaluated the feasibility of adopting a more sedentary lifestyle. In the short-term these 
decisions were perfectly rational, however, as with most human actions, no matter how 
well planned, such choices can result in long-term, unforeseen consequences. This was 
certainly the case with the storage of surplus food.
While full-time farming assured families access to sufficient amounts o f essential 
nutrients when growing conditions were optimal, the erratic climate could easily force a 
hasty return to foraging when drought or floods decimated crops. Storing surplus food in 
flush years became a way to lessen the likelihood of this occurring. Although, the practice 
of dividing harvests into discrete units created new difficulties as it redirected food 
allocation away fi'om communal sharing and toward private household ownership and use. 
This then resulted in new and unsettling confrontations as communities attempted to 
adjust to this redefinition of property and potential unequal distribution of resoiuces.^’
Evidence of bands devising new rituals to manage these conflicts first appears in the 
archaeological record in approximately 700 C.E. with construction o f “great houses” in 
the south. These were larger than normal pithouses that lacked residential hearths and 
storage features. Later, large kivas, which were dug deeper into the ground, appeared in
Mark R. Hackbarth, A rchaeological and A rchival Investigation o f  the Las Canopas: The Esteban  
Park P roject, Pueblo Grande Museum Anthropological Papers, Forward by Todd W. Bostwick, no. 6 
(Phoenix: City o f  Phoenix Parks, Recreation, and Library Department, 1997), 7-9; Chester W. Shaw and 
Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 18; Klucas, 135.
Plog, 184-5; Gilman, 6-9, Chester W. Shaw and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 423; Richard Ciolek- 
Torrello, “Summary,” 271.
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the east, while platform mounds and ballcourts reminiscent of Mesoamerica sprang up in 
the central basins. In each instance these new, more public venues, signified that groups 
now found it necessary to perform community rituals to formalize obligations of 
reciprocity.^"
Of all the emerging sedentary groups, the Hohokam displayed the most elaboration in 
developing these new ceremonial structures. The probable reason for this is that by the 
700s C.E. the number o f families living along the Gila and Salt Rivers was beginning to 
reach the river’s carrying capacity, which created three significant, interrelated problems. 
First, canal residents had to find ways to equitably distribute finite supphes of land and 
water amongst themselves. Second, families had to develop a system for deflecting 
challenges fi’om outsiders seeking access to irrigation sites. And third, these now 
dependent farmers had to strengthen trading ties with people living in areas unaffected by 
local weather fluctuations as insurance against starvation in years with low-river flows.^'
To effectively respond to all three dilemmas, the Hohokam chose to subdivide their 
ritual system so as to address matters related to trade, conflict resolution, and alliance 
building in distinct settings. Most likely they built platform mounds for mediating conflicts 
among canal families, and Mesoamerican-hke ballcourts for soothing tensions with 
outsiders and greasing the wheels o f trade. From a pragmatic perspective, this duality 
gave the Hohokam more flexibility in managing their increasingly complex reality without
Plog, 186-7, 192-3; Fried, 144-5; Upman, “Decoupling,” 12; Gilman, 70-1.
Katherine A. Spielman, "Interaction Among Nonhierarchical Societies," in Farmers, Hunters, and  
Colonists: Interaction Between the Southwest and the Southern Plains, ed. Katherine A. Spielman 
(Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1991), 4-5; Glen E. Rice, "Warfare and M assing in the Salt and 
Gila Basins in Central Arizona," in D eadly Landscapes: Case Studies in Prehistoric Southwestern  
Warfare, ed. Glen E. Rice and Steven A. LaBlanc (Salt Lake City: The University o f  Utah Press, 2001), 
302-4; Fried, 61, 208-9; Hackbarth, Archival, 8-9.
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having to create a centralized, hierarchical political system to dictate resolutions/^
In general, platform mounds were located in residential areas, and served as arenas for 
conducting rituals to ensure adequate rainfall, to communicate with supernatural forces for 
other purposes, and to stress the necessity o f abiding by the rules of reciprocity.
Ballcourts, on the other hand, were located toward the edge of settlements and appear to 
have hosted games that involved both spectators and players. BaUgames would have 
allowed people lacking kinship ties to come together in a controlled setting to bond and 
dissipate the potential for violence through rigorous physical activity.^^
New ceremonial structures such as kivas and ballcourts would have also facilitated the 
advent o f new administrative positions. This is not to say that communities would have 
abandoned older forms of leadership, circumscribed as they were by context and 
consensus, but instead that these public venues would have broadened their conception of 
authority. To clarify, there is a distinction between authority and power. Positions of 
authority are most prevalent in societies just beginning to develop beyond egalitarian, 
familial bands. In this context, authority is the ability to influence behavior without the 
clout to mete out punishment for refiisal to cooperate. Power, on the other hand, usually 
appears in later stages o f socioeconomic development and includes the unchallenged right 
to reward or punish other community members. As Hohokam society was comprised of
James E. Odenkirk, An Interpretation O f The Hohokam Ballcourts In Arizona, 1984, 
< http://wwwlaafla.org/SportsLibrary/NASSH Proceedings/NPI984/NP1984g.pdf> (l5 September 2003); 
John P. Andrews and Todd Bostwick, D esert Farmers A t The River's Edge: The Hohokam A nd Pueblo  
Grande, 2000<,http://www.ci.phoenix.az.us/PLFEBLO/dfritual.html>(12 September 2003); Plog, 192-3.
”  Richard Eflfland and Barbara MacNider, Egalitarian Hierarchies?, 
<http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/dept/dlO/asb/lost tribes/Ieadership.html>(2 September 2003); Odenkirk, 
Internet; Plog, 192-4.
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leaders with authority, but not power, anyone seeking a higher ceremonial status would 
have had to still rely mainly on persuasion to gain and keep pubhc support/"
Traditionally, a person could attract followers by excelling in areas such as warfare, 
craft production, hunting, or medicine. To address additional complications that came 
with sedentary living, Arizona’s central communities most likely expanded this list to 
include the ability to fairly redistribute resources and the knack for circumventing crop 
failure by appeasing supernatural forces. Thus, ambitious individuals could now achieve a 
differentiation in status if they could keep family members and trading partners sufficiently 
supplied with resources. Or, a person could attain a position of prominence if they 
exhibited a penchant for combining the cycles o f the sun and the moon with patterns of 
floods and droughts into a predictive system that reliably produced healthy harvests. 
Obviously, anyone who exhibited skill in both areas stood the best chance of winning and 
maintaining community fidelity.^^
Of these two forms o f leadership, the more difficult, and thus tenuous, was that of 
weather prognosticator. To untangle the mysteries of nature, they would have had to 
engage in analytical processes to allow them to explain the unknown in terms of the 
known. Those who succeeded probably did so by working inductively, that is, reasoning 
that if events with clear cause and effect relationships occurred due to the actions of 
physical beings, then events lacking clear causes must be the result o f supernatural 
intervention. Likewise, if  humans could understand and influence the behavior o f  visible
David P. Bruan, "Selection and Evolution in Nonhierarchical Organization," in The Evolution o f  
Political Systems: Sociopolitics in Small-Scale Societies, ed. Steadman Upman, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 66-7; Lee, 237-9.
Effland and MacNider, Egalitarian H ierarchies, Internet.
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organism, then there ought to be mechanisms for doing the same with entities beyond 
human sight/"
Just explaining these relationships would not have been enough, however, as they also 
would have had to demonstrate a personal affinity for communicating with and placating 
these mystical forces. Unfortunately, the naturally unpredictable Southwestem climate 
probably turned many of their well-crafted predictions into lies, making it difficult for such 
men and women to maintain community allegiance. In the best case scenario, a 
discredited forecaster would have merely lost status, while in the worst case such a person 
could have been accused of witchcraft and ostracized from the group. Ultimately, this 
linking of Hohokam social authority to the Southwest’s mercurial climate, most likely 
introduced an element of instability into their political structures that eventually 
undermined their ability to maintain cohesion during times of crisis.^’
Evidence of leadership positions associated with socioeconomic authority also appears 
in Arizona’s archaeological record in the 700s C.E. The first signs emerged at a Hohokam 
village archaeologists call Snaketown. Located at the confluence of the Gila and Santa 
Cruz Rivers, the site’s founding families apparently began at this time to leverage their 
prime location into increased wealth and political authority.
Two complimentary advantages afforded them this opportunity. First, living between
Winifred Creamer, "The Origins o f  Centralization; Changing Features o f  Local and Regional 
Control During the Rio Grande Classic Period, AD 1325-1540," in From Leaders to Rulers, ed. Jonathan 
Haas (New York: Kluwer Academic/Penuim Publisher, 2001), 56; Stephen Plog, Ancient People o f  the 
American Southwest (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 54-5; Hinde, 53-5, 72.
Plog, Ancient Peoples, 178-9.
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perennial rivers, they had access to sufficient supplies of irrigation water to produce not 
only enough food for subsistence, but also handsome surpluses for trade. And second, 
due to the fact that all draft animals capable of hauling large loads had gone extinct in the 
Americas, people fi'om across the Southwest used the rivers as highways for moving bulky 
items. Thus, the junction of the Gila and Santa Cruz Rivers had the potential to become a 
trading hub for goods from as far away as the Pacific Ocean, the Great Plains, and 
Mesoamerica. Once they realized this, Snaketown’s elite apparently seized the chance to 
expand their influence. They did so by building two platform mounds for consolidating 
their lineage’s ability to produce surpluses, and two ballcourts for translating those 
surpluses into control over trade in foodstuffs and luxury items-such as macaw feathers, 
copper bells, and sea shells.^*
From approximately 800 to 1000 C.E. the roots of complex civilization slowly dug 
deeper in the central basins, while peoples in the surrounding areas lived in a manner that 
was less complicated, yet still reasonably comfortable. During this time the Medieval 
Warming Anomaly brought warmer and wetter weather to the Southwest, with increased 
rainfall in the lowlands and a longer frost-free growing season in the mountains. Such 
salubrious conditions apparently encouraged many families still subsisting by gathering and 
hunting to settle down. Evidence shows that some planted gardens near high altitude 
water sources, while others sowed crops on floodplains once considered too dry to farm.
' Lynn Thompson, "Hohokam Luxury Trade," in Center and Periphery: Com parative Studies in 
Archaeology, ed. Timothy C. Chapman (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 47-50; Ciolek-Torrello, 
“Summary,” 273; Joan S. Schneider and Jeffery H. Altshul, 7; Sharon F. Urban, "Shell Artifacts: Beads by 
the Hundreds," in E l M acayo: A Prehistoric Settlement in the Upper Santa Cruz River Valley, ed.
William L. Deaver and Carla R. Van West (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2001), 113; Jefferson Reid and 
Stephanie Whittlesey, The Archaeology o f  Ancient Arizona  (Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1997), 
88-9.
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As this trend accelerated, the density of settlements surrounding the Hohokam villages 
increased, creating a large pool o f new clients for their central exchange network/" In 
response, Snaketown’s leading families extended ballcourts out to these new desert 
settlements/"
On the Colorado Plateau Anasazi families were among those who optimistically moved 
out onto previously marginal floodplains. A willingness to take such a risk was apparently 
widespread as many new villages soon appeared. Their success is evident in the 
substantial masonry storehouses that sprang up during this period on the edges o f larger 
settlements. A similar chain o f events also unfolded to the south as MogoUon farmers 
began growing crops in basins that once had been too arid for cultivation, and at higher 
elevations where a longer frost-fi-ee growing season could now accommodate com."'
While neither the MogoUon nor the Anasazi appear to have been directly connected to 
the Hohokam trading network, the two peoples did forge closer economic ties through 
rituals conducted in newly buUt great kivas. As usual, life changed the least in the far
”  During the Medieval Climatic Anomaly, worldwide climates were generally warmer from 850 to 
1200. In the Southwest, the climate was also wetter. See Emi Ito Hu et al., 'Narmer Periods In Alaska  
A rea N ot Confined To M odern  r;mej,<ttp://www.eurekalert.org.pu release/2001 -08/uoia- 
wpi082001.php>(2 September 2003); Steven A. LeBlanc, "Warfare and Aggression in the El Morro 
Valley, N ew  Mexico," in D eadly Landscapes: Case Studies in Prehistoric Southwestern Warfare, ed. Glen 
E. Rice and Steven A. LeBlanc (Salt Lake City: The University o f  Utah Press, 2001), 45.
Fried, 69-79, 112-3, 117, sees such ritual structures as venues for creating affinal ties, and therefore 
establishing familial rules o f  reciprocity as the guide for trade between unrelated groups. See also Charles 
W. Shaw and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 46; Landis, 41; Carla R. Van West and William L. Deaver, 21; 
Gilman, 76-7; Hackbarth, Archival, 8-9.
John D  Grahame and Thomas D. Sisk, Canyons, Cultures A nd Environmental Change: An 
Introduction To The Land-Use H istory O f The Colorado Plateau  [Online Report, accessed 25 October 
2003]; available at http://www.cpluhna.nau.edu; Internet; Richard C. Lange, Prehistoric Land-Use 
Settlement o f  the M iddle Little Colorado River Valley: The Survey o f  Homolovi Ruins State Park,
Winslow, Arizona  (Tucson: Arizona State Museum, 1998), 6, 130-3.
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west, yet even there people sowed more crops and some northwestern bands moved into 
the Hohokam sphere o f influence to share in the central basins’ good fortune/^
As rivers swelled and watertables bubbled higher, more families settled into a farming 
lifestyle across the region. Over time, successive good harvests and less rigorous, 
sedentary living combined to enhance female fertility. As this increased the number of 
successful pregnancies, the size of the average family grew and the enlarged population 
accelerated the trend of bringing more land into cultivation. With more muscle power 
available, extended families now settled in areas that could only be inhabited through 
intense physical management, (i.e. building irrigation canals, terracing, constructing 
catchbasins). Ultimately, what this also meant was that Arizona’s families were 
subsidizing their increased population by destroying the wild buffer zones part-time 
farmers had relied on for generations. This was especially true when drought or floods 
had destroyed whole harvests."^
The favorable climatic regime not only encouraged bands living along the Santa Crtiz 
and San Pedro Rivers to expand crop production, but also may have given them a sense of 
economic independence that led these families to withdraw from the larger Hohokam
O f this, military scout, William R. Price, 230, wrote, "Remnants o f  c liff dwellings and pottery are 
observed fifteen or twenty m iles above the villages, which would indicate that at some previous date the 
water had come to the surface much higher up the canyon and that much more land was susceptible to 
cultivation."
A human fem ale’s reproductive system shuts down in times o f  nutritional stress; whether due to a 
lack o f  food in general, or to a lack o f  nutrients in particular. When a female has access to a balanced diet 
and is not expending more calories than she is ingesting, pregnancy hormones reach levels conducive to 
conception. See Amenorrhea: When Menstruation G oes Away, April 19 ,2004, 
<http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfin?objectid=55FAC47F-288C-4F89-83B1701B4B34CAE3>(20  
April 2003), Mayo Clinic. Improvement in nutrition and less need to travel also reduces pressure to keep 
family size small through infanticide. According to Robert McC. Netting, 22-3, once population levels 
reach a certain upper threshold, humans must abandon extensive subsistence strategies for more intensive 
methods, or face starvation. See also Paul R. Fish, 37; Susan K. Fish and Paul R. Fish, 133-8; Gilman. 
70-1, 76-7; Cavalli-Sforza, 98-9.
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ballcourt system. With starvation risks reduced, benefits gained by remaining connected 
to the central basins apparently were no longer worth the cost of continued 
subordination.""
At about the same time, the Hohokam began altering their ceremonial complex, most 
likely in response to these southem villages leaving their trading network, but also due to 
nomadic bands crowding closer to their canals. Those responsible for these changes began 
to shift community focus away fi'om ballcourts and toward platform mounds and as such, 
to the rituals that placated the forces o f nature and bound neighbors into peaceful 
alliances. It is possible that individuals connected to weather prediction spearheaded this 
sociopolitical transformation, as they saw an opportunity to leverage their supposed 
connection to the improved climate into real power. By encouraging the building of fewer 
ballcourts and more platform mounds they could drain influence away from the trading 
elite and bolster their own clout. Migration away from Snaketown and other Gila River 
settlements to Salt River sites may be evidence of this.""
The end of the Medieval Warming Anomaly in the Southwest began in roughly 1040 
C.E. when many parts of Arizona received only 25 percent of the average annual rainfall.
In these places inhabitants now faced a future that would once again include the ever­
present specters o f drought, floods, and famine. Having never lived when climatic 
variability was the rule instead of the exception, farmers now lacked experience in
Henry D. Wallace and William H. Doelle, "Classical Period Warfare in Southern Arizona," in 
D eadly Landscapes: Case Studies in Prehistoric Warfare, ed. Glen E. Rice and Steven A. LeBlanc (Salt 
Lake City: The University o f  Utah Press, 2001), 252-3.
Reid, 103-4; Rice, "Warfare and Massing," 319; Andrews and Bostwick, D esert Farmers-, 
Hackbarth, Archaeological, 8-9.
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dealing with these once again constant threats. The best response was to either diversify 
their subsistence base by cultivating drought-resistant wild plants, or to revert back 
completely to a gathering and hunting way of life. Those who lived where one or the 
other of these options was possible eventually did so; while the rest found themselves 
faced with a crisis.""
As circumstances offered this last group little time to contemplate their predicament, 
many adopted a variety of short-term solutions. Some bands migrated toward remaining 
lowland rivers. Once arrived, however, they often found established residents on the best 
sites who were more than willing to defend their positions. Others migrated vertically, 
hoping to take advantage of smaller, yet numerous mid-elevation springs and streams, yet 
they soon discovered that the climatic change had appreciably shortened the frost-fi'ee 
growing season. A few even exercised the option of last resort and began raiding existing 
riverine communities."^
Had the Hohokam ballcourt system still been functioning it may have served as a 
macroregional institution for ameliorating the growing disparity between the haves and the 
have-nots. By this time, however, most ballcourts had fellen into disuse. As over­
population and an inability to improve environmental conditions through greater labor 
outlays spread through the central basins, Hohokam families began to abandon the most 
intensely used ritual sites. With their departure the human bonds needed to maintain what
^  Center For Climate Assessment For The Southwest, "Reconstructing Past Climate In The 
Southwest," 2002,< http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/climas/research/paleoclimate/overview.html>(25 
September 2003); Dean, 13; Lange, 139-143; Kaldahl, 21-4; Rice, 328; Gilman, 79.
David R. W ilcox et al., "Antecedents to Perry Mesa: Early Pueblo III Defense Refuge System in 
West-Central Arizona," in D eadly Landscapes: Case Studies in Prehistoric Southwestern Warfare, ed. 
Glen E. Rice and Steven A. LeBlanc (Salt Lake City: The University o f  Utah Press, 2001), 123-4; Landis, 
42; Lange, 134-5, 145, 165.
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was left of the once elaborate Hohokam ceremonial complex simply faded away/*
As this sequence of events played out in the central basins, people in the Anasazi and 
MogoUon territories responded to the reappearance of environmental uncertainty with a 
flurry of innovative, cooperative measures. Discarding their tradition of low intensity, 
extensive, dry farming, families joined together to augment the region’s carrying capacity 
with muscle power. They built stone walls to catch floodwater and abate erosion; they 
dug ditches to channel runoff; and they fashioned reservoirs out o f natural sinks. Despite 
only achieving short-term success, their willingness to work cooperatively did buy them a 
Uttle more time.""
By 1180 C.E., famiUes throughout Arizona were coming to accept that life would 
once again be lived at the mercy o f unpredictable weather cycles. The Hohokam were the 
last to rebel against this reality with one final burst o f activity. They extended existing 
irrigation networks on the Salt and Gila Rivers and added new channels to remaining 
secondary streams. Founding families quickly seized control o f headgates on both old and 
new canals, however, leaving lower status bands and newcomers to vie for less desirable 
positions. Battles erupted when farmers Uving at the end of each canal discovered that 
water flow would often be insufficient to reach their fields. With no viable alternative to 
remaining, terminus groups apparently soUcited aUies to help them fight for greater shares 
of water. Most likely, they sought assistance from desert dwelling kin, yet it is also 
possible that they simply opened their doors to anyone willing to join the struggle. Over
Andrews and Bostwick, D esert Farmers', Hackbarth, Archival, 8-9.
According to Landis, 20, during periods o f  drought on the Colorado Plateau, plant life dies out 
allowing flood waters to wash away topsoil, which then begins a cycle o f  arroyo cutting. Grahame and 
Sisk, Internet; Dean, 15, 138; Ciolek-Torrello, “Sites,” 230; Netting, 26; Lange, 8-9, 164.
25
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
time this strategy proved so successful, that these settlements were able to translate their 
numerieal strength into greater political and ritual power. Large platform mounds 
appearing at each terminus site is evidence of this phenomenon.""
At the same time that Hohokam families were battling each other for water shares, 
desperate desert raiders began threatening their communities from the outside. Exhibiting 
an extraordinary gift for compartmentalization, canal residents reacted by suspending 
internal animosities whenever group survival was at stake."' This contextual-based, 
community cohesion allowed the Hohokam to field fighting forces large enough to drive 
hostile bands out of surrounding buffer zones and into distant, hilltop settlements. 
Cooperation also permitted the Hohokam to build defensive fortresses around terminus 
platform mounds. These sanctuaries had thick adobe walls that allowed club-wielding 
warriors and archers to strike invaders from above as well as provide protection for whole 
canal populations below.
Once warfare became an accepted strategy for coping with community problems, 
vulnerable Hohokam leaders appear to have expanded its use. Spanish explorers observed
Kaldahl, 20-9; Weaver, 95-6; Plog, Ancient, 140-3; Klucas and Woodson. 85.
A description o f  the Yavapai homeland in 1877 offers clues as to the source o f  their desperation, 
“We found Mr. AI Blackburn keeping a station at Soda Lake. A spring near the house furnished brackish 
water, but Mr. Blackburn hauled water in barrels from a much better spring o f  fresh, sweet water about 
three miles to the northwest. Around the station lay many dead cattle, each o f  them dried-up mummies. 
Near the house were three o f  them that looked as though they were but lying down to rest; but they had 
been dead for three years. So dry is the climate that the dead animals, i f  not eaten by coyotes or foxes, 
will soon desiccate and remain entire for years.” See Don Maguire, Gila M onsters and Red-E yed  
Rattlesnakes: Don M aguire's Arizona Trading Expeditions, J876-1879, ed. Gary Topping (Salt Lake City: 
The University o f  Utah Press, 1997), 40.
”  K.J. Schroeder, Archaeological Survey o f  Phoenix's Papago Park, M aricopa County, Arizona, 
Pueblo Grande Museum Technical Report, no. 96 (Phoenix: Parks, Recreation and Library Department, 
1996), 17, 33; Camillio C.C. Carr, "The Days o f  Em pire-Arizona, 1886-1869," in Eyewitness to the 
Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Book, 2001), 3-22; In 1877, 
merchant Don Maguire, 79, observed a terminus mound and noted that "Judging from the foundation and 
for some feet above the foundation, the walls were six feet thick."
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the results of this when they arrived in Arizona in the late seventeenth century and found 
the Pima Indians, who are the likely Hohokam deseendents, battling with Yuman groups 
on the Colorado River. The Spaniards explained that the Pimans were attacking their 
neighbors due to a belief that the Yumans had conjured a drought to torment them. The 
main beneficiaries o f such warfare clearly would have been Piman weather prognosticators 
who would have been able to deflect blame for the arid conditions away fi'om 
themselves.""
This change in war rationale highlights the problems a variety o f sedentary leaders 
faced once the favorable weather cycle came to an end. The return of climatic variability 
would have made it ahnost impossible for economic elites to maintain authority as much of 
their power derived fi'om their ability to create and distribute food surpluses. The 
situation was doubly hard for individuals who gained deference through their apparent 
knack for predicting and controlling the elements, as it would now appear that their 
powers had dissipated.""
Even in the less developed regions of the territory, this weakening of centralized 
authority would have had profound repercussions. In the short term it would have meant 
that life felt more uncertain and chaotic, while in the long term it would have meant that 
instead of a stable core society, corrçlete with all the accouterments of complex 
civilization, setting the pace of regional life, Arizona would revert back to a state of 
decentralized, insular villages in wliich people worried more about their next meal than 
dabbling in the arts, politics, or science.
”  Van West and Deaver, 23; Carr, 23. 
Rice, 319; Netting, 57; Bruan, 66-7.
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As conditions worsened, people living on the Colorado Plateau finally reached the 
point where problems related to environmental degradation—such as arroyo cutting and a 
dramatic drop in the watertable—forced them to view out migration as the only real 
solution. The first families to leave seem to have gone into the MogoUon Mountains to 
settle with extended kin, where they appear to have integrated into existing communities 
with little or no conflict. Those who departed later apparently gained entrance into non­
related MogoUon viUages by establishing themselves as craft speciaUsts. Evidence of this 
comes fi’om areas where Anasazi influences over material culture attained predominance, 
leading to the submergence of MogoUon forms.""
In addition to these short migrations, some Plateau and MogoUon famiUes also 
traveled into the southem basins. Their reception there, however, was less than 
welcoming as southem population levels were already high. There was, therefore, little 
room to accommodate these newcomers. Archaeological evidence indicates that the 
MogoUon migrants first joined with upland groups and then possibly began raiding riverine 
settlements. Fear, o f these raiders then apparently caused lowland bands to huddle closer 
together and fortify their perimeters. Real or threatened retaUation by these aggregate 
viUages, they appear to have caused upland residents to move to better-defended, upland 
sites.""
Dean, 81; Landis, 50; Lange, 165; Netting, 43, 58; Reid and Whittlesey, 198-9; Van West and 
Deaver, 23; Gilman, 77-9; Lange 165; Joanne M. Newcomb, "Silver Creek Settlement Pattern and 
Paleodemography," in Living On The Edge o f  The Rim: Excavations and Analysis o f  the Silver Creek  
Archaeological Research Project, 1993-1998, ed. Barbara J. M ills, Sarah A. Herr, and Scott Van Keurn 
(Tucson: Arizona State Museum, 1999), 21, 23-4, 50-1.
Ibid.
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This pattern of migration and aggregation repeated itself across Arizona as desperate 
families joined to either maintain access to scarce resources or to repel invaders. While 
aggregating was a rational short-term solution, as it offered more muscle power for 
extensive foraging and defending territory, in the long run it was, to say the least, 
counterproductive. Within only a few years, residents stripped the land surrounding their 
settlements o f vegetation, and onee the forage was gone, so too went the animals that the 
plants sustained. The result was a depletion of food and fuel that set the stage for a 
serious macroregional, economic collapse.""
Considering the state o f region, it should come as no surprise that by the end of the 
1100s G.E., warfare or its threat was ubiquitous throughout Arizona. Mutual suspicion, 
hoarding, and club-wielding warriors decimated the last ties of camaraderie. Where there 
was access to stable supplies o f water and food, groups fought amongst themselves for 
fair shares, while simultaneously banding together to repel outsiders. While on the dry 
peripheries, the less fortunate woke every morning wondering where their next meal 
would come from and whom they would have to fight to get it."*
With almost no other options remaining, an exodus from aggregate sites began in 
approximately 1330 C.E. Families living in the MogoUon Mountains either moved to 
Black Mesa to eventuaUy become the Hopi and Zuni cultures, or broke into smaU, familial
”  Netting, 26, 57; Dean, 147-8. O f the Anasazi, Dean writes, "Thus, in a span o f  about 40 years the 
activities o f  man produced a profound change in the vegetational pattern o f  Kiet Siel Canyon. It is 
possible that the denudation o f  the bottom lands hastened the destruction o f  the farmland by the Tsefi- 
Naha arroyo. In this regard the clearing o f  the land for agriculture may be compared to the present 
overgrazing by Navajo stock. While neither may be considered the sole cause o f  a cycle o f  erosion, both 
affect the rate at which the cutting proceeds by destroying the natural plant cover that would inhibit the 
destructive capabilities o f  runoff.” See also, Landis, 50; Newcomb, 50-1.
Ibid., 57.
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bands and resumed, as best they could, a mobile hunting and gathering lifestyle. In the 
Hohokam core, canal residents abandoned large sites, and they or later raiders even 
burned some villages, such as Casa Grande. Just to the south in the Santa Cruz and San 
Pedro basins, families resumed an older two-village strategy that divided labor and time 
among farming, gathering and hunting. Ironically, the people in the far west fared the best 
in terms of alterations to their lives as they had not destroyed their wild food reserves nor 
completely given up a mobile existence.""
Eventually, a sense o f equilibrium returned to Arizona and for approximately one hundred 
and fifty years residents survived by once again judiciously partaking of available 
resources and maximizing their subsistence options through a variety of strategies. With 
each passing year, the lessons o f sedentary living faded, making it likely that if a new wet 
cycle returned, Arizona’s people would remember too little to quickly return to settled 
life. In the end, no one will know exactly how they would have reacted, as they never got 
the opportunity. Before the climate could turn once again in their favor, strangers began 
arriving and set the region on a new historical course.
”  The Hohokam constructed homes o f  adobe, yet they also used timber for roofs and architectural 
support. See Newcomb, 50-2; Lange, 160-1; Landis, 50. Coronado’s men found the Mesa Pueblos easily  
defended; they had “a wall o f  large and small stones at the top, which they could roll down . . .  so that no 
army could possibly be strong enough to capture the village.” They also noted the Pueblos had “room to 
sow and store a large amount o f  com  and cisterns to collect snow and water.” See Pedro de Casteheda, 
“Account o f  the Expedition to Cibola which took place in the year 1540, in which all settlements, their 
ceremonies an customs are described,” in Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States, 1528-1843, 
ed. Frederick W. Hodge (New York: Barnes & Nobel, 1959), 321.
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CHAPTER 2
ATHAPASCANS AND IBERIANS 
For approximately one hundred and fifty years after climatic instability and resulting 
environmental degradation collapsed their sedentary economy, Arizona’s inhabitants 
practiced older forms of mobile subsistence strategies. If another wet cycle had appeared 
within two or even three generations, these peoples’ oral traditions would have retained 
enough memory of sedentism to recreate a new interconnected and complex community. 
This, however, did not happen and after the fourth and then fifth generations came and 
went, coping with aridity by judiciously partaking of a mix of wild and cultivated 
resources once again became the accepted way of life.'
The next phase in Arizona’s history began almost imperceptibly, and for approximately 
two hundred years brought subtle, albeit important, changes to local life. While not as 
dramatic as steady increases in rainfall or the emergence of economic elites, who conduct 
network-building rituals in ballcourts, in cumulative form, the incremental alterations of 
this period set the stage for future, more dramatic events.
The forces that influenced Arizona from approximately 1400 to 1600 C. E., were not 
native to the Southwest, but instead appeared in the form of newcomers who arrived in
‘ Carole L. Crumley, "Communication, Holism and the Evolution o f  Sociopolitical Complexity," in 
From Leaders To Riders, ed. Jonathan Haas (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001), 32; 
Hackbarth 10, Reid, 201, 220, 247,257.
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the region from distant lands. The first of these groups were Athapascans who emerged 
from the north after traveling along the Rocky Mountain corridors that connected what is 
today Alaska with the Northern Plains, the Great Basin, and the Colorado Plateau."
Compared to other indigenous groups, the Athapascans arrived in the Americas late, in 
fact almost at the end of the Pleistocene in 10,000 B.C.E. At first they settled along the 
arctic coast, but they did not stay long as the Inuits, the last Asian group to journey across 
the Bering land bridge, established camps nearby and eventually pushed the Athapascans 
inland. With other bands monopolizing alternate sites, the Athapascans continue to move 
eastward until they reached the interior mountains. These families soon found, however, 
that their new home lacked abundant sources of food. To sustain themselves, they had to 
develop new subsistence strategies that placed a greater emphasis on mobility and 
opportunism. This meant that for most o f the year they lived in small, loosely organized 
bands that could respond quickly whenever an opportunity to exploit a resource arose."
Throughout North America, many other aboriginal groups also stressed economic 
flexibility over specialization and social fluidity over strict hierarchical organization, but 
the Athapascans stood out due to the degree with which they made these two attributes 
the focal points of their culture. For instance, instead of tracing descent matrilineally to
 ^ John W. Ives, A Theory O f  Northern Athapascan Prehistory (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1990), 
15-7, 27-9; Richard Perry, Western Apache H eritage (Austin: University o f  Texas Press, 1991), 59-61.
 ^ James W. Vanstone, Athapaskan Adaptations: Hunters and Fishermen o f  the Subarctic Forests 
(Chicago: Field Museum, 1974), 3-5, 32, 38; J. Loring Haskell, Southern Athapascan Migration, A.D. 
200-1750  (Tsaile, AZ: Navajo Community College Press, 1987), 11-2; Ives, 30-1, 36, 60-1; Perry, 12-5.
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be assured of familial lineage, the Athapascans appear to have been tracing descent 
bilaterally to enlarge ties of reciprocity and assure multiple venues of assistance in times of 
crisis. Athapascan families also invested individual members with a unique sense of 
autonomy that encouraged them to follow their instincts; even if such behavior produced 
long absences or the permanent fracturing a group. And lastly, the archaeological record 
and ethnographies show that the Athapascans freely adopted technological innovations 
from allies and strangers alike, regardless o f the transforming effect this had on their 
beliefs and practices."
In about 1500 B.C.E., this lifeway encouraged some Athapascan families to move 
southward when cold and wet weather returned after a long warming cycle. Under this 
climatic regime, the arctic zone expanded to cover over one thousand miles, which 
allowed a number o f Athapascan bands to follow the caribou herds into the Arctic Taiga, 
on the edge of the Northern Plains. A few continued on and crossed the ecological 
boundary to exploit plains foods such as wild plums and grapes, prickly pears and 
sunflowers, pronghorn antelope and elk, and even big wooly bison."
Beginning in 100 C.E., when a new warming trend began, many arctic-adapted species 
and Plains animals seeking cool summer habitats began moving to the north. Given a 
choice between retreating with their cold weather resources or maintaining their southem 
position, a fair number o f Athapascans chose to permanently leave their homeland behind . 
By 200 C.E. some had migrated into the Wyoming Basin where they
 ^Haskell, 44-49.
’ Vanstone, 15, Ives, 56; Bradford Fagan, The G reat Journey: The Peopling o f  Ancient Am erica  
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), 192-203.
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encountered Caddoans, and possibly, Algonquian speakers. Over time, through 
intermarriage and trade aUiances, these peoples coalesced into new cultural entity 
paleoanthropologists call the Avonlea Complex."
Despite their socioeconomic success, a combination of environmental continuity and a 
sense of individual autonomy compelled many Avonlea Athapascans to keep moving 
southward. Some of these bands settled for a time along the front range of the Rocky 
Mountains, where they mingled and merged with Plains Kiowa-Taonans and desert- 
dwelling Uto-Aztecans. This new mixing created the Fremont Culture, which blended the 
three subsistence systems into economic strategies that allowed practitioners to move 
easily between ecological zones. As such, Fremont families spread into Rocky Mountain 
valleys and the Great Basin, while others migrated into the northern reaches o f present- 
day Arizona and New Mexico."
In the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, these Fremont families faced the same 
drought-induced subsistence crisis that had forced Arizona’s inhabitants to revert back to 
simpler economic strategies. In response, they also adopted less intense subsistence 
practices and began to abandon depleted sites. Searching for greener pastures, some 
traveled onto the high plains of Wyoming and Colorado, while others migrated onto the 
Colorado Plateau. The first group became the founders o f the Jicarilla Apaches, while the
‘’Canadian Museum o f  Civilization, A H istory O f The N ative Peoples O f  Canada, 1000 BC To 500  
AD, Late Plains Culture, 21 March 2003,< http://www.civilization.cayarcheo.hnpc/npvol27e.html>(21 
September 2003); Yuri Berezkin, Traditional High Cultures: Legend M otif Distribution On A Continental 
Scale, 2002,<http://www.traditionalhighcultures.com/AthabaskanMigrations.htm>(4 September 2003); 
Dale Welde, The Avonlea Period: Timeframe, Environment, And Subsistence, 27 September 2001, 
<bttp://www.ucalgary.ca/~walde/avonlea.btml>(l 1 September 2003).
’ S. Cassells, The A rchaeology o f  Colorado  (Boulder, CO: Johnson Books, 1990), 25-8.
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second eventually splintered to become the Navajo and the Mescalero and Gila Apaches/ 
On the Colorado Plateau, low precipitation made it very difficult for even small bands 
to survive. Wide-ranging animals capable of digesting tough scrub offered access to 
protein, but the plant life consisted mostly of vegetation that humans cannot digest. These 
Athapascans possessed horticultural skills, yet the Plateau lacked sufficient water for fiill- 
time farming, and the frost-free season in the wetter uplands was too short for com. It 
soon became evident that newly arrived bands would either have to keep moving or devise 
strategies to overcome these ecological obstacles. Those who stayed created a system in 
which they procured a surplus of reliable animal-based commodities and then forged 
trading alliances with neighbors possessing complimentary carbohydrates.^
The closest and most attractive trading partners for these Fremont Athapascans were 
the Puebloan farmers in northern New Mexico. Luckily for them, the Puebloans were 
willing to exchange their surpluses of carbohydrate-rich crops and sundry manufactured 
wares (e.g. blankets and pottery) for the Athapascans’ hunted goods (e.g. protein, fat, and 
furs). As the relationship developed, the Athapascans became the more dependent 
partner, as they had more difficulty finding alternative sources of carbohydrates than the 
Puebloans did finding other sources o f meat. Consequently, it is likely that the 
Athapascans engaged in some level of intimidation to ensure that the Puebloans would 
continue to trade. In fact, had this process continued without disruption, the Athapascans
* Jarod Jennings, Prehistory o f  Utah and the Eastern G reat Basin, University o f  Utah 
Anthropological Papers, no. 98 (Provo, UT: University o f  Utah Press, 1978), 55-62; Ives, 47.
’ Spielman, 13.
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would have, in their own self-interest, asserted a certain level of control over the larger, 
regional system of trade. Before this could happen, however, a second group of outsiders 
appeared in the form of a black explorer and a Spanish padre.'”
Once the Spanish established a colonial base in the Caribbean late in the fifteenth 
century, eager Spaniards gazed out fi-om the islands, impatient to seize gold and win glory. 
These would-be conquistadores were well-versed in the arts of conquest as they were the 
product o f a culture that had just recently emerged fi'om centuries o f repeated conquests. 
Moving westward across the Mediterranean, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Visigoths, and 
Moorish Berbers had all in various degrees and at various times laid claim to Iberia and 
her people." After some invasions, lengthy occupations had even followed, with each 
leaving an indelible mark on the Hispanic psyche. As such, by the time Iberians set out on 
their own colonizing adventures, they carried with them a well-tested blueprint for 
achieving hegemony in distant lands.
Coronado's chronicler, Castefteda, 333, 363, wrote that the Plains Apaches "do not have any 
crockery [ceramic vessels] in this region. They do not make gourds, nor sow corn, nor eat bread, but 
instead [eat] raw meat— or only h alf cooked— or fruit." This is slightly m isleading as these Indians were 
not surviving on meat alone. As Casteheda unknowingly corrects him self when he writes, "When they 
open the belly o f  a cow [sic], they squeeze out the chewed grass and drink the juice that remains behind . .  
." As humans cannot digest cellulous grasses due to a lack o f  stomach enzymes, the Apaches were taking 
advantage o f  pre-digested plant material. See also Katherine Spielman, "Coercion or Cooperation? 
Plains-Pueblo Interaction in the Protohistoric Period," in Hunters, Farmers, and Colonists: Interaction  
Between the Southwest and the Southern Plains, ed. Katherine Spielman (Tucson: University o f  Arizona 
Press, 1991), 36-7.
"  For an overview o f  the Phoenicians in Spain, see M arilyn R. Bierling, ed.. The Phoenicians in 
Spain: An A rchaeological Review o f  the Eighth-Sixth Centuries in B.C.E  (W inona Lake, IN; E isenbrouns, 
2000). For an overview o f  the Greek, Rom an, and V isigothic influences in Spain, see M argarits D ia- 
A ndrue and Simon Keay, ed.. The Archaeology o f  Iberia: The Dynamics o f  Change (New York:
Routledge Books, 1997). And for Muslim influences in Spain, see Thomas F. Manchester, From Muslim  
Fortress to Christian Castle: Social and Cultural Change in Spain  (New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1995).
For the latest view o f  Roman influence on Spanish colonizing practices, see David A. Lupher, 
Romans in a New World: C lassical M odels in Sixteenth-Century Spanish Am erica  (Ann Arbor: University 
o f  Michigan Press, 2003).
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One of the main benefits Iberians gained from their long contact with more complex 
societies was an accelerated acquisition of technology. Once innovations bom of 
sedentary living emerged in the Fertile Crescent, they spread westward along the 
Mediterranean through both conquest and trade. The Iberians, therefore, gained access to 
new ideas and tools without having to undergo the slow, organic processes o f innovation. 
Instead, revolutionary breakthroughs in areas such as transportation and communication 
simply arrived on their shores."
Iberians also benefited fi’om their prolonged contact with people who looked and 
behaved differently, in that it taught them to view the world as a place inhabited by people 
with differing phenotypes, customs, languages, and religious beliefs. Because of this, 
Iberians could imagine a reality that was far more diverse than anything the Amerindians 
could envision, as New World topography tended to isolate social groups. Ultimately, this 
made Iberians more resistant to the element o f surprise and therefore to uncertainty during 
instances o f first contact with strangers."
Proof that tliis more expansive worldview assisted the Iberians during encounters with 
new societies comes fi-om Heman Cortés’ conquest of the Aztecs. After arriving in the 
Caribbean, the Spanish spent twenty-seven years gathering information about the New
For literacy as technology and it influence on cultural development, see Walter J. Ong, Orality and  
Literacy: The Technologizing o f  the Word (London: Methuen, 1982); Idem, Rhetoric, Romance, and  
Technology: Studies in the Interaction o f  Expression and Culture (Ithaca; Cornell, 1971).
Columbus discovered the Caribbean in October o f  1492. For the next twenty years, the Spanish 
and later the Portuguese conducted reconnaissance along the eastern coast o f  Mesoamerica. Trips inland 
were brief and often resulted in the death o f  some explorers, yet enough data was collected, that when 
Cortés and his men landed at what is now Vera Cruz, they were not shocked to discover people who 
looked and behaved differently. For a soldier’s perspective on the events that led to the fall o f  the Aztecs, 
see Bernal Diaz, The Conquest o f  New Spain, trans. J.M. Cohen (New York: The Penguin Group, 1963). 
For Cortes’ views, see Hern an Cortés, Letters From M exico, trans. ed. Anthony Pegden, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986).
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World. They expected to find unfamiliar societies and understood that reliable information 
would assist in maintaining the upper hand at the moment of contact. This meant that 
Cortés already had an abundance of reconnaissance data even before he set sail in 1519. 
Once on the mainland, he then took another two years to study Mesoamerican society 
before finally attacking the Mexican capital of Tenochtitlan in November of 1521.
Already being familiar with other foreign polities, Cortés, therefore, knew that there had 
to be head of state somewhere along with a political apparatus for wielding power. His 
challenge was to leam as much about them as need be to plot an appropriate course of 
action."
It was Monteczuma who faced the larger dilemma as he had no fi-ame of reference 
from within which to evaluate these bearded, light-skinned men fi-om across the sea.
Thus, his response to the Spaniards was fatally inappropriate, as he hesitated, then 
assumed the strangers were gods. This assessment was unfortunate, as it gave 
Monteczuma few options for saving himself and his people. Thus, Cortés’ challenge was 
not the actual takeover o f Tenochtitlan, as he had leeway with which to plot each of his 
moves. Instead, his utmost problem was the illegitimacy of his actions, as he lacked a 
royal contract authorizing him to lead the conquest."
Ibid.
The Spanish discovery and occupation o f  the New World was done under the aegis o f  the Kingdom  
o f  Castile; not Spain as a nation, as that did not exist yet. Neither Isabella nor Ferdinand wanted to 
expend their own money to finance wars or exploration, so they relied on the medieval practice o f  “hiring” 
men to undertake such adventures at their own expense. This made better economic sense; successful 
conquerors received confirmation o f  legitimacy and a share o f  the treasure. See Henry Kamen, Empire: 
How Spain Becam e a World Power, 1492-1763 (New York, HaperColiins, 2003), 27, 36, 98, 100.
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This is why, once Cortés had Tenochtitlan under his command, he quickly appealed to 
the Crown for post hoc authorization. After the King recognized the conqueror’s fa it 
acompli, Cortés then began dividing the spoils o f war among his men. Those who 
participated garnered what they believed would be permanent shares of the Mexican 
empire, while those who arrived on the heels o f conquest were left to watch with envy and 
dream of setting out on their own grand adventures."
In Spain, the young Castilian King Carlos I, also known as Holy Roman Emperor 
Charles V, was plotting to increase his control over various European and Mediterranean 
principalities when news of Cortés’ triumph arrived. Imbued with a millennialistic spirit 
and suffering fi'om a chronically empty war chest, Charles and his advisors choose to view 
the New World and its vast wealth as a holy subsidy for spreading the Catholic faith.'*
While pleased with his new colony, Charles, as were his grandparents, was jealous of 
power and understood the threat Cortés posed if not sufficiently hobbled. As a result, 
there was no doubt in the King’s mind that Cortés’ wings needed to be clipped, what was 
not clear was how to do so without discouraging other warriors fi-om expending their own 
wealth and health to expand Spain’s empire. This quandary, more than almost anything 
else, explains the many contradictions in Spam’s colonial policies. On the one hand, the 
Crown wanted to encourage bold and often brutal action in the name of conquest; while 
on the other hand, it wanted to circumscribe individual initiative and discourage 
conquistadors from siphoning off tribute and wielding undue power over new vassals.'”
Kam en, Empire 105, 117.
'* Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, "The Improbable Empire," in Spain: An History, ed. Raymond Carr 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 69-77; Kamen, Empire, 45.
Kamen, Empire, 79-80.
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The first expedition to the north of Tenochtitlan occurred as a result o f one of the 
Crown’s plans to weaken Cortes’ power. In 1528, the King sought to undermine Cortés 
by making one of his chief political rivals, Nuno de Guzman, the lead judge of New 
Spain’s Audiencia.^” Charles authorized Guzman to use his office to expose any 
malfeasance on the conquistador’s part. In the end, however, it was Guzman who soon 
found himself in trouble with the Crown. Charged with corruption and abuse of power, in 
1529, Guzman made a hasty exit fi-om Mexico City to escape fi-om the authorities. To 
divert attention fi-om his misdeeds, Guzman announced a plan to seek new Indian 
civilizations, quickly gathered eager recruits, and headed north along Mesoamerica’s 
western coast. Employing slash and bum tactics, the Guzman’s expedition found little real 
wealth to seize; this, however, did not stop them fi-om confiscating caches of Indian food 
and exploiting Indian labor under slave-like conditions.^'
At the same time Guzman was wrecking havoc on the west coast, on the east coast, 
the survivors of Panfilo de Narvaez’s expedition to Florida—Alvar Nunez Cabeza de 
Vaca, Alonzo del Castillo Maldonado, André Dorantes de Carrança, and Dorantes’ slave 
Estévan—were making their way back inland across the southern plains. The four men 
spent almost eight years wandering westward, including a brief pass through southeastern 
Arizona, before eventually making their way to Spanish-held territory. Chronicles o f the 
journey described native groups suffering fi-om drought and living in a state of nutritional 
privation, as weU as the Spaniards’ acts o f  slaving, rape, and other forms o f  terrorism.
A Spanish court with judicial and legislative powers.
John L. Kessel 1, Spain in the Southwest: A Narrative H istory o f  Colonial New Mexico, Arizona, 
Texas, and California  (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma, 2002), 22-6; Castefleda, 285-7; Kamen, Empire, 
118.
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Upon their return, however, it was not vivid stories of Indian life that intrigued captivated 
audiences, but instead Vaca’s tale o f seven distant cities filled with thousands of vassals 
and buildings constructed of shimmering gold/^
Upon hearing this tale, impatient men wasted no time lobbying representatives o f the 
Crown for the honor of bringing these cities into the Spanish domain. In the end, it fell to 
Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza to decide who would go. As he was under orders to keep 
greedy and reckless behavior in check, Mendoza selected Fray Marcos de Niza to 
accompany the slave Estévan on a reconnaissance mission to the north. In his directive to 
Marcos, the Viceroy instructed him to:
Take much care to observe the people who are there, if they be many or few, 
and if they are scattered or live in communities; [note] the quality and fertility [of the 
soil], the temperature of the country, the trees and plants and domestic and feral 
animals which may be there, the nature o f the ground whether rough or level; the 
rivers, if they are large or small, and the minerals and metals which are there; and of 
the things o f which you may be able to send or bring specimens, bring them or send 
them, in order that his majesty may be advised of everything.^^
And then, in almost the last paragraph, the Viceroy remembered his duty to the Pope and 
his Christian God, “And if God, Our Lord, is so served that you find some large 
settlement, where it appears to you there is a good situation to establish a monastery and 
to send fiiars to undertake the conversion, you shall send information by Indians or return 
yourself to Culiacan.” "^
^  Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, “The Journey o f  the Vaca Party,” in The Native Am erican and  
Spanish Colonial Experience in the G reater Southwest, ed. Basil C. Hendric and Carroll L. Riley, vol. 1, 
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1992), 10-1, 30-1; The Journey o f  Coronado, 1540-1542, trans. George 
Parker Winship (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishers, 1990), 20-1; Castefteda, 285-7.
Cleve Hall en beck. The Journey o f  Fray M arcos de Niza  (Dallas: Southern Methodist University 
Press, 1987), 10-11; Castefteda, 288.
Hallenbeck, 12.
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On his journey. Fray Marcos dutifully made note of land suited for farming and 
ranching, native material culture, and any details pertaining to the northern cities. In fact, 
his report is filled with so much enthusiasm that it reads more like a fable than a truthful 
account. The padre did experience some difficulty along the way, yet it was not with the 
Indians. Instead, it was his companion Estévan, who apparently never declined an offer of 
female companionship, which raised Marcos’ ire. Eventually, the missionary decided to be 
rid of him and sent Estévan ahead to prepare the Indians o f Cibola for his arrival. In the 
end, Estévan’s arrogance was his undoing; for when he arrived at the Zuni Pueblo, his 
antics offended the Zuni to such an extent that they killed him.^  ^ Unaware of this, Marcos 
continued moving slowly northward until he reached the Sobaipuri Indians living along the 
San Pedro River in southeastern Arizona.^”
After resting, he traveled for four more days and encountered the Sobaipuri’s trading 
partners, the Southeastern Yavapai. As Marcos found no people living in-between, neither 
the Chiricahua nor Western bands of the Athapascan Apaches must have yet arrived in the 
region that would later become their home.^’ As he traveled toward Zuni Pueblo, Marcos 
encountered one of the Indian guides that had gone ahead with Estévan; the fi-antic man 
told him of Estévan’ ftite. Once Marcos heard this, he was too fiightened to make contact 
with the Zuni, so, instead, he observed their mesa-top pueblo firom a safe distance and
W inship, 102; Castefteda, 288-9.
These people were most likely the descendants o f  the Anasazi and Mogollon peoples.
This shows that the Yavapai were far to the southeast o f  the northwestern boundary o f  the Colorado 
Plateau; offering compelling evidence that it very well could have been the Yavapai, and not the Apaches, 
who latter attacked Euro-American settlers in the central valleys.
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then retreated back to Mexico City/*
For some unknown reason, upon his return. Fray Marcos exaggerated the details of 
what he had seen. Not only did he relate his true discoveries of prime sites for future 
Spanish settlements and missions, but he also fabricated a story in which he made contact 
with residents of one of the seven cities of gold. His glowing report set Mexico City 
abuzz and Viceroy Mendoza wasted no time selecting his friend Francisco Vazquez de 
Coronado to bring Cibola and the other northern cities into the Spanish realm. As was 
typical, Coronado agreed to self-finance his expedition and to abide by restrictions to limit 
abusive behavior among his men.^”
Before the Coronado expedition departed. Viceroy Mendoza ordered Hernando de 
Alarcon to take the baggage Coronado’s men could not carry and to sail as far as possible 
up the west coast. He was to then wait to rendezvous with the explorers. Once these 
logistical matters were settled, and after much pomp and circumstance, Coronado and his 
band o f over one thousand men headed north. The Spaniards, however, were not 
adequately prepared to deal with the desert’s dearth of wild food and water. As such, it 
was not long before many men became desperate for fresh provisions. Consequently, the 
expedition paid little notice to the resource-poor Indian settlements in Arizona and instead 
marched directly to the comparatively well-off Pueblo villages. Coronado’s chronicler 
even called the barren region between the San Pedro River and the Zuni Pueblo “the
Albert H. Schroeder, Apache Indians, A  Garland Series: American Ethnohistory, Indians o f  the 
Southwest, ed. David Agee Horr, vol. IV and V (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 2-3; Winship, 32- 
6 .
Castefteda, 291.
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wilderness.’" ”
Following an initial confrontation, the Puebloans willingly offered the newcomers gifts 
o f com and blankets as well as access to their wells. When the Spaniards continued to 
demand more, however, conflict erupted. From the Spanish point of view, the relationship 
fell imder the purview of conquest, so there was no need to take Indian concerns into 
consideration. Thus, when one village finally refused to continue “trading,” it reaped a 
whirlwind as outraged Spaniards set it ablaze. Once the Indians learned the consequences 
o f resisting, the Spaniards then declared the territory sufficiently “pacified.” At this point. 
Captain Juan GaUego left: with Fray Marcos to report their findings to the Viceroy as “he 
did not think it was safe for him [Marcos] to stay in Cibola, seeing that his report had 
turned out to be entirely false . .
After establishing themselves at the Zuni Pueblo, Coronado ordered his men to 
reconnoiter the region. Some marched westward imtil they met the Yuman-speaking 
Maricopa Indians at the junction of the Gila and Colorado Rivers. They were much 
impressed by the natives’ size and physical strength. As the Spaniards traveled further 
down the Colorado, they found a tree marked “Alarcon reached this place.” Curious, they 
dug at the bottom of the tree and found letters explaining that Alarcon had traveled as far 
up the Colorado as possible, waited, ran low on provisions, and turned back. At the same 
these men were reading Alarcon’s letter, other explorers, under the command of Don
Castefleda, 294-6, 299.
Juan Jaramillio, “Narrative Given by Captain Juan Jaramillio o f  his journey to the New Land o f  
Spain and to the Discovery o f  Cibola under General Francisco Vazquez Coronado,” in The Native 
Am erican and Spanish Colonial Experience in the G reater Southwest, ed. David H. Snow, vol. I (New  
York: Garland Publishing, 1992), 119; Castefleda, 301-2, 317.
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Garcia Lopez de Cardenas, were staring awestruck over the edge of the Grand Canyon. 
They marveled at its sheer beauty and were baffled as to how the Indians navigated down 
the canyon’s jagged walls to reach the bottom. What impressed both parties the most, 
however, was the Colorado Plateau’s utter lack of water for miles on end. One Indian 
guide told the Spaniards, “there was no water within three or four days, [and] when they 
traveled] across this region themselves they [took] with them women loaded with water 
in gourds . .
Hoping to rid themselves o f the Spanish parasites, the Puebloans directed Coronado 
farther to the north. They assured him that if he and his men would only leave, they would 
discover immeasurable wealth just beyond the horizon. Coronado eventually took the 
bait, but only left with a small party o f men to search for the rich city the Indians called 
Grand Quivara. Along the way, Coronado’s chronicler noted their first meeting with a 
group of Athapascans. He described them as expert buffalo himters who “lived like 
Arabs” and utilized every part o f their giant prey.^  ^ Had Coronado arrived later he would 
have discovered these plains hunters moving south to trade meat for com at the Pueblos, 
but as this was their prime-hunting season, the Athapascans were miles away. When 
Quivara tumed out to be nothing more than a diversion, Coronado garroted his native 
guide and retumed to the Pueblos."
Coronado and his men had similar difficulty finding water near the Pueblos in New M exico, "they 
left the camping place and mid-day o f  the third day, when they saw some snow-covered mountains, 
toward which they went in search o f  water, neither the Spanish nor the horses nor the servants [had] 
drank anything." As cited in Castefteda, 303, 309-10, 14.
This demonstrates the Iberians much broader frame o f  reference when it came to categorizing 
unknown ethnic groups.
"  Castefteda, 330, 337; Jaramillio, 100; Ives, 47.
45
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Disillusioned, Coronado left New Mexico in 1542, marching again across the 
“wilderness” of eastern Arizona. His exposure o f Fray Marco’s ruse dampened further 
interest in the far north for about forty years. In New Mexico, however, the chaos 
wrought by the Spaniards surely lingered. With some of their villages burned and their 
stores of com and blankets depleted, the Puebloans would have had little to exchange 
when the Athapascans arrived. This may have sparked a conflict and created a more 
adversarial relationship between the two peoples. If this were the case, it would explain 
why the next Spanish explorers foimd the Athapascans attacking the Pueblos to force 
them to relinquish their caches fbod.^^
The next Spanish exploring party of consequence for Arizona reached the Southwest 
in 1598. Under the direction of Don Juan de Ofiate, this second group of conquerors also 
arrived weary and short of food. At first Ofiate sought to replenish their supplies by 
soliciting Indian hospitality, yet as soon as he met resistance, the Conquistador resorted to 
a level of violence reminiscent of Coronado’s abuse.
Unbeknownst to Ofiate, at the time, the Puebloans were under increasing subsistence 
pressure due to an extended period of aridity, which had begun in the 1560s. Since about 
1400 the region had been in a less-then-average precipitation cycle, but the years 1579 
to 1585 were extremely dry. This overall drought phase lasted until 1790, which meant 
that for approximately one hundred years, there was not enough rain to adequately sustain
Castefleda, 375; Spielman, "Coercion," 36-7.
36 "Yg The Viceroy o f  New Spain, Asking him to Issue an Order for the Safeguarding o f  the Road o f  
the Province o f  Nueva, Galacia,” in H istorical Documents Relating to New M exico Nueva Vizcaya, and  
Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles Wilson Hackett, vol. I (Washington D C.: Carnegie Institution 
o f  Washington, 1923), 105.
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agriculture or livestock." The proximate effect of this climatic regime was repeated failed 
harvests and resulting famine, while the remote effect was the desertification of the 
Colorado Plateau and the migration o f some of the Athapascans southward into west- 
central New Mexico."
The first Athapasean families to arrive, whom the Spanish called the Gila Apaches, 
initially congregated in New Mexico’s Distal Mountains. They then slowly moved closer 
to the Pueblos and eventually settled in the foothills flanking the Rio Grande River. At the 
same time, a second Athapascan group, whom the Spanish called the Navajo, emerged 
fi-om the northwest and settled in the upper San Juan River drainage. These two 
Athapascan populations shared linguistic and cultural traits, yet they had been separated 
for so long that neither now viewed other as a familial ally.^”
The Athapascan newcomers found ample space to settle, as they had migrated into the 
territory previous Anasazi and Mogollon residents had abandoned in the 1330s. Ecological 
conditions had not demonstrably improved since that time, so there was no resident
Elinore M. Barrett, Conquest and Catastrophe: Changing Rio Grande Pueblo Settlement Patterns 
in the Sixteenth Century (Albuquerque: University o f  New M exico Press, 2002), 16-7, 166-7; Marquis o f  
Cadereyta, "Autos which came with letters from the Viceroy, Dated February 28, 1639, concerning 
whether the division o f  bishoprics on N ew  M exico and doctrinas o f  Sinaloa would be advisable," in 
H istorical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. 
Charles Wilson Hackett, vol. 1 (Washington D C.: Carnegie Institution o f  Washington, 1923), 98-99. In 
1639, Don Francisco de Bustamente wrote to his superiors that the Indians in New M exico faced a harsh 
life: “They commonly suffer from famines, during which entire pueblos are in the habit o f  going to the 
mountains to look for game and roots in order not to perish.” See Don Francisco de Bustamente, 
"Opinion o f  Don Francisco de Bustamente, M exico, February 18, 1639," in H istorical Documents 
Relating to  New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles Wilson Hackett 
(Washington D C.: Carnegie Institution in Washington, 1923), 121.
These bands had moved into northwest New M exico during the last dry cycle, then remained and 
did not migrate onto the Plains. It is most likely that they were living on the Colorado Plateau in small 
horticultural communities when the Spanish arrived. When they began to feel the effects o f  the drought, 
they migrated toward the Pueblos, attracted by their surplus agricultural, as well as by Spanish livestock. 
See Ives, 47; Haskell, 82-3.
”  Haskell, 82-3; Ives, 48-9.
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population to resist them. The Athapascans’ biggest concern, then, was not trespassing on 
claimed territory, but instead how to find enough food and water to survive. Fortunately, 
as ingenuity was a hallmark of their culture, this was not an overwhelming obstacle. Over 
time, they adapted through various combinations o f horticulture, extensive exploitation of 
wild foods, and maintaining trade connections with the Puebloans through both 
negotiation and intimidation.'*”
The one long-term variable that the Athapascans had not encountered before was the 
effects Europeans had on the native economy. The Spaniards regularly consumed more 
than their share o f food, water, and fiiel, and their fi-ee-roaming cattle and sheep scoured 
unfenced Indian fields and decimated desert-adapted plants. Faced with such 
overwhelming competition for resources, the Athapascans eventually had to look for new 
sources o f subsistence to augment the Puebloans crops and Mother Nature’s bounty.'"
Considering the circumstances, it did not take long for them to shift their focus to 
Spanish livestock and advanced trade goods. Initial contacts indicate that the Athapascans 
would have willingly entered into peaceful trading relations had the opportunity been 
offered. But with Spanish soldiers and administrative officials seeking wealth through 
Indian slaving, early close encounters with Spaniards often cost Athapascans their fi-eedom 
and sometimes even their lives. Consequently, instead of a nonviolent, reciprocating 
relationship developing, one based instead on kidnapping, raiding, and retaliatory warfare
David H. Snow, "Upland Prehistoric M aize Agriculture in the Eastern Rio Grande and Its 
Peripheries," in Farmers, Hunters, Colonists: Interactions Between the Southwest and the Southern 
Plains, ed. Katherine Spielman (Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1991), 76-7, 88; Homer Aschmann, 
"Terrain and Ecological Conditions in the Western Apache Range," in Apache Indians V: A Study o f  
Western Apache Indians, I846-I886 , (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 4-5, 20-1.
Conrad J. Bahre, A Legacy o f  Change: Historic Human Impact on Vegetation in the Arizona  
Borderlands (Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1991), 55-7.
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emerged/^
Disappointed by the prospects o f his quasi-feadal estate, in 1604 Onate decided to 
venture out and explore beyond New Mexico’s boundaries. In doing so, he also fulfilled 
his pledge to the Crown to seek a passage from New Mexico to California. Such a route 
was important to the Spanish government for three reasons. First, little was actually 
known about California and the King wanted an efficient and safe route for reconnaissance 
teams to travel. Second, the Monarch wanted access to the region’s natural ports to better 
establish trade with China. And third, officials still hoped that a clear passage would be 
found connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific so as to eliminate the need to explore on 
horseback.'*^
To reach California, Onate’s party decided to travel across Arizona’s northern plateau. 
On their way, they vigilantly scouted for signs o f mineral deposits. As such, upon meeting 
a group of Indians, most likely Yavapais, in what is now the San Francisco Mountains, 
Onate inquired about the colored ores the Indians had painted on their bodies. When an 
older man explained how they extracted the ores from a spot in the mountains, Onate 
asked to be taken to the place. He later wrote that the mine “had a very large dump, 
where there were many and apparently very good ores. .
"Autos which came with letters from the Viceroy, February 28, 1639, and Petition o f  Don Francisco 
de la Mora, February 4, 1639," in H istorical Documents Relating to New Mexico. Nueva Vizcaya, and  
Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles Wilson Hackett (Washington D  C.: Carnegie Institution 
Washington, 1923), 98-99; Franeisco Martinez de Baez, "Petition o f  Francisco Martinez de Baeza; 
Mexico, February 12, 1639," idem, 119; Schroeder, 40-1.
“Don Juan de Ofiate From N ew  Mexico, 1599” in Spanish Exploration in the Southwest, 1542- 
1706, Original Narratives o f  Early American History Series, ed. Herbert Eugene Bolton (New York: 
Barnes & Noble, 1908), 219-20.
Ibid., 244.
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Similar to Fray Marcos, Onate apparently did not encounter Apache bands living along 
the Mogollon Rim. Exactly when the Athapascans, known as the Western Apaches, 
arrived in eastern Arizona is uncertain, as scholars are still not sure o f their location prior 
to migrating into the Southwest. While there is no doubt that the Athapascans who 
moved into Arizona’s southeastern Chiricahua Mountains originated with the Gila 
Apaches in New Mexico, researchers disagree over whether the Western Apaches were 
also an extension of the Gila bands, or if they were subgroup of Fremont Athapascans 
from somewhere on the Colorado Plateau. The first theory rests mainly on the proximate 
location o f the Güa Apaches to the Western bands, while confidence in the second 
hypothesis derives from the fact that the Gila and Western Apaches maintained a buffer 
zone between them and rarely worked in concerted effort.”^
In 1606, King Philip III received incrirninating reports regarding Onate’s behavior and 
by 1609 he decided to recall the errant administrator and disband the colony. The 
Franciscans, who had accompanied Onate, made no effort to hide their disdain for him. 
They did not, however, want the entire New Mexican settlement dissolved, especially their 
missions. To avoid such an event, in reports to the Viceroy the missionaries devoted as 
much ink to inflating the number o f Indians they had supposedly baptized as they did to 
vüüying Onate. Repeatedly, they stressed the Viceroy’s duty to protect their newly saved 
Cliristian souls. Such tactics ultimately paid off when the King changed course and 
ordered that New Mexico become a royal colony, maintained at the Crown’s expense. He 
then removed Onate and appointed a new governor; he also dispatched fifteen friars and
Perry, 148-50. Most information on the Apaches comes from ethnographies complied since the 
end o f  the nineteenth century and from linguistic analysis. This is the case due to the Apaches being a 
mobile group who left behind little material that remained in the archaeological record.
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fifty married soldiers to populate the colony. In 1610, Onate rode out of New Mexico in 
disgrace, leaving behind a settlement that would now be a permanent burden to both the 
royal treasury and the Southwestern economy.'*”
Between 1623 and 1650 two closely spaced, severe droughts cast a pall across the 
Southwest. Apache raiders reacted by looking for ways to improve their subsistence 
success; they found that assistance in the skill o f horse riding. This new mode of 
transportation made them much more efficient at capturing Puebloan com as well as 
Spanish cattle and sheep. In addition, a string of incompetent governors disrupted New 
Mexican life even further through their despicable acts o f slaving; which in many cases 
resulted in a firestorm of Indian retaliatory attacks. With deteriorating climatic conditions, 
increasing Apache raids, and abusive government officials, by 1640 the Southwest was in 
dire straights. Starving men and women lined the roads begging for food, while Spanish 
and Pueblo men indiscriminately killed Apache raiders, who responded by striking back 
just as mthlessly.'*’
For about twenty years after 1640 circumstances normalized somewhat, but drought 
retumed again in 1666 and once more threw the region into turmoil until 1671. This latest
46 The Viceroy Concerning the Current State o f  Affairs in New M exico Report o f  the Province,” 
in H istorical Documents Relating to  New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. 
Charles Wilson Hackett (Washington D  C.: Carnegie Institution Washington, 1923), 199-201.
In 1661, Captain Andres Hurtado wrote, ". . . very great. Sir, has been the covetousness o f  the 
governors o f  this kingdom, wherein they have, under color o f  chastising the neighboring enemy, made 
opportunity to send, apparently in the service o f  his Majesty, squadrons o f  men to capture the heathen 
Indian to send them to the camp and mines in El Parral to sell (as governor Don Bernardo Lopez de 
Mendizabal is doing at present, he having sent there more than seventy Indian men and women to be 
sold).” See "Declaration o f  Captain Andres Hurtado, Santa Fe, September, 1661," in H istorical 
Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to  1773, ed. Charles 
Wilson Hackett (Washington D  C.: Carnegie Institution Washington, 1923), 186-7; Elinore M. Barrett, 
166-68.
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drying cycle was especially devastating as it culminated in a great famine, a deadly 
epidemic, and a barrage of Apache raiding. In 1669 Fray Juan Bernal wrote that:
For three years no crops have been harvested. In the past year, 1668, a great 
many Indians perished of hunger, lying dead along the roads, in the ravines, and in 
their huts. There were pueblos (as instance Humanas) where more than four 
hundred and fifty died o f hunger. The same calamity still prevails, for, because of 
lack of money, there is not a fanega of com or of wheat in the whole kingdom, so 
that for two years the food of Spaniards, men and women alike, has been the hides 
of cattle, which they had in their houses.'**
In 1679 Fray Francisco de Ayte wrote o f the worsening conditions:
In the year 1670 there was a very great famine in those provinces, which 
compelled the Spanish inhabitants and the Indians alike to eat the hides that they had 
and the straps of the carts, preparing them for food by soaking and washing them 
and toasting them in the fire with maize, and boiling them with herbs and roots. By 
this means almost half the people in the said provinces escaped [starvation]. There 
followed the next year o f 1671 a great pestilence, which also carried off many 
people and cattle; and shortly thereafter, in the year 1672, the hostile Apaches who 
were then at peace rebelled and rose up, and the said province was totally sacked 
and robbed by their attacks and outrages, especially all the cattle and sheep, of 
which it had previously been very productive. They killed, stole, and carried off aU 
except a few small flocks o f sheep which were saved by the vigilance and care of 
some of the inhabitants, who guarded them by day at great risk of losing their lives, 
as some did, and locked them up at night in the patios and corrals of their own 
houses.'*”
This last quote also highlights the breakdown in understanding that occurred between 
the Apaches and the Spanish. In the same breath that Spanish officials bemoaned their 
own drought-induced suffering, they also castigated the Apaches for saving themselves 
fi’om a similar fate. Apparently, the Spaniards were unable to see beyond their own self-
‘ Autos sent by Fray Juan Bernal, Commissary o f  the Holy Office o f  New M exico, against Bernardo 
Gruber, January 19, 1667-September 1, 1670. Folio 373,” Historical Documents Relating to New M exico, 
Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles Wilson Hackett, vol. 1 (Washington D C.: 
Carnegie Institution Washington, 1923), 271-2.
“Petition o f  Father Fray Francisco de Ayeta; M exico, May 10, 1679,” Historical Documents 
Relating to N ew  M exico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles Wilson Hackett, 
vol. 1 (Washington, D C.: Carnegie Institution Washington, 1923), 296-303.
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interest to grasp that the Apaches were also resorting to extreme, short-term solutions to 
stave off starvation. Unfortimately, this lack of empathy was not a limited phenomenon. 
On the contrary, it became the official Spanish response to Apache survival strategies 
throughout the colonial era.
By 1680, members of the Pueblo communities had also reached a breaking point and 
lashed out at the Spaniards with a nativist movement that resulted in the 1680 Pueblo 
Revolt. Guided by the spiritual leader Pope, the Puebloans drove the Spaniards south into 
Chihuahua to cleanse their land o f their corrupting influence. Not all Puebloans 
participated, though, as some families rejected the violence and sought refuge among the 
Navajo. For their part, the Navajo willingly absorbed these refugees along with their 
useful agricultural and technological know-how.””
As they watched the Spaniards fleeing, some Gila Apaches followed to maintain access 
to Spanish material goods as well as to seize any opportunity to strike at their enemy.”' 
When they arrived in northern Chihuahua, these Apache bands mixed with local Uto- 
Aztecan and Coahulican Indians who practiced similar subsistence strategies.”^  Since they
"Hearing o f  June 16, 1663, Requested by Mendizabla; Folio 24. Against Don Diego de Penalosa, 
Governor o f  New Mexico," in H istorical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and  
Approaches Thereto, to 1773^ ed. Charles Wilson Hackett (Washington D C.: Carnegie Institution 
Washington, 1923), 271-2; “Don Antonio de Otermin Letter from the Governor and Captain-General, 
From New M exico,” Hackett, 327; “Don Francisco Cuervo y Valdez to his Majesty; Santa Fe, October 18, 
1706,” in H istorical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to  
1773, ed. Charles Wilson Hackett (Washington D C.: Carnegie Institution Washington, 1923), 383; 
Kessell, 117.
”  “The Viceroy o f  New Spain Makes report to your Majesty o f  the general uprising o f the Indians o f  the 
provinces o f  New M exico, and o f  the measures and means which have been adopted for their restoration 
with M exico, February 28, 1681,” in H istorical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and  
Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles Wilson Hackett (Washington D C.: Carnegie Institution 
Washington, 1923), 339-41.
It is likely that these were the descendents o f  the Casas Grandes society; the larger complex 
civilization from which the Hohokam traded for luxury goods. Apparently the Casas Grandes people met 
a fate similar to that o f  the Hohokam, as they too burned many o f  their buildings.
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shared much in common, it did not take long for a new hybrid, Apachean subgroup to 
appear. The Spanish identified this and aU future blended Athapascan entities as Apachean 
due to familiar linguistic markers. The reason for this was that the Athapascans were 
willing to radically change almost any part o f their culture except their language. By 
1686, this mixed tribe had begun raiding not only New Mexico’s exiled settlers, but also 
Spanish and Indian communities throughout what is now northern Sonora and 
Chihuahua.””
Northern towns lived at the mercy of Apache raiders for ten years before Spanish
officials established presidios at Janos and Fronteras. Located in northeastern Sonora,
these forts were strategically placed to obstruct Apache travel routes through the Sierra
Madre Occidental. For a time this strategy worked, but it was not long before the raiders
discovered new passages. Effectively blocking the Apaches was not the only difficulty
Spanish soldiers faced. Once found and engaged in battle, the soldiers then had to deal
with the Apache’s guerilla tactics that tumed many of the Spaniard’s military strengths
into weaknesses.”'* Frustrated by this, in a letter written sometime in the 1720s, leading
citizens of Sonora petitioned the King to save them fi'om the cunning Apache villains:
The Apache enemies visit us boldly and repeatedly, to our confusion and damage. 
All for lack of a commanding officer [at Fronteras] with determination, interest, 
and valor. Every retaliation against them, made by [the current] lieutenant, is 
brief and without speed, range, or organization. In all of this. Sir, we petition 
Your Lordship, who is endowed with royal civility and compassion for our
”  Haskell, 78-9, 83-4, 104-5.
Donald T. Garate, Juan Bautista de Anza  (Reno: University o f  Nevada Press, 2003), 56-7, 80, 82-3; 
Perry, 134-5; Fay Jackson Smith, Captain o f  the Phantom Presidio: A H istory o f  the Presidio o f  
Fronteras, Sonora, New Spain, 1686-1735, Including the Inspection by Brigadier Pedro de Rivera, 1726 
(Spokane: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1993), 100-107.
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Miseries, to deign provide, with appropriate foresight, that which calamités
55require. .
One way the Indians were able to negate the Spaniard’s military advantages was by 
living in mountainous areas almost too rugged for horses to reach. Because of this, the 
Spaniards often had to stop their pursuit at the mountains and in doing so lost their 
offensive advantage. Even when they caught the Indians in the open, the Apaches 
outwitted their Spanish adversaries through the art of strategic retreat. If not assured an 
offensive edge or if the Apaches were woeftiUy outnumbered, they would disperse in as 
many directions as men running. This strategy was so simple, yet effective, that it 
tormented generations o f Spanish and then later American soldiers.””
Almost in admiration. Captain of the Fronteras Presidio, Juan Bautista de Anza wrote 
of his Apache adversaries, “They live in small, dispersed rancherias, both in their own 
lands and when they seek the protection o f the impregnable mountain ranges along the 
fi-ontier. Hence, if they are found, only a small number are seized.. .  .And even though 
they always inhabit regions of great strategic advantage they attain even greater advantage 
by taking positions where they cannot be attacked, in land as vast as the ocean, with their 
backs secure.””’
Frontier conditions eventually deteriorated to the point that Brigadier General Pedro 
de Rivera in 1720 reported that:
"Undated and Unsigned Letter," in Juan Bautista de Anza, (Reno: University ofN evada Press, 
2003), 91.
See Jack S. W illiams and Robert L. Hoover, Arms o f  the Apacheria: A Comparison o f  Apachean  
and Spanish Fighting Techniques in the Latter 18th Century, Occasional Publications in Mesoamerican 
Anthropology, no. 25 (Greeley: University o f  Northern Colorado Press, 1983). See also Garate, 117-18.
”  Garate, 117.
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Because of the carelessness of the army of this presidio [Fronteras] and because 
of the cleverness o f the enemy of these frontiers, they [the Apaches] have committed 
continuous thefts o f horses, cattle, and other things, penetrating right to the presidio 
itself. It is ordered that the armies be continually on the move, with one squadron 
inspecting and visiting the passes and areas where the enemy comes, for this presidio 
was built for that reason.”*
By the time the General completed his assessment of Fronteras, however, many of the 
southern Apache bands had already shifted their focus to the north and west. Pushed by 
Spanish soldiers and their Opata Indian auxiliaries, and pulled by a herd of Spanish cattle 
that had recently arrived at the outpost of San Xavier del Bac, some Apaches had 
reoriented toward southern Arizona. The man responsible for the cattle’s appearance was 
a Jesuit priest whose life’s goal was to prove that one could reach the missions of 
California through the dangerous territory of the Apaches. His name was Padre Eusebio 
Kino.””
When Kino first arrived in Mexico City in 1681, his superiors assigned him as 
cosmographer for what was believed to be the island of California. It was his duty to 
improve the viability of the province by seeking a less costly, overland travel route for 
delivering supplies to its residents. Sailing cargo ships north against the current from 
Mexico proper was time consuming, and thus expensive. Officials, therefore, hoped that 
Kino would discover an easily accessible, land route running peu-allel to the east coast of 
the supposed island. With single-minded determination, then. Kino made it his life’s work 
to bring California into the Christian fold. His zeal alone was insufficient, however, as
”* Brigadier General Pedro de Rivera, Regulation fo r  the Fronteras Presidio, quoted in Donald 
Garate, Juan Bautista de Anza  (Reno: University O fN evada Press, 2003), 114. See also Smith, 122-23.
Ernest J. Burrus, Kino and Manje: Explorers o f  Sonora and Arizona, Their Vision o f  the Future, A 
Study o f  Their Expeditions and Plans with an Appendix o f  Thirty Documents (St. Louis: Jesuit Historical 
Institute, 1971), 96.
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politics in Spain had stagnated at the end of the seventeenth century. Suffering from a 
lack of administrative attention. Kino received little financial support.””
In 1686, noticed arrived advising Kino to abandon his assignment and turn his 
attention instead to establishing missions in the Pimeria Alta—central and southern 
Arizona. No one had yet attempted this feat and many argued that it was impossible as 
the upper Pimans were as belligerent as their Apache allies. Kino paid no heed to these 
naysayers as he viewed his new assignment as a vehicle for completing his unfinished route 
to California. With this in mind, he first made contact with the Yuman Indians along the 
lower Colorado River. He then worked his way up the Gila River and briefly visited the 
Maricopas, before traveling to the junction of the Santa Cruz River, where he met with the 
Pimans. In each village, residents welcomed Kino, along with his enticing trade goods.
By leaving more than he took, Kino consistently received parting invitations to soon 
return.”'
Not only was the Padre a master o f persuasion among the Indians, he was even more 
convincing with his superiors. To revive support for his Arizona-as-route-to-Califomia 
plans, he filled his reports with bucolic images of fertile Piman farms that would be the 
“support o f the scantier and more sterile lands o f California.””’ With each letter, his 
words wooed important men along the chain o f command until they reached the King’s 
council. It was there that Kino finally received authorization and financing for a series of 
exploratory ventures to California. Sure that a route existed. Kino never doubted his
^  Idem, ed.. Kino Reports to  Headquarters: Correspondence o f  Eusebio F. Kino, S.J., From New  
Spain to Rome (Rome, Italy: Jesuit Historical Institute, 1954).
61 Burrus, Kino Reports, 34-5; idem. Kino and Manje, 152.
"  Kessell, 135.
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ability to prove it. Before he could demonstrate this, however, the one variable in life he 
could not control put an end to his quest: just after midnight on March 15, 1711, Father 
Eusebio Kino passed fi'om this world into the next.””
During Kino’s tenure, fear of Apache raiders had kept Spanish slavers and land- 
hungry haciendados at bay. As a result, Arizona’s Indians had had little direct contact 
with these more brutal colonial figures. What they knew of the Spanish had arrived in the 
form of a kindly Padre on horseback who brought them wonderful new plants and 
amazing new trade goods. When Kino died, the Indians of the Pimaria-Alta were openly 
solicitous for more Spaniards to come to live among them. When this did not happen, the 
Indians worried that they would be forgotten.”‘*
Kino’s death not only halted plans for integrating Arizona into a larger transportation 
and communication network, but it also marked a larger transition in Spanish colonial 
administration. In 1700, the last heir in the Spanish Hapsburg line, sickly Charles II, 
mercifully died and a new French Bourbon monarch, Philip V, assumed the throne. With 
Philip V’s coronation came not only a change in royal lineage, but more importantly, a 
change in administrative philosophy. The Hapsburgs had created a hetrarchical 
administrative structure in which power was shared with the nobility and subdivided into 
overlapping governing units.”” The purpose of this had been to bind Spain’s aristocracy to 
the Castilian Crown as well as create political friction to discourage collusion between
“  Burrus, Kino and Manje, 142-3; Kessell, 135.
Edward Spicer, Cycles o f  Conquest: The Impact o f  Spain, M exico and the United States on The 
Indians o f  the Southwest, 1533-1960  (Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1962), 130-2.
Crumely, 26-7.
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administrators in differing parts of the bureaucracy.””
When Philip V arrived in Spain, he found the old Hapsburg system in a state of 
disarray. Not from abuses from below, but from corruption at the top. Despite the vast 
wealth pouring out of its New World colonies, Spain had become a debtor nation to 
pursue an aggressive imperial strategy. Consequently, by the end of the sixteenth century, 
receipts from its empire did not even cover half of the country’s expenditures. Unwilling 
to modernize the country’s tax system, Philip II had begun to raise revenue by selling 
bureaucratic offices to the highest bidder. Eventually, even American-bom Spaniards 
could purchase a government position. Because of this, by the seventeenth century, 
money, not loyalty, had become the requisite for serving in the colonial administration. 
Yet, even with this new source of income, Philip II still could not cover Spain’s expenses. 
In fact, before he died, Spain had to declare bankruptcy four times.”’ Philip V, therefore 
had much to accomplish if Spain was to continue as a world power.
^  John Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808  (Oxford: The Camelot Press, 1989), 2-4.
Henry Kamen, "The Vicissitudes o f  World Power," in Spain: A History, ed. Raymond Carr 
(Oxford: University o f  Oxford Press, 2000), 158-9; idem, Empire, 439-43; Linda K. Salvucci, Richard J. 
Salvucci, Aslan Cohen, "The Politics o f  Protection: Interpreting Commercial Policy in the Late Bourbon 
and Early National Mexico," in The Political Econom y o f  Spanish Am erica in the Age o f  Revolution, 
1750-1850, ed. Kenneth J. Andrien and Lyman L. Johnson (Albuquerque: University o f  New M exico 
Press, 1994), 95-8.
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CHAPTER 3
SPANISH BOURBONS AND THE MEXICAN INTERIM 
In 1700, the Spanish government entered an era of transition when the last of the 
Hapsburgs, Charles II, died without an heir. Before dying, he selected Philip of Anjou, the 
grandson of the French monarch Louis XIV and of Bourbon lineage, to succeed him to the 
throne. Upon ascension, Philip discovered he had inherited a treasury in arrears and a 
bureaucracy plagued by inefificiency and corruption. The new King and his counselors had 
little time to address these matters, however, as they quickly faced a war o f succession 
with the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs. To raise sufficient funds for Spain’s defense, 
Philip V initiated a process of administrative centralization, which included streamlining or 
abandoning imperial programs in Europe and the colonies. For Spanish citizens, soldiers, 
bureaucrats, and missionaries, the Crown’s new emphasis on fi-ugality often translated into 
reassignments, transfers, or rejections o f new settlements, presidios, and missions.'
Due to this more austere state o f affairs, after Padre Kino died in 1711, it was almost 
another thirty years before ecclesiastical officials had enough funding to dispatch Padres
‘ Henry Kamen, The War o f  Succession in Spain, 1700-15  (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1969), 15-9; idem. Empire, 464-6; Salvucci et al., 95-8; Richard L. Garner and Spiro E. Stefanou, 
Economic Growth and Change in Bourbon M exico  (Gainesville, FL: University Press o f  Florida, 1993), 
109-110, 141-45, 154-7; John S. Leiby, Colonial Bureaucrats and the Mexican Economy: Growth o f  a 
Patrim onial State, 1763-1821  (New York: P. Lang, 1986), 167-71.
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Keller, GrashofFer, and Segesser to the Pimaria-Alta. When these missionaries arrived in 
1732, they began where Kino had left off in bringing salvation to the Piman and Yuman 
Indians/ Compared to Kino, however, these new men of God were not as successful at 
drawing favorable attention to southern Arizona. Parsimonious royal pohcies and a lack 
of diplomatic acumen hindered their efforts. Even local officials, paid little heed to the 
padres’ pleas, as they were focused instead on Apache attacks against missions, mines, 
and ranches.^
In addition to these “depredations,”  ^officials were also concerned over reports o f a 
new Apache group, living north o f the Chiricahua Mountains, who were blocking travel 
routes between the Sobaipuris on the San Pedro River and Zuni Pueblo in New Mexico. 
Officials labeled this new group the Western Apaches, yet administrators usually referred 
to them as individual bands with names that matched their geographic location, such as the 
White Mountain or Warm Springs Apaches. These Apaches apparently migrated south 
into the Mogollon Mountains fi'om near Black Mesa sometime after 1695/
In 1736, Padre Keller was shocked when he visited the Maricopas, who were a branch 
of the Yuman Indians that had migrated up the Gila River toward the Hohokam villages 
during the dry years in the fourteenth century. Upon his arrival, he discovered their homes 
destroyed and blamed the Western Apaches for the dastardly deed. His conclusion was
 ^ Garate, 122.
 ^ Kessell, Spain, 229-30.
Spanish officials labeled anything Indians did that they found unpleasant, inconvenient, or criminal 
as a depredation. This would include killing feral cattle and sheep, or retaliating for the killing o f  a 
relative.
’ Schroeder, Apache Indians, 41-3; Max L. Moorehead, The Apache Frontier: Jacobo Ugarte and  
Spanish-Indian Relations in Northern New Spain, 1769-1791 (Norman : University o f  Oklahoma Press, 
1968), 170-1.
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
incorrect; however, as Western Apache territory never extended that far west. Instead, it 
is more likely that the Maricopas’ long-time adversaries the Yavapais, who lived just to 
the north on the Gila River, were responsible party. Once done, though, such 
misassignment of guilt to the Western Apaches for conflict in western Arizona became 
common and continued throughout the colonial period and into the Mexican and 
American eras.^
In 1752, to protect northern mines and settlements from Apache raiders, Spanish 
officials established a number of new, strategically located presidios, including one at the 
community of San Xavier Tubac, in south-central Arizona. The plan was to place soldiers 
closer to Apache base camps to block raids at their point of origin, as well as more 
effectively mete out punishment.^
With Tubac now an important frontier buffer, the post needed a commander o f above- 
average competence. It would require a leader who understood the larger forces that 
influenced human behavior and was honest enough to see the flaws in his own society.
This man was Juan Bautista de Anza, Jr., the son of the Fronteras Presidio commander of 
the same name. As his father, the younger Anza had a reputation as both a ruthless Indian 
fighter and as an evenhanded pragmatist.*
Once in command of San Xavier del Tubac, it did not take Anza long to determine 
that Spanish pohcing policies were ineffective at achieving and maintaining peace. He first
* Albert H. Schroeder, Yavapai Indians: A Study o f  Yavapai H istory (New York: Garland Publishing, 
1974), 1-3.
’ Kieran McCarty, D esert Documentary: The Spanish Years, 1767-1821, Historical Monograph, no. 4 
(Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1976), 68.
* Ibid., 1-8; Kessell, Spain, 254-5; John L. Kessell, M ission o f  Sorrows: Jesuit Guevavi and the 
Pimans, 1691-1767  (Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1970), 38-9.
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realized this in February of 1766, after he had led his men in pursuit of Apache raiders and 
captured 40 warriors. Anza divided the Apaches among his men to sell as slaves in 
payment for their service; they then set out to return to Tubac. Upon the soldiers’ arrival, 
however, they were shocked to discover that in their absence other Apaches had driven off 
the cattle from a nearby settlement. Anza’s anger over being duped eventually turned into 
reflection and he slowly began to view his role as more than just a soldier. In fact, he 
became determined to create a more rational plan for maintaining peace on the frontier.^
During Anza’s tenure, some of the Jesuit missionaries ministering to Arizona’s Indians 
also came to see the Apaches differently. In other parts o f northern Mexico, the Jesuits 
were despised for protecting the Indians from abuse by a sundry list of Spanish 
predators—mine owners, haciendados, administrative officials. Up until the late 
eighteenth century, however, the Jesuits, as other frontier residents, looked upon the 
Apaches as little more than animals, undeserving of sanctuary. As with Anza, though, 
once they began living in close contact with the Apaches the padres began to change their 
minds.'"
Initially sure that the Indians’ behavior derived from sin, men such as Fray Pfefferkom 
came to realize that their actions actually were driven by their inabihty to find enough to 
eat. Pfefferkom wrote, “They [the Apaches] Plant [sic] maize, beans, gourds, and other 
things in different places, especially in valleys, but in such small quantities that they would 
starve if they were not able to  supplement their meager harvest with the products of
’ Schroeder, Apache Indians, 50-1; Kessell, M ission  o f  Sorrow 173-4.
Henry F. Dobyns, LANCE, HO!: Containment o f  the Western Apaches by the Royal Spanish 
Garrison A t Tucson (Lima, Peru; Editorial Estudios Andinos, 1964), 3-5.
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robbery and theft.”’ ' Living himself in southern Arizona, he now understood just how 
difficult it was to survive in the desert. Had King Carlos III not expelled the Society of 
Jesus fi'om the Americas in 1767, a combination of Anza’s military pragmatism and 
missionary compassion may have produced system that better balanced Spanish and Indian 
interests, and thus reduced conflict.'^
Following the Jesuit expulsion, colonial bureaucrats asked for and received royal 
consent to secularize the missions o f northern Mexico. This meant that Catholic Indians 
would receive individual ownership of mission lands, which made it easier for 
unscrupulous speculators to take native property and then force the Indians to work as 
low-paid laborers. Just as the Crown authorized this, Franciscan missionaries, who had 
taken over the Jesuit’s territory, were beginning to realize the true magnitude of their 
undertaking.’^
By 1797, Friar Bringas submitted a report that asked not only for a suspension of the 
decision to secularize Sonora’s northern missions, but also permission to Open new 
missions in the many areas that had never been adequately proselytized. The request never 
received royal approval, but it highlighted the region’s continued unsettled, frontier 
nature, which was due in large part to continued Apache agitation for access to 
resources.
" Aschmann, 4-5.
John L. Kessell, Friars, Soldiers, and Reformers: Hispanic Arizona and the Sonoran Mission 
Frontier, 1767-1856  (Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1976), 59-60.
" Ibid, 182-190.
D iego Miguel Bringas, Friar Bringas Reports to the King, ed. David S. Matson and Bernard 
Fontana (Tucson: University o f  Arizona Pres, 1977), 44-53.
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Spanish administrators had not turned a deaf ear to men such as Friar Bringas; they 
had simply come to view reports from Arizona not as policy suggestions but instead as 
tools for uncovering and exploiting Apache weaknesses. In fact, it was this use of 
intelligence that underlay a major shift in frontier policy at this time. A shift that moved 
away from an offensive posture and toward one seeking to create among the Apaches a 
state o f chronic economic dependence and cultural demoralization. The man who initiated 
this pragmatic, yet morally dubious Indian policy, was a minor nobleman named Jose de 
Galvez.'^
Galvez arrived in New Spain in 1765 under orders to reform and centralize Spain’s 
civil and military bureaucracy. Exuding the Bourbon affinity for fastidiousness, Galvez 
tightened lax tax collection, extended royal monopolies, and implemented a new plan for 
eliminating waste in colonial expenditures. He was especially determined to bring order to 
the turbulent north. To achieve this, he called for a thorough inspection that would include 
recommendations for administrative restructuring. Not one to delegate hghtly, Galvez 
sent the trusted Marquis de Rubf with instructions to visit key northern settlements, to 
note any irregularities, and to finally synthesize the sum of his observations into a coherent 
plan for improved efficiency.’"
Rubf arrived in Tubac in December o f 1766. He was pleased with the settlement and 
praised Captain Anza for creating such an efficient state o f affairs. He must not, however, 
have truly understood just how much Tubac’s success was the result o f  Anza’s
Kessell, Friars, 259-60.
Alfred Barnaby Thomas ed., Teodoro de Croix A nd The Northern Frontier o f  New Spain, 1776- 
1783, trans. Alfred Barnaby Thomas (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1968), 62-67.
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management, because in his final report, Rubf recommended that the town’s civilian 
residents be left to care for themselves, while the presidio moved north to the more 
vulnerable settlement o f San Augustine de Tucson. This decision made good economic 
sense as it deployed resources more efficiently, yet it was bad policy as it ultimately 
removed a necessary, meditating institution fi’om a highly contested region.'^
Upon completion o f his two-year, fect-finding mission, Rubf concluded that the 
Apache threat was surmountable if the Crown would authorize a systematic re­
deployment o f presidios along a corridor stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of 
California. Combined with a policy o f waging relentless war against the Apaches, Rubf 
believed that his plan would not only boost the northern economy, but in the end would 
save the Crown money through reduced expenditures. In 1772, the Monarchy acted by 
issuing the Reglamento de 1772, which in many respects was a codified version of Rubf’s 
recommendations with modifications by Jose de Galvez.’*
Unaware of what was about to happen, Juan de Anza, with the assistance of 
Franciscan Padre Francisco Tomas Hermenegildo Garces Maestro, began to revive Kino’s 
idea of establishing an overland route connecting Sonora and New Mexico with California. 
When royal officials first reviewed the plan they found no compelling reason to finance 
their efforts. In 1772, however, the Russians began moving down the coast o f California, 
causing Viceroy Bucareli to throw his support behind the idea of strengthening the 
colony’s military position with an efficient overland supply route. He decided, therefore.
Ignaz Pfefferkom, Sonora: A D escription o f  the Province, trans. Theodore E. Treutlein (Tucson: 
Uni versity o f  Arizona Press, 1989), 271-2; McCarty, 31-4.
Moorhead, 116-117, 133.
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to reverse course and authorized Anza and Garces to take an exploratory journey. Leading 
a group of settlers, the Captain and the Padre crossed the lower Colorado River headed 
for California, on May 2, 1772.’^
Anza returned triumphant in May of 1774, yet his celebratory mood soon turned to 
distress when he found Tubac in disarray and under siege by Apache raiders. A drought 
begun in 1770 had by this time severely contracted available wild plant and animal life and 
was beginning to affect domesticated crops and livestock as well. The need to feed their 
families was therefore driving the Apaches to raid for whatever supplies they could 
capture. Likewise, settlers were fiercely defending their scarce supplies. Afraid that 
renewed conflict would dampen official support for his plan to transform Arizona into a 
commercial hub, Anza wrote to the Viceroy to assure him that there would be few 
problems for travelers in Arizona if they would merely follow a few simple rules.^"
The Captain first advised that settlers bound for California strictly follow the Santa 
Cruz River to the junction with the Gila. Then, from there they should hug the Gila River 
until it joined with the Colorado. These stipulations had less to do with the aridity o f the 
region than with the protection Anza beheved the Piman Indians would provide against 
Apache attacks. What he actually meant was that the river Indians would serve as a buffer 
from Yavapai attacks as the GUa River was the lower boundary of the eastern Yavapai 
bands, not the Apaches. Secondly, to ensure Piman cooperation and to establish friendly 
relations with the Yumans, who were willing to ferry travelers across the swift moving
Kessell, Friars, 93-100.
“  Garate, 87-93.
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Colorado, Anza warned that Spanish travelers must take pains not to alienate either group. 
Among his list of transgressions was taking food without permission or just compensation, 
allowing livestock to destroy native fields, and any other arrogant behavior that would 
provoke indignation.^'
Anza fed his rules into the slow turning gears of the Spanish government where they 
passed from one bureaucrat to the next until they finally reached the Viceroy. At this 
point, however, Anza’s message lost its urgency as it became tossed in a sea of pressing 
communiqués. Unable to advance further, Anza’s pragmatic plan for ameliorating conflict 
on the Apache frontier stalled. Unaware, in 1776, the Captain followed orders and moved 
his men to Tucson under the stipulations established in the Reglamento de 1772. To 
assist, the Crown promised to excuse settlers who were willing to relocate from all taxes 
and tithes, as well as provide them supplies if they provided their own weaponry and 
horses and served in the ranks o f the citizen militia.^^
Anza apparently seized this opportunity to implement parts of his plan for dealing with 
the Apaches. He offered the Apaches a clear choice between food and peace or continued 
raiding and relentless warfare. As the Crown’s offer to compensate those who went to 
Tucson had attracted more than one thousand soldiers, settlers, and Piman Indians, Anza 
had gained, as presidio commander, the power to requisition generous amounts of 
supplies. Thus, he could order enough food to support not only the citizen’s of Tucson, 
but also all peace-seeking Indians. Throughout his tenure at Tucson, 300 b eef cattle
Ibid., 101-155.
' Moorhead, 90-1; McCarty, 16-18, 88-92.
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arrived annually, providing plenty for all/^
In 1776, Jose de Galvez became Minister of the Indies and began implementing his 
own plan for transforming New Spain’s northern frontier into an independent 
administrative unit. Calling his creation the General Command of the Interior Provinces, 
Galvez selected Viceroy Croix’s nephew Teodoro as the first Commandant General. 
Teodoro’s primary job was to defend the frontier against hostile Indians and foreign 
encroachment. He began by first addressing the deficiencies he saw in Rubi’s presidio 
corridor plan and evaluating other options for containing the Apaches. After settling on 
solutions, Croix informed Captain Anza in 1777 that his talents were to be put to better 
use in the more volatile region of northern New Mexico. '^*
Apparently unaware of Anza’s previous warnings that Spaniards not trespass on the 
Pima and Yuma Indians, Croix authorized Padre Garces to establish two missions on the 
west bank of the Colorado River. These new settlements were to be different as they were 
to be streamlined, meaning soldiers would live with the missionaries, instead of in a nearby 
presidio. Garces was reluctant, as he understood the sagacity of Anza’s rules; he worried 
that this plan would create just the type of confiict between Spaniards and Indians that the 
Crown was attempting to eliminate.^"
It did not take long for Garces’ misgivings to be proven correct. Once arrived, 
mission soldiers began allotting themselves farm plots from Indian fields, and they allowed 
their cattle to graze on Indian crops. To add insult to injury, when the soldiers ran low on
23 Kessell, Friar, 334-6.
Dobyns, 33-35. 
“  McCarty, 35-40.
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provisions, they took supplies from the Indians without offering just compensation. The 
final straw came in the summer of 1781 when a group of Yumans ferried a Spanish party 
across the river and the settlers only paid them with a few cheap gifts. The Spaniards then 
allowed their livestock to strip nearby mesquite trees bare—an essential Indian food 
source. In mid-July the Indians had had enough and rebelled. They killed most o f the 
Spanish men, including the two friars, and captured the women and children. Once Croix 
heard of this disaster, he dismissed any fiiture possibility o f establishing missions in 
southern Arizona. He then attempted to shift the blame for the debacle onto Anza by 
accusing the Captain o f misleading him into thinking that Arizona’s river tribes were 
peaceful.^"
In 1785, Jose de Galvez’s nephew Bernardo became Viceroy and decided to use his 
position to experiment with a new Indian policy. While serving in Spanish Louisiana, 
Bernardo Galvez had admired French methods for winning Indian cooperation through 
gift giving and diplomacy. Not only did he beheve that the French policy was more 
successful at minimizing conflict, but that it was also much cheaper than relying solely on 
mihtary force. Consequently, in 1786 Viceroy Galvez ordered Commandant General 
Ugarte^’ to adopt a similar peace policy on the northern frontier. Once in operation, 
presidio commanders were under orders to negotiate with individual Apache bands and to 
ensure that Spaniards strictly adhered to all treaty stipulations. Commanders were also to 
assume a  p r io r i  that the Indians would not uphold their end o f  the agreements. Instead,
“  Ibid.
27 Teodoro Croix had been poisoned and gone insane by this time.
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they were to be ready to coax compliance by rewarding pliant Indians and viciously 
punishing those who remained intractable/*
Indians willing to settle near a presidio received adequate rations, poor quality guns 
for hunting, and protection from molestation from settlers. But, most importantly, they 
gained access to an endless supply of liquor. This was the case as Bernardo de Galvez 
hoped to control the Indians through their appetites. On the one hand this was a 
pragmatic way to address the roots of Apache unrest, food scarcity and mistreatment by 
settlers and soldiers, while on the other hand it was a reprehensible attempt to destroy 
Apache society through addiction and internal conflict.^^
Regardless o f the motives, by 1790 the Apache threat to frontier settlers had 
diminished greatly, as more and more Indian families settled near presidios. In Arizona, 
the Western Aravapai Apaches permanently relocated near Tucson to gain access to 
rations and other goods. By the time Americans began traversing the region in the 1830s, 
the Spanish had begun calling these bands Mansos Apaches, which translated to Tame 
Apaches.^" The effects of this peace program only lasted for about twenty-five years, 
however. It came to an end when Mexican Creoles broke from Spain and royal fimding 
disappeared, leaving presidio commanders with no provisions for their Apache charges. 
As soon as it became evident that the Spaniards were no longer able to fulfill their 
obligations, Apache families deserted the peace camps and resumed other subsistence
^*Henry F. Dobyns, Spanish Colonial Tucson: A Demographic H istory (Tucson: University o f  
Arizona Press, 1976), 92-112; Moorhead, 104, 117, 119, 127, 131.
Dobyns, 97-108.
McCarty, 61-3.
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strategies, which included raiding/'
By enforcing existing taxes and implementing new government monopolies on key 
commodities Spain’s Bourbon monarchs had succeeded in diverting money from colonial 
hands into royal coffers. The Bourbons had also managed to curtail local prerogatives, 
making it more difficult for colonial-born bureaucrats to improve their standard of living 
through patronage and graft. While causing disquiet, such policy changes did not, 
however, automatically lead to rebeUion. Instead, for over one hundred years, American- 
bom Spaniards continued to beheve that the benefits derived from belonging to a powerful 
empire outweighed the costs o f what the Bourbons were deducting from their bank 
accounts and egos.^^
The breaking point finaUy came when Creole resentment combined with the 
uncertainty that emerged foUowing Napoleon’s seizure of Castile’s throne in 1808. Many 
in the colonial ehte at first recoiled from advocates for independence as these rebels were 
also clamoring for a social revolution. As events in Spain became even less stable, 
however, many Creoles began to beheve that the only way to protect their way of life was 
to start their own limited movement for independence.** Although, before they could take 
charge, a populous rebelhon broke out under the guidance of a parish priest named Father 
Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla.
Hidalgo was a revolutionary whose aim was to oversee a true social uprising in which
Moorehead, 37-42.
Leiby, 167.
”  Paul J. Vanderwood, "The Millennium and Mexican Independence: The Saga o f  Enticing 
Opportunities," in The Birth o f  M odern Mexico, 1780-1824, ed. Christon I. Archer (Wilmington: SR 
Books, 2003), 176; Leiby, 176.
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the poor and dispossessed would rise and struggle for their liberation. The ranks o f his 
army reflected this as they were filled with Indians and Mestizos. As would be expected, 
Padre Hidalgo’s goals and constituency fiightened Mexico’s Creoles who correctly 
envisioned attacks on themselves as the ruling elite. They were unable to stop Padre 
Hidalgo, however, who had the advantage of numbers and momentum, until he provided 
them an opening at the edge of Mexico City. Hidalgo was low on provisions and afraid he 
would lose control o f his organized mob once they entered the capital, so, in a fateful 
decision, Hidalgo chose not to attack and instead retreated to seek fresh supplies. In 
doing so, his lost forever his chance to upend the Mexican social structure.*'*
Given this break, Mexico’s leaders mounted an all-out effort to capture the priest and 
teach his followers a lesson. When news of the rebellion reached presidio commanders in 
Sonora and southern Arizona, they dispatched all available soldiers to capture the priest. 
Consequently, when Hidalgo’s retreating army arrived at Guadalajara, these northern 
soldiers were waiting for them. Dependent on Mexico City for funding of the Apache 
peace program, frontier citizens saw no benefit to be gained by joining Hidalgo’s populist 
movement.**
Only after conditions in Spain worsened appreciably, in their view, did Mexico’s 
Creoles finally decide that it was time to break the colonial bonds. Led by Colonel 
Agustm de Iturbide, these reluctant rebels won their independence and then set about 
codifying the socioeconomic system that had benefited their caste throughout the colonial
Hugh M. Hamili, The H idalgo Revolt: Prelude to  M exican Independence (Gainesville: University 
o f  Florida Press, 1966), 176-78.
** James E. Officer, Hispanic Arizona, 1536-1856  (Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1987), 84-6.
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era. Once news of the rebellion reached the northern frontier, debate raged over the 
rightness of opposing Spain. Ultimately, the regional leadership decided to throw their 
support behind the conservative revolutionaries.*"
Life after Mexico’s ruling class achieved independence was chaotic as political power 
shifted rapidly between two ideological camps, neither o f which represented the lower 
castes. The effect o f this in Arizona was multifaceted; with the most telling consequence 
being a precipitous drop in the amount of money available to frontier posts. Surrounded, 
as many were, by Apaches who had grown used to provisions provided through the peace 
program, the loss o f revenue threatened to cause a wave of rebellions. To add to this 
problem, m the case of the Arizona settlements in particular, the government made matters 
worse in 1828 when officials decided to expel all peninsulars,*^ depriving the outposts of 
not only all o f their missionaries, but also the Friars’ independent sources o f money and 
provisions.**
Once the Mexican government reneged on Spain’s treaty obligations to the Apaches, 
the peace camps began to dissolve. With access to secured resources gone, it made little 
sense for the Indians to stay and starve when they could leave and easily supply 
themselves through raiding. This return to a state o f Apache hostilities traumatized nearby 
settlers not only due to years o f relative quiet coming to an abrupt end, but also because 
the scale o f raiding was even worse than it had been before. The reason for this was that 
ranchers, miners, and small farmers had all advanced northward during the peace-poUcy
Archer, 136-37.
”  Spaniards born in Spain.
** David J. Weber, The M exican Frontier, 1821-1846  (Albuquerque: University o f  N ew  M exico Press, 
1982), 70.
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years in the belief that the frontier had been permanently pacified. Some had even 
ventured into the heart the Apacheria and acquired large land grants, which they populated 
with cattle and sheep. These plump beasts then became the Indians’ main target after they 
returned to a nomadic way of life.
Many contemporary observers and historians have consistently blamed the Apaches for 
the theft o f livestock in this period. Under the circumstances, however, it would be more 
correct to state that many Indian groups were raiding, yet Mexican citizens only 
consistently blamed the Apaches.'*" One notable example of the continuing 
misidentification of guilty parties occurred when a number of southern Piman bands began 
attacking Mexican settlements after losing their prime sources of water. Their misfortune 
began when several well-connected, non-Indian families received land grants along the 
Santa Cruz River and began diverting water for irrigation. Without a resident missionary 
to plead their case, the Indians foimd themselves without protection and subsequently 
without water.'**
In addition to feeling aggrieved over their lost water, the Pimans also echoed 
complaints over Hispanic methods o f ranching that dated back to Onate’s settlement in 
1598. Still practicing extensive livestock management, the Mexican landowners allowed
All the American groups that traveled across the southern route to reach California commented on 
the ferocious, wild bulls that ran feral in the abandoned haciendas in southern Arizona. See Sgt. Daniel 
Tyler, A Concise H istory o f  the Mormon Battalion in the Mexican American War, 1846-7  (Chicago: The 
Rio Grande Press, 1964), 95-6; John Russell Bartlett, Personal Narrative o f  Explorations and Incidents in 
Texas, New Mexico, California, Sonora, and Chihuahua: Connected With The United States and Mexican  
Boundary Commission, During the Years 1850, ’51, ’52, And ’53 (Chicago: The Rio Grande Press,,
1965), 155; Schroeder, Apache Indians, 103-6.
Kessell, M ission o f  Sorrow, 119-123. James Officer also notes, 84-6, that Mexican officials in 
Tucson had seen the Papago, or more correctly the Tohono O ’Odom, disguised as Apaches and raiding 
settlements.
McCarty, 6-7.
75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
their cattle and sheep to roam freely and trespass on mission and Indian fields. It was this 
second grievance that pushed some southern Pimans to adopt Apache tactics; they began 
stealing livestock and destroying check dams that kept water from reaching their fields.'** 
By the late 1820s, much of Mexico’s northern frontier looked as it did before 
Bernardo de Galvez implemented his peace policy. Soldiers struggled daily with hungry 
and angry Indians, while settlers lived in constant fear o f Indian raids. Not everything was 
the same, though; there was one noticeable difference. Whereas, settlers had once kept 
watch for French and British interlopers, now, they were on the look out for Americans. 
Southern plantation owners were pushing into Texas and entrepreneurs from diverse parts 
o f the United States were converging on the Santa Fe and Taos trade fairs. Many of these 
Norte Americanos also dabbled in the fur trade and had their interest piqued when they 
heard of good trapping along the Gila River. Technically, they could not go into Mexican 
territory without a license, but as long as they knew whose palm to grease or whose sister 
to marry, few were actually kept out.'**
The Indian reaction to the American presence in Arizona was varied. Some Indians 
avoided the trappers fearing they were slavers, while others attempted to trade with the 
Americans hoping they had better goods than the Mexicans. A third group of Indians 
even preemptively attacked the trapper to protect their resources and families from 
American rapacity. Inter-ethnic relations in Arizona became increasingly tense when the 
governor o f  Chihuahua began offering bounties for Apache scalps. In his decree, the
Ibid., 5-7.
See Seymour Connor and Jimmy Skaggs, Broadcloth and Britches: The Santa Fe Trade (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977); and LeRoy Haffen, ed.. Fur Trappers in the Far Southwest: 
Twenty Biographical Sketches (Logan: Utah State University Press, 1997).
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governor only asked for an intact forelock of black hair as proof for payment. Obviously, 
this led to indiscriminate killings of innocent Indians and even Mexicans citizens. With the 
going price at $100 for a male, $50 for a female, and even $25 for a child, murder on the 
frontier became rampant and produced the opposite effeet that the policy was intended to 
produce. Instead of creating docile Indians, the lawlessness associated with the bounty 
hunters provoked attacks against anyone the Indians felt was suspicious in an eye for an 
eye style of revenge. Thus, right on the eve of official contact between the residents of 
Arizona and the U.S. government, a state o f near pandemonium gripped the region.'*'*
'*'* Ralf Adam Smith, Boarderlander: The Life o f  James Kirker, I793-I852  (Norman: University o f  
Oklahoma, 1999), 49.
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CHAPTER4
MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE AMERICAN WEST 
The first Americans to venture into Arizona were fiir trappers eager for access to the 
Gila and Salt Rivers. According to Mexican law, it was illegal for Americans to trap 
without authorization, but few bothered to apply. Thus, the vast majority o f Americans in 
Arizona before the Mexican-American War were illegal aliens. In many ways, however, 
the American fur trappers who ventured into Mexican Arizona had much in common with 
the resident Hispanic population. Both viewed natural resources as commodities that 
could be translated into personal wealth; both belonged to societies that utilized similar 
technologies, such as guns and writing; and both adhered to millennialistic forms of 
Christian monotheism that promoted conquest over heathens.'
On a deeper level, however, obvious distinctions existed between the two peoples. 
While both recognized the same supreme being, religious practices diverged as Hispanic 
Catholicism and American Protestantism were in many respects antithetical to one 
another.* And while both participated in hierarchically organized political systems, the 
Americans adhered to an aggressive form of republicanism that had no real counterpart m
' McCarty, 8-9; Kessell, Friars, 99; Eve Kornfeld, Creating an American Culture, 1775-1800  
(Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 120-7; Weber, 44-52.
 ^This is necessarily so as Protestantism was a reaction against Catholic ritual and liturgical 
conventions.
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the still semi-feudal, northern Mexican polity.*
These and other socio-cultural differences stemmed in part from England’s distinct 
history and the traits England passed on to her North American colonists. But the 
differences were even more the result o f Anglo-American development apart from, and 
then in opposition to, their motherland. Over the millennia, England, as Spain, received 
successive waves o f migrants and invaders who left their mark as they came and went.
Yet, unlike Spain, in the years preceding American colonization, England experienced no 
uniting event such as the Reconquista/ but instead witnessed divisive conflicts between 
Protestants and Catholics, as well as economic upheavals that pitted social classes against 
each other.* This explains why, when the opportunity to migrate to North America arose, 
various groups within English society jumped at the chance to escape from hardship.
When joined with lax immigration policies, this willingness to leave resulted in a 
hodgepodge of English colonies settled not by representatives o f a unified ideology or 
monarchy, but instead by divergent factions possessed of differing agendas."
The first English colonizing efforts, which took place in the 1580s, were not successfixl 
due to a combination of inadequate funding, deficient supplies, harsh coastal
* In Spanish society a person’s place was determined in large part by their genetic lineage. Because o f  
this Spaniards went to great lengths to categorize people according to their parentage and set limits on 
rights and aspirations for each group. There were obvious exceptions to the rule, but for the most part a 
person’s potential was predetermined at birth. For an in-depth examination o f  Spanish social structures, 
see Robert Howard Jackson’s Race, Caste, and Status: Indians in Colonial Spanish Am erica  
(A lbuquerque: University o f  N ew  M exico Press, 1999).
This is what the Iberians called the war to drive the Moors from the Peninsula.
 ^When Spanish gold and silver from the Americas flooded into Europe it caused spiraling inflation 
that hurt not only the poor but also aristocrats who lived on fixed feudal incomes.
* For an in-depth examination o f  the differences between Spanish, Dutch, French, and English 
colonization policies and experiences, see Denys DeLange’s Bitter Feast: Amerindians A nd Europeans in 
Northeastern North America, 1600-64  (Van Cover: UBC Press, 1993).
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conditions, and disease carrying insects. It was not until 1606, when investors in the 
Virginia Company tried their hand at colonizing, that England achieved it first success. To 
avoid the problems that plagued previous attempts, company officials legally bound all 
participants to place the good of the company ahead of personal enrichment. While this 
coercive policy correctly identified one of the main causes of colonizing failure, company 
officials failed to establish the means to enforce this rules once the ships arrived in the 
Americas. As a result, company captains were no better at controlling their “employees,” 
than were leaders o f previous ventures. What allowed the Virginia Company to succeed, 
then, was not skilled planning or adept leadership, but the chance arrival and dictatorial 
assumption of power o f soldier of fortune John Smith. Through his ruthless enforcement 
o f common sense rules. Smith successfully kept the company’s settlement, Jamestown, 
from becoming just another failed enterprise.*
Despite their best efforts, no members of the Virginia Company ever found Indian 
gold. They did, however, stumble upon something almost as good as gold: tobacco. 
Spanish explorers had discovered the stinking weed in the Caribbean and had been 
exporting it into Europe before the English arrived in the Americas. Thus, a nicotine- 
addicted market already existed, ready to purchase whatever Jamestown planters could 
produce. The problem for planters, then, was not a shortage o f customers, but a shortage 
of laborers to grow and process the time-intensive plant. At first, growers tapped into a 
domestic supply o f  workers by indenturing desperate English citizens who had been 
pushed off their land during the enclosure movement o f the early 1600s. After exhausting
* David Hackett Fisher and James C. Kelly, Bound Away: Virginia and Westward M ovement (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 110-118.
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this pool, planters then turned to importing African slaves as their main source of labor.* 
As other Southern colonies came into existence, they also adopted economic systems 
that tended to replicate inequalities reminiscent of the English social system. At the top 
were men able to monopolize resources and keep others on the bottom rung of the social 
ladder; at the bottom, were the men and women living miserable lives with little hope for 
improvement. Hence, in England’s southern American colonies, a political culture 
emerged that stressed themes of classical liberalism with an emphasis on the protection of 
private property and the notion that only the “best” men should directly wield economic 
and political power.^
In the North, radical and moderate Puritans founded the New England colonies to 
create the Christian utopia they believed could not take root in their corrupted homeland. 
Once established, other religious migrants followed and settled nearby. The Quakers, a 
religious sect that actually practiced the Christian toleration they preached, made their 
home in William Penn’s proprietary colony, Pennsylvania. Farther south. Lord Baltimore 
established Maryland for Catholics fleeing England’s tumultuous political and religious 
climate. Neither o f these later groups claimed the same sort o f chosen status as the 
Puritans, yet both did view America as a refiige from persecution. Thus, in contrast to the 
secular Southern colonies. Northern culture adhered more to a pious worldview, which 
tended to emphasize themes of classical republicanism, such as service for others, charity.
For an explanation o f  the Chesapeake economy and its race and class relations, see T.H. Breen and 
Stephen Innes’ “Myne Owne Ground: ” Race & Freedom on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 1640-1676  (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
9’ Ibid.
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and the suppression of individual desires in favor of the common good.*"
Over time Northern and Southern concepts o f individual achievement, protection of 
property rights, and government promotion of the public good blended with various 
European currents o f thought into a unique American worldview. This new ideology first 
appeared in coherent form in the discourse o f colonists expressing their outrage over 
Parliament flexing its power to lay and collect taxes. It then became embedded in the 
common vernacular during the War for Independence, and afterward, it found its way into 
the new nation’s founding documents through the pens o f men such as James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson."
In the years foUowing the war, Madison and Jefferson gave fuU expression to this new 
inteUectual tradition as they struggled to construct the political system the Americans 
claimed was their birthright. Each man turned to the other as they ruminated over how 
best to maintain individual liberty, while at the same time guarding against the rise o f a 
grasping aristocracy or an unruly mob. Further, they pondered over ways to expand 
poUtical participation without initiating some grand scheme for artificiaUy redistributing 
private property. In the end, after many vigorous debates, both men arrived at the same 
conclusion: the solution to their dilemma lay in the country’s ability to expand into its vast
Puritan minister John Winthrop expressed the northern ideal o f  community good succinctly when 
he wrote in his sermon “A Model! o f  Christian Charity,” “There are two rules whereby wee are to walke 
one towards another: Justice and Mercy.” For a broader examination o f  northern intellectual culture, 
please see Ernest Lee Tuverson’s Redeem er Nation: The Idea o f  A m erica’s M illennial Role (Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1980).
" In his book The Ideological Origins o f  the Am erican Revolution  Bernard Bailyn traces the 
concurrent streams o f  intellectual discourse prevalent during the pre-war years and delineates how the 
colonists expressed Europeans themes through their own provincial lens. Jefferson’s most eloquent 
contribution to this ideology would have to be the D eclaration o f  Independence, while M adison’s gift to 
political thought, apart from the U.S. Constitution itself, was Federalist No. 10.
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western holdings.**
Being a consummate theorist, Madison scoured philosophical treatises ranging from 
ancient to contemporary scholars hoping to cobble together a comprehensive model from 
which to construct a new government. Yet the more he searched, the more disheartened 
he grew as one tome after another told the tale o f a failed republic that crumbled due to 
human failings and errors. His despair turned to elation when he realized that it was 
unchecked factional power that had led to the downfall o f many previous republics, and 
that remedying this defect would remove the greatest obstacle to creating a truly 
enlightened government. Consequently, Madison argued at the Constitutional Convention 
that the United States could succeed only if its national government was carefully 
regulated and balanced by equally powerfiil, coimtervailing forces. And amongst those 
forces would be a strong yeoman class.'*
After sharing his insights, Madison then had to convince his critics who firmly believed 
that uncorrupted republican government could only exist in geographically and culturally 
limited polities. Citing conventional wisdom, they argued that a country as large and 
diverse as the Untied States could not sustain representative democracy, as its populace 
was too scattered and possessed of too many interests.*'*
To view the complete collection o f  Jefferson and M adison’s correspondence, please see A Republic 
o f  Letters: The Correspondence Between Jefferson and Madison, 1776-1826, ed. James Morton Smith 
(New Haven: Courtpress, 1952).
James Madison, The D ebates in the Federal Convention o f  1787, which fra m ed  the Constitution o f  
the United States o f  Am erica  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1920).
Charles F. Hobson, “Republicanism, Commerce, and Private Rights: James Madison’s Path to the 
Constitutional Convention,” in Liberty, Equality and Power: Private Property and Other Rights, ed. Ellen 
Franke! Paul and Howard Dickerman (New York: State University o f  New York Press, 1989), 85-7.
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Madison countered by turning their argument on its head. He asserted that in fact a 
large country possessed of a substantial population, with a good number of competing 
interests, was actually the best setting for republican government. Only in such a nation, 
he claimed, could representatives o f the people truly serve as stewards o f the public good. 
This he said was due to the feet that the ability of any one interest group to form a 
majority and infringe upon the rights o f the minority would diminish in inverse proportion 
to the number o f interest groups represented in the government. The caveat, he conceded, 
was that the country’s population could not expand beyond its resource base by any 
considerable degree. If this occurred, he admitted, a propertied majority would appear 
and reduce the landless minority to a state o f utter dependence. And in doing so, they 
would shatter the republic’s cornerstone.**
Due to this belief, Madison argued that the ability of the United States to increase its 
land base in tandem with its population was paramount. Fortunately, North America was 
much larger than the small portion occupied at the time of Independence. While it was 
true that Indians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Englishmen all inhabited much of the 
continent, this was only a minor complication, as political leaders could remedy the 
situation once the country’s constitutional government was functional.*"
Jefferson’s views tended to be more pragmatic than those of his theoretical friend.
This was due in part to the fact that he was the ambassador to France during the years
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson June 19, 1786, in Republic o f  Letters, 424. In his 
correspondence with Jefferson, Madison developed the concepts that would later emerge as his most 
famous essay. Federalist No. 10, when he wrote: “Our limited population has probably a large share in 
producing this effect [comfort o f  the masses] as the political advantages which distinguish us. A certain 
degree o f  misery seems inseparable from a high degree o f  populousness.”
Ibid:
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preceding the bloody French Revolution. As a result, he witnessed in stark relief the 
consequences o f sacrificing the majority’s wellbeing to subsidize a life o f leisure for the 
elite.’’ Contrasts between starving families and opulent wealth worried him enormously as 
he feared the same would happen in his own country if government policy did not include 
the means for promoting an equality o f circumstance. He even went so far as to propose a 
system of progressive taxation to lessen the possibility o f property concentrating in the 
hands of the few.’*
In addition to his disdain for corrupt aristocrats, Jefferson also deplored the 
degeneracy he believed accompanied the rise o f commercial manufacturing. As a result, 
he hoped America’s abundance of land would also postpone for many generations the 
need to resort to non-agrarian production. In his Notes On The State o f  Virginia,
Jefiferson addressed this topic when he wrote:
In Europe the lands are either cultivated, or locked up against the 
cultivator. Manufacture must therefore be resorted to o f necessity not of 
choice, to support the surplus o f their people. But we have an immensity of 
land courting the industry o f the husbandman. Is it best then that all our 
citizens should be employed in its improvement, or that one half should be 
called off fi’om that to exercise manufactures and handicrafts for the other?
The first signs o f  Jefferson’s political pragmatism appeared in 1776 when he assisted in drafting 
Virginia’s Constitution. W hile he agreed with the majority in attendance that only propertied, white 
m ales should have the franchise, he also insisted on granting “every person o f  frill age neither owning nor 
having owned [50] acres o f  land . . .  an appropriation o f  [50] a cres .. . ” The Avalon Project at Yale Law 
School, Draft Constitution fo r  Virginia, June 1776,
1996,<http://w w w.yale.edu/Iaw w eb/avalon/jeffcons.htm >(8 N ovem ber 2003).
'* Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, October 3, 1785, in The Republic o f  Letters, 390. In his 
Second Inaugural Address Jefferson also wrote, “The remaining revenue on the consumption o f  foreign 
articles is paid chiefly by those who can afford to add foreign luxuries to domestic comforts, being 
collected on our seà-board & frontiers only, &, incorporated with the transactions o f  our mercantile 
citizens, it may be the pleasure & the pride o f  an American to ask, “What farmer, what mechanic, what 
laborer ever sees a tax-gatherer o f  the Untied States?” The Writings o f  Thomas Jefferson, 2001, 
< http://www.etext.org/Politics/Essays/Thomas.Jeffrrson/Inaug2.txt> !12 October 2003).
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Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a 
chosen people . .
In light of such views, it should come as no surprise, then, that it was Thomas 
Jefferson, acting as President, who doubled the size o f the United States by boldly seizing 
a fortuitous diplomatic opportunity. Upon inauguration, Jefferson had categorized himself 
as a constitutional constructionist. A man who would not engage in the type of loose 
interpretation his political rival Alexander Hamilton had employed to create the National 
Bank. Yet when Napoleon Bonaparte offered to sell the whole o f the Louisiana territory 
for $15 million, Jefferson soon found that the only way he could acquire this land was to 
loosely interpret the Constitution’s treaty making clause. Ultimately, it was Jefferson’s 
vision of an “empire for liberty” teaming with yeomen formers, sturdy in their habits and 
secure in their independence, that allowed him to violate his own principles and purchase 
the Louisiana Territory.’’’
To hide lingering misgivings over his expansion of presidential authority, Jefferson 
exuded an infectious optimism. He repeatedly assured the American public that the 
country’s new dominion would guarantee the continuance of their blessed republic.”  In
Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the State o f  Virginia, 1787,” in The Am erican Intellectual Tradition: 
Vol. I, 1630-1865, ed. David A. Bollinger and Charles Capper (New York; Oxford University Press,
1993) 174-75.
In a letter to James Madison dated April 27, 1809, Jefferson wrote: “we should have such an 
empire for liberty as she [history] has never surveyed since the creation; and 1 am persuaded, that no 
constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive em pire and self-governm ent.” 
Republic o f  Letters, 1586.
Jefferson was actually planning to propose a constitutional amendment specifically authorizing the 
president to acquire new territory, but French diplomats informed him that Bonaparte would withdraw the 
deal if  Jefferson did not act quickly. Consequently, Jefferson informed Madison-who was his Secretary o f  
State-that “Infer that the less we say about constitutional difficulties respecting Louisiana the better . . . ” 
See letters from Jefferson to Madison dated July 1803 and August 18, 1803 in Republic o f  Letters, 1269, 
1278.
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his second inaugural address, and subsequent State of the Union speeches, he mixed lofty 
ideals with a call for every American to exercise their right to claim a portion of the 
enlarged public domain:
I know that the acquisition of Louisiana has been disapproved by some from a 
candid apprehension that the enlargement of our territory would endanger its union. 
But who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate 
effectively? The larger our association the less will it be shaken by local passions; & 
in any view is it not better that the opposite bank of the Mississippi should be settled 
by our own brethren & children than by strangers o f another family? With which 
should we be most likely to live in harmony & friendly intercourse?”
Consequently, unlike Europe, where the expectation to benefit from government 
power was limited to the aristocratic classes, under Thomas Jefferson, America became a 
country where average citizens could expect their government to promote the public good 
by also securing their access to private property. It was this sense of entitlement that 
energized many aggressive American settlers as they struck out onto the frontier.”
To fulfill his promise o f making land available to those who would work it, Jefferson 
had to devise a system for extinguishing Indian property rights. He was not starting from 
scratch, however, as previous government officials, including himself, had already begun 
to pave the way. In fact, one of the first acts of the Continental Congress in 1775 was to 
create three departments o f Indian affairs, and then to appoint men such as Benjamin 
Franklin and Patrick Henry as Indian commissioners. Their job was to negotiate treaties
^  Thom as Jefferson’s Second Inaugural Address; Internet.
^^Unfortunately, included within this lot were land speculators and silent congressional partners who 
took advantage o f  insider information to buy land cheap and sell it for a profit. Jefferson worried that such 
criminal activity would be detrimental to the country. He noted this in a letter to Madison dated April 23, 
1787: “The inhabitants o f  those places [settlements on the Illinois and Wabash], claim protection against 
the savages, and some provision for both criminal and Civil justice. It appears also the land jobbers are 
among them who are likely to multiply litigations among individuals, and by collusive purchases o f  
spurious titles, defraud the United States. The Republic o f  Letters, 475.
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with Indian groups, so as to secure pledges of neutrality during the War for
Independence.’"* Jefferson revealed his own views on how to deal with Native Americans 
when he wrote to a Mr. Charles CaroU, “Our news from the westward [5 /c] is 
disagreeable. Constant murders committing [ric] by the Indians, and their combination 
threatens to be more and more extensive. I hope we shall give them a thorough drubbing 
this summer, and then change our tomahawks into a golden chain of friendship. The most 
economical as well as most humane conduct towards them is to bribe them into peace, and 
to retain them in peace by eternal bribes.”’^
This did not mean that Jefferson believed Native Americans were biologically inferior. 
Unlike his views on Africans, whom he categorized as subhuman in his Notes On Virginia, 
Jefferson judged Native Americans to be equal to Euro-Americans, yet deficient in 
civilized manners. To view them otherwise would have confirmed European critics who 
argued that the American environment produced peoples with degraded intellects. After 
all, was Jefferson not now also a “native” American? Consequently, when it came time to 
devise an Indian policy, Jefferson focused not only on exacting submission, but also on 
extinguishing heathen manners through coercive assimilation.’^
C.L Henson, "From War To Self-determination: A History O f The Bureau O f Indian Affairs," 
American Studies Today Online, 1996,< http://www.americansc.org.uk/Online/Indians.htm> ! ! !  
September, 2003).
The Letters o f  Thom as Jefferson: 1743-1826, To C harles Carroll Philadelphia, A pril 15, 1791, 
Jefferson's Indian Policy, 2003,<http://courses.smsu.edu/ftm922f/Documents/jeffindianpolicy.html>(8  
October 2003).
Two books offer extensive coverage o f  Jefferson’s policies and actions regarding Native Americans, 
the first is Donald Jackson’s Thomas Jefferson & The Stony Mountains: Exploring the West From 
M onticello  (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 1981); and the second is Bernard W. Sheehan’s Seeds o f  
Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the Am erican Indian (Chapel Hill: University o f  North 
Carolina Press, 1973).
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Under Jefferson’s administration Indian agents were to slowly allow American 
settlements to encroach upon hunting grounds until the Indians could no longer support 
themselves. Then, once tmder duress, officials were to offer the Indians assistance in 
becoming self-sufficient agriculturalists, while simultaneously convincing them to cede 
land in return for farming implements and know-how. For those tribes who refused to 
cooperate, Jefferson authorized government traders to sell them goods on credit until they 
could no longer service their debt. Once this happened, agents were then to offer to 
forgive the debt in return for land cessions. For any tribe that refused both approaches, or 
decided to “take up the hatchet,” agents were authorized to drive them “across the 
Mississippi.” In any case, Indians had to remove themselves from the path of advancing 
whites.”
Jefferson’s coercive policies of assimilation and removal held sway up to the late 
1820s. Until then, his successors continued to offer Indians the choice o f living 
unmolested in their pursuit o f sedentary life, or being forcibly relocated beyond the line of 
white settlement. Things changed somewhat during Andrew Jackson’s administration 
when he set the precedent o f removing even assimilated Indians beyond the Mississippi. 
Consequently, from the early 1830s to the 1850s, Indian agents placed more emphasis on 
restricting Indians to areas removed from white settlers, rather than negotiating terms for
President Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, Governor o f  the Indian Territory, 1803, 
< http://www.course.smsu.edu/ftm922fiDocuments/jeffindianpolicy.htm>(8 October 2003)..
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assimilation.’*
New problems arose following the American victory over Mexico in 1848. With the 
country’s acquisition o f Mexico’s Northern provinces, the United States now controlled 
the territory it had been using to exile recalcitrant Indians. As American citizens believed 
themselves entitled to take any land paid for in American tax revenue and blood, the 
Executive Branch had to abandon simple Indian removal and create some other form of 
exclusion. Had the Gold Rush not happened when it did, Washington officials may have 
reincarnated Jefferson’s system of peace through bribes. This did not occur, however, as 
it was not long after California became American territory, that a worker at Sutter’s Mill 
discovered gold and set off a mad rush of prospectors directly across “Indian Territory.”
When Americans first began migrating westward, they crossed paths with not only 
previously removed tribes, but also Plains and Southwestern Indians. These native groups 
had spent many generations honing their skills o f resistance against Spaniards and 
Frenchmen and were unwilling to simply bow to American pressure. Government officials 
and citizens alike were aware o f these Indians fi’om reports such as those of Lewis and 
Clark, but were unsure as how to treat them. Many early travelers erred on the side of
In his Fifth Annual M essage to Congress on December 3, 1883, Andrew Jackson summarized his 
views o f  Indian affairs: “My original convictions upon this subject have been confirmed by the course o f  
events for several years, and experience is every day adding to their strength. That those tribes cannot 
exist surrounded by our settlements and in continued contact with our citizens is certain. They have 
neither the intelligence, the industry, the moral habits, nor the desire o f  improvement which are essential 
to any favorable change in their condition. Established in the midst o f  another and a superior race, and 
without appreciating the causes o f  their inferiority or seeking to control them, they must necessarily yield 
to the force o f  circumstance and ere long disappear..” President Jackson Speeches, 
<htt://www.synaptic.be.ca.ejournal/Jackson.htm>(10 September 2003).
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caution and did their best to avoid them.’^
Circumstances became volatile when the trickle o f prospectors, merchants, and sundry 
other Americans heading for California turned into a river. Not only did the increased 
number o f people consume more resources, but so too did their large number o f cows, 
mules, and horses. Thus, while emigrants cut precious trees for fuel and helped 
themselves to game animals, their livestock destroyed the grasses Indian horses relied on 
and fouled scarce watering holes.’” Real inter-ethnic violence did not start in full, 
however, until the Americans crossed the line and repeated the Spanish mistake of 
punishing Indians who “took” supplies or drove emigrants away from resources.”
For a time, migrating Americans defended themselves, but it was not long before they 
grew tired of providing for their own security and demanded that government troops 
protect them from aggrieved Indians. When government officials obliged, military leaders 
and Indian agents found themselves in a weakened position. Now they could not simply 
threaten to remove a tribe, as there was virtually no place left that was not already 
claimed. Many o f the Plains and Southwestern Indians also possessed o f a sense o f 
property rights and were determined to not turn over their land to the Americans without 
a fight.”
’^For a thorough examination o f  American migration west please see John D. Unruh’s The Plains 
Across: The O verland Emigrant and the Trans-M ississippi West, 1840-1860  (Urbana: University o f  
Illinois, 1982).
See Elliot West, The C ontested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, & The Rush to California  (Lawrence, 
Kan.: University o f  Kansas Press, 1998).
See Gary Clayton Anderson, The Indian Southwest 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention  
(Norman: University o f  Okalahoma Press, 1999).
See Robert M. Utley’s The Indian Frontier o f  the Am erican West, 1846-1890  (Albuquerque: 
University O f New M exico Press, 1983), as it address this type o f  conflict.
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Due to growing unrest, by the mid-1850s, the Interior Department took Ameriean 
Indian policy in a new direction with a reservation system. To quell potential conflicts and 
remove Indians from areas whites wanted, the government began consolidating native 
groups on restricted pieces o f land where they could receive coneentrated, assimilation 
training. The problem with this was that militarily strong Indian groups refused to stay on 
their reservations. Government officials responded by authorizing troops to force 
compliance, which led to a state o f low-level warfare. Commissioners from the executive 
branch still went through the motions o f negotiating treaties with Indians, yet by I860 the 
only choices Indians had were to relinquish self-determination or wage an all out war 
against the white man.”
Representatives o f the American government made official contact with Arizona’s 
Indians in 1846 when the Army of the West traveled through on its way to California.
This meeting of soldiers and residents ostensibly took place in the shadow o f war, yet no 
fighting took place. In feet, early contact was so uneventful, that many American soldiers 
praised the various Indian groups for being well disposed to peaceful relations. Conditions 
would not stay this way for long, but at least for a time it seemed that Arizona would 
become a middle ground where different cultures could co-exist.
”  Indian agents often expected one or the other o f  Indian groups. For example, here is a quote from 
an Indian agent assigned to the Apaches before even meeting his charges: “From all I have seen and know 
o f  the Apaches, they are treacherous, warlike and cruel, and need severe chastisement before they can be 
made to know the policy o f  observing good faith with white people.” Letters R eceived by the Office o f  
Indian Affairs, 1824-1888, New M exico Superintendency, 1849-1880, Roll 546 (Washington: The 
National Archives and Record Service, 1956).
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CHAPTER 5
THE AMERICANS OFFICIALLY ARRIVE 
The first officially sanctioned American exploration o f Arizona began in 1846 when 
soldiers and scientists' passed through during the Mexican-American War. American 
political and military leaders were not interested in Arizona per se, as they, like the 
Spaniards before them, viewed the region mostly as an extension of New Mexico as well 
as a dangerous barrier blocking access to California. But President Polk wanted to secure 
New Mexico’s trade economy, while Congressional members sought information about 
possible southern routes to the Pacific. These two motivations not only set the agenda for 
the Americans’ first visit to Arizona, but also shaped American relations with Arizona’s 
Hispanic settlers and Native Americans for the last half of the nineteenth century.’
To secure New Mexico and survey a southern route to California, Secretary of War 
William L. Marcy ordered General Stephen Watts Kearney to organize at least fifteen 
hundred volunteers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and to march them to Santa Fe as soon 
as possible. In the early summer of 1846, Keamy fiilfiUed his orders by taking command
' As today with the Army Corp o f  Engineers, in the 1840s the military included a branch know as the 
Corp o f  Topographical Engineers. See letter from Secretary o f  War W. L. Marcy to the President o f  the 
Senate Geo M. Dallas in Emory, 19.
 ^George Rutledge Gibson, Journal o f  A Soldier Under Kearny and Doniphan, 1846-1847, ed. Ralph 
P. Bieber (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1974) 23-6.
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of seventeen hundred troops and heading southwest, toward New Mexieo.’
While Keamy did not have specific reconnais^ce orders, the daily need to secure 
adequate water supphes caused the General and his subordinates to carefully note their 
surroundings. On July 4, 1846, Private George Rutledge Gibson wrote about their search 
for water in his journal: “The day was excessively hot, and all the eompany suffered 
extremely from thirst, to relieve which they pushed forward at a rapid gait, expecting any 
moment to find water. In this, however, they were disappointed and had to march twenty 
miles under a burning sun before they came to any.”  ^ In fact, the closer they came to New 
Mexico the more likely it was that they would travel more than a full day between 
adequate watering sites.
At times soldiers would discover water, only to be disappointed when a pecking order 
for access emerged. Sergeant Daniel Tyler expressed his frustration when he wrote, “. .  
.after about twelve miles’ [sic] travel [we] came to a hole or crevice in a rock . . .  [with] 
water enough to give each man a half pint. As the Colonel and staff rode up to it, the 
former remarked ‘The men can do without water better than the animals.’ . . .  His mule 
and his staff mules drained the spring.”’
A member o f the Mormon Battalion, Tyler and his coreligionists had joined the 
fighting to prove their patriotism for a country that had rejected them.” Little did they 
know that their unit would become famous for surviving a grueling trek down the Rio
" Ib id , 17.
“ Ibid., 133-4.
’ Tyler, 208.
* The Mormons had by this time been driven from two states by angry mobs and where in conflict 
with the government over their practice o f  polygamy. To smooth tensions Brigham Young encouraged 
some o f  his followers to participate in the war.
94
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Grande River into Chihuahua, and a harrowing march westward across the harshest parts 
o f southern Arizona. Captain James Alien was td be their commander, but died at Fort 
Leavenworth. As a result, on October 2, General Keamy selected Captain Philip St. 
George Cooke, who was in St. Louis at the time, as their new leader. As the battalion 
was already en route to New Mexico when Cooke assumed command, Keamy decided he 
would leave the Mormons in Santa Fe to wait for him.’
After facing no resistance from New Mexicans, who were tom between their cultural 
ties to Mexico and their resentment over t)eing neglected by federal authorities, Keamy 
left the Mormons in Santa Fe and headed west.* Among his troops was another young 
man whose life work was also about to become tied to Arizona. This was Lieutenant 
WiUiam H. Emory, a member the military’s Corp of Topographical Engineers. Lt. Emory 
was under orders from Washington to first assist in extinguishing all armed resistance in 
the Southwest, and then, as a scientist, to gather geographic data on New Mexico and 
California.”
When Keamy and his men reached the headwaters o f the Gila River they found the 
terrain was too mgged for their heavily loaded wagons. The General finally decided to 
abandon the buckboards and transfer his supplies to the backs o f the company’s mules. 
Before leaving, he hired local guides to wait for Cooke and to assist the Mormons in
’ Philip St. George Cooke, “Cooke’s Journal o f  the March o f  the Mormon Battalion, 1846-1847,” in 
Exploring Southwestern Trails, 1846-54  ed. Ralph P Bieber and Averam B. Bender, vol. 7 (Philadelphia: 
Porcupine Press, 1974), 254-5.
* For a contemporary view o f  the ambivalent feelings New Mexicans felt on the eve o f  the Mexican- 
American War see Arms, Indians, and the Mismanagement o f  New Mexico: Donaciano Vigil. 1846, ed. 
David J. Weber (El Paso, Texas Western Press, 1986).
’ Emory, 10-1.
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refitting their mules. When all the repacking was complete, Kearny’s battalion moved into 
Arizona’s eastern mountains. It did not take Lt. Emory long to discover why the 
prehistoric Anasazi and Mogollon Indians had abandoned the region and why the Western 
Apaches could not give up raiding and adopt a sedentary life.'”
On October 9, he wrote, “Game in [this part of] New Mexico is almost extinct, if it 
ever existed to any extent.” Then, on October 29, he noted, “The dust was knee deep in 
the rear o f our trail; the soil appeared good, but, for whole acres, not a sign o f vegetation 
was to be seen.” And lastly, on November 5, he observed, “Nature has done her utmost 
to favor a condition o f things which has enabled a savage and uncivilized tribe, armed with 
the bow and lance, to hold as tributary powers three fertile and once flourishing states. 
Chihuahua, Sonora, and Durango . .
Cooke and his Mormon troops left Santa Fe on October 19, ten days behind Keamy.
It was not until they came upon the discarded wagons and hired guides that they leamed 
o f the new mule-train plan. Unconvinced that this was the best course of action, Cooke 
decided not to follow General Keamy and to instead map-out a southem route that would 
circumnavigate around Arizona’s eastem mountains.”
As the days passed, conditions on Cooke’s route worsened. The land was rough and 
uneven, and water was dangerously scarce. It was not long before Cooke began to doubt 
the wisdom of his headstrong decision; yet he confided his misgivings to no one but his 
journal. The farther the battalion went, the more he worried about where he would
“’ Emory, 113-4.
Ibid., 90;113;123. 
”  Cooke, 95.
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purchase meat on the hoof to feed his men; and where he would find healthy replacements 
for his exhausted draft animals. This last problem was to become particularly vexing for 
later Americans heading across Arizona, as horses and even mules had difficulty coping 
with the region’s desert topography and arid climate.”
To keep his fears from becoming reality, at each stop, Cooke ordered his quarter­
master to search for anyone willing to trade healthy stock for their “broken down” mules 
and depleted cattle. Of this, on October 25, 1846, he wrote, “I sent the quartermaster and 
interpreter to the owner . . .  [but] they [5/c] treated his oflfer with contempt. It was great 
good luck to obtain those [mules] yesterday from a merchant. . .  The bargain for 
exchange, two for one, was made before he saw mine””
Both Keamy and Cooke set a significant precedent when they began to strike deals 
with Indians who offered to trade or sell animals and other items. On October 20, General 
Keamy even sent a runner to the well-known Apache headman Mangas Coloradas to let 
his band know that the Americans would like to trade. Of this encounter Lt. Emory 
observed, “The whole camp was now busily engaged in attempting to trade. The Indians 
had mules, ropes, whips, and mezcal [sic].””  Cooke met with the equally well-known 
Navajo chief Manuelito on November 29 and in a roundabout manner asked him to trade. 
Cooke wrote that he told Manuehto: “we [are] friends and . . .  my great chief [Keamy] 
ha[s] gone on to California with a few men to meet a great many more who came by the
" Ibid., 71-3.
Ibid., 76-7.
Emory, 100.
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sea; that [Keamy] would take the country from the Mexicans; that I would join him; that 
my mules were tired and I wished trade with his people for others.””
Neither Keamy nor Cooke ever bothered to ask where or how the Indians acquired 
their animals and other supplies even though both had to have known that such goods 
were stolen.”  Emory betrays his knowledge when he describes the trading event in great 
detail, even down to what each Indian was wearing; “One had a jacket made of a Henry 
Clay flag, which aroused unpleasant sensations, for the acquisition, no doubt, cost one of 
our countrymen his life.” In light of this, it is no wonder that during the early years of 
contact Plains and Southwestem Indians continued to view raiding as a more profitable 
economic practice than other more “legal” subsistence strategies.'*
Apart from powerful headmen such as Manuelito and Mangas Coloradas, most Indians 
kept their distance from the Americans. Soldiers from Private George Gibson all the way 
up to General Stephen Watts Keamy attributed this fear to bounty hunters such as James 
Johnson who had once lured a large group of Indians to his camp and then killed most o f 
them with cannon blast so as to claim a reward for their scalps.'’ The Americans did not, 
however, seem to know of the circumstances that prevailed during the years o f Bemardo 
de Galvez’s peace policy, as none correctly identified it as the cause of the Indians’ 
dependence on, and therefore insatiable desire for, Hquor. In regard to this, boundary
Cooke, 122-3; Cooke refers to Manuelito as an Apache, but he was Navajo.
”  Ibid., 78. Just one month before meeting Manuelita, Cooke passed by a Mexican ranch that had 
lost over 6,000 head o f  sheep to Navajo raiders.
Emory, 101; John C. Cermony, “The Apache Race,” in Eyewitness to  the Indian Wars, ed. John 
Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Book, 2001), 10.
In every journal or report related to encounters with the Apaches there is somewhere a very similar 
accounting o f  Johnson’s actions; making it highly likely that the men all read the same story in local 
newspapers.
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commissioner John Russell Bartlett wrote of a typical encounter, “They [the Indians] 
asked for whiskey, which I positively refused, denying that I had any. Although this was 
the simple truth, they did not believe it, not being able to imagine how a party of 
Americans could be without that indispensable article.”’”
Of the few lesser-known headmen who met with the Americans, all professed 
friendship and proposed that the two people join as allies in defeating their common 
Mexican enemy. At no time, however, did any o f them state that they would submit to 
American authority, nor did they behave in a manner that would indicate that they 
expected to be treated as anything but equals. Unfortunately, most Americans ignored 
this; instead, they heard the Apaches’ message without really listening to what was being 
said. Consequently, men such as Keamy and Cooke falsely led the Indians to believe that 
they agreed with their views, and they gave officials in Washington the wrong impression 
of the Indians’ disposition.’' The men made it appear that Arizona’s Indians as a whole 
where willing to quietly accept subordination to the Great White Father in Washington 
when this was not actually the case.
Of all the Indians the Americans met on their way to California, it was the 
“industrious” Pimans who they favored the most. While the soldiers looked down on the 
Pimans for their childlike fascination with dyed cloth and their preference for silver over 
gold coins, their vast, well-kept fields and settled villages so readily matched the
“  Bartlett, 302.
When addressing the Indians Kearny and Cooke affected a child-like speaking pattern and liberally 
infused their rhetoric with phrases such as “Great Father in Washington” and “Red Children.”
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Jeffersonian ideal, that the Americans could not help but embrace them.”  The fact that 
the Apaches did not intimidate the Pimans also impressed the Americans as the soldiers 
viewed the Mexicans as cowards, unnecessarily paralyzed with Apache fear.”  Of this 
Cooke wrote, “. . .  the Apaches do not often trouble [the Pimans], being afraid.” And, 
“They have a reputation of escaping molestation fi-om Apache [sic], on [account] o f [their] 
resistance.”’"* In almost every way, then, the Pimans were the model of what the 
Americans wanted in their Indians.
Keamy and then Cooke stayed briefly in the Piman villages to allow their men and 
animals to recuperate. It is a good thing that they did because upon leaving, each faced 
two more harrowing challenges before crossing into California. The first was the march to 
the junction of the Gila and Colorado Rivers. The bend in the Gila River forced the 
soldiers to either waste precious time and energy hugging its banks, or to march straight 
for over a day without access to potable fluids. A second obstacle appeared when the men 
reached the Colorado. The River’s rapid and unpredictable nature made it a challenge for
Neither o f  these behaviors was irrational as bright dyes were hard to come by in the desert and the 
Mexican economy, especially in the north, was based on the silver standard.
They are probably also including the Southeastern Ya vapai who lived just north o f  the Pima and 
had been their enemy since the time o f  the Hohokam; the most poetic description o f  Mexican prostration 
came in 1849 through the pen o f  John Woodhouse Audubon when he wrote o f  a Mexican town: “it has the 
apathetic lassitude o f  everything M exican.” See John Woodhouse Audubon, Audubon's Western Journal, 
1849-1850, (Tucson: University o f  Arizona Press, 1984), 84. May 3 0 ,1 8 4 9 , prospector A. B. Clark and 
his party stopped in Tucson and he wrote: “The soldiers made a contemptible appearance, lounging about 
their quarters. Their pay is the promise o f  three bushels o f  wheat; and a small sum o f  money per m on th ..
. They however receive more than their services are worth.” A.B. Clarke, Travels in M exico and  
California, ed. Anne M. Perry (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1988), 68.
Cooke, 168-9; Emory, 133-6. In 1871 Peace Commissioner Vincent Colyer met with a group o f  
“Tonto Apaches,” which were either an intermixed band o f  Yavapai and Apaches or a band o f  Yavapai, 
who told him that they would not com e to Fort M cDowell unless the Americans would promise to keep 
the Pimans away from their camp sites. See Vincent Colyer, Peace With the Apaches o f  New M exico and  
Arizona, Report o f  Vincent C olyer  (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 23.
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even the most physically fit to cross.”
Both Keamy and Cooke made it to California with their ranks intact and the Mexican- 
American War ended in March o f 1848 when the Senate ratified the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo. At that moment, most o f what had once been Spain’s northern buffer against 
foreign encroachment became the property o f Mexico’s overbearing northern neighbor.’” 
Once the war was over, reconnaissance reports such as Lt. Emory’s made their way back 
to military headquarters and inquisitive congressional committees. Such information 
would have taken possibly a year or more to filter through official channels and into 
newsprint had nothing of major importance happened to force the information into the 
public arena.
This important event occurred when President Polk confirmed the discovery o f gold in 
California in his December 1848 State o f the Union Address. Predictably, soon after, 
there was a sudden urge among thousands o f men to go west; and each traveler was now 
very interested in knowing which was the shortest and safest route to the Pacific. Some 
forty-niners opted to travel over northern trails that passed through Wyoming, Utah, and 
Nevada, while others decided to try the southem course pioneered by Cooke. This lower 
route became especially attractive after the gmesome details o f the Donner Party, who 
resorted to cannibalism after becoming stranded in the Sierra Nevada Mountains during
Sgt. Tyler, 240-1; Em ory, 157-63. In 1849 John Audubon wrote o f  the journey to the Colorado; 
“Sixteen days o f  travel from the Pim os [sic] villages and such travel, as please God, I trust we m ay none 
o f  us ever see a g a in . . . .  Lack o f  w ater and grass we have alm ost com e to regard as inevitable; truly we 
look, and are, a forlorn spectacle, and we feel, I am sure, worse than we look.”
In Arizona, only the area north o f  the Gila River transferred to the U.S. in the Treaty o f  Guadalupe 
Hidalgo; the region that currently makes up southern Arizona became U.S. territory with the Gadsden 
Purchase in 1853. See The Avalon Project, “The Gadsden Purchase Treaty, December 30, 1853,” 1998, 
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/mexico/mxl853.htm>(25 September 2003).
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the winter of 1846, reached the eastern newspapers.”
At first there was just a trickle o f emigrants passing through Arizona, but by the early 
1850s the trickle had turned into a steady stream of prospectors, cattle herders, and 
merchants. As the number o f migrants increased, so too did the potential for conflict. 
Violence during the early years o f contact, however, was just as likely to be committed by 
non-Indians perpetrating murders, thefts, and bloody brawls as it was by Indians. Among 
the Indians, violence was more likely to occur between groups than with Americans as 
internal feuds and offenses often required a physical response. Regardless o f who was 
committing the majority o f the violence, Arizona soon became a place in need of a 
mediating authority.’*
That mediator arrived in 1851 when the War Department sent Major Samuel P. 
Heintzelman to establish Fort Yuma at the junction of the Gila and Colorado Rivers. The 
tiny outpost was not very impressive, consisting of little more than a few shabby tents and
Louisiana Strentzel, “Letter o f  Louisiana Strentzel to her Family,” in C overed Wagon Women: 
D iaries and Letters from  the Western Trail, 1840-1890, vol. 1, 1840-1849, ed. Kenneth L. Holmes 
(Glendale, Calf.: Arthur H. Clark, 1983), 250-67. In her letters home Louisiana Strentzel reports that she 
finds The Gila Trail much as Cooke had with the only exception being that there were many more people 
and animals. She writes, “. .  .At his place we met a company o f  Mexicans returning from the gold mines. 
They gave awful accounts o f  the road before us, that they way was strewn with dead animals, and that 
wagons and property o f  every kind were left on the road all the way through the desert.” Yet even after all 
the hardships she writes, “We have just heard from the emigrants who came the other route [northern 
route] and from what we can learn they suffered a great deal more than those who came the Southern 
route.”
Major Samuel P. Heintzelman, A Transcription o f  M ajor Samuel P. H eintzelm an’s Journal, I 
January 1851-31 D ecem berl854: Concerning the Establishment o f  a  Post at the Junction o f  the Colorado  
and Gila Rivers, trans. Creola Blackwell (Yuma, AZ.: Yuma County Historical Society, 1989). Major 
Heintzelman’s journal serves as an excellent gauge for the increasing amount o f  violence in Arizona over 
time; the change in American attitude toward even the Pima Indinas is evident from the following quote 
taken from Hepah, California! The Journal o f  Cave Johnson Cuots: From M onterey, Nuevo Leon,
M exico to Los Angeles, California During the Years 1848-1849, ed. Henry F. Dobyns (Tucson: Arizona 
Pioneers’ Historical Society, 1961), 68. “The Unfortunate redman! Unsuspicious and unsuspecting o f  the 
cunning and politic white flatterer, little thought o f  their days being numbered! O f the day when the 
white man would see the last red warrior drowning in the Pacific, and rejoice as his rifle ball took the last 
breath o f  life from him!”
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a holding pen for animals. Unimposing as it was, the fort did at least now provide 
American officials with an institutional base from which to exert control over both people 
and resources. Heintzelman was none too happy when he arrived at one of the country’s 
hottest spots and often openly wished he could be assigned anywhere else. Throughout 
his stay he consistently complained that he had been “exiled” from the civilized world.”
As a good career soldier, however, he ftilfrlled his orders and did his best to bring 
American justice to the Arizona frontier.
The first order o f business for Major Heintzelman and his men was to address the 
violence that was keeping Americans from crossing peacefiilly into California.”  In his 
assignment letter from the Adjunct General’s Office, the Major was directed to: “ . .  
.protect the emmigrants [sic\, to punish the Indians for any outrages they have committed 
upon persons passing through their country, [and] to establish and maintain friendly 
relations with and to prevent any combination on the part of different tribes for hostile 
purposes.””
Heintzelman soon discovered, however, that while the military was correct in 
recognizing that the situation on the Colorado River needed to be ameliorated, the 
leadership was incorrect in assuming that the only parties in need o f chastisement were the 
Indians. In fact, he was surprised to find that many Indians felt just as threatened by 
emigrants, who were expropriating their resources, as emigrants felt about Indians who
”  In his last journal entry Heintzelman wrote, “This ends the last year o f  my exile I hope [sic]”, 174.
”  It is interesting to note that no one ever asks why the Indians were attacking travelers until people 
on the ground started to report that the Indians had good reasons for why they oppose American 
encroachment on their territory.
Ibid.
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were lashing out at American abuses.”
When Heintzelman realized this he jettisoned the idea that all Indians needed to be 
“controlled” and instead adopted a more evenhanded approach. An example o f this 
occurred on January 31, 1853, when he refused to punish a group of Indians based solely 
on unsubstantiated accusations: “Those Mexicans accuse the Indians o f stealing some of 
their animals. They have no evidence of it, only [that] they have lost the animals. I don’t 
think the indians [sic] would venture to do this.””  At times the Major even found himself 
serving as a de facto  peace chief by mediating between warring bands of Maricopas, 
Cocopahs, and Yumans. On December 9, 1852, he wrote, “ . . .  I was explaining to the 
two Co-co-pas [sic] chiefs the relation in which they stood & that I would not permit them 
to war against the Yumans [n]or the latter to against them.”’"*
By 1853, many Mexican miners were coming back from California as discriminatory 
laws had kept them from mining. Among these men were some who planned to still strike 
it rich by driving Sonoran sheep, cattle, and mules back to sell in California’s inflated 
markets. Slowly, as the amount o f livestock crossing Arizona increased, so too did the 
reports o f stolen animals. Not all cases involved Indians, but, as bands o f Pai speaking 
natives living in western Arizona were in perpetual short supply of food and had few other
John Audubon, A udubon’s Journal, on October 5, 1849, Audubon comments that the Maricopas 
were on their way to “assist the Yumas against the Americans,” yet conflict was apparently averted with 
the “prompt shooting o f  a party o f  Texans who had shot one or two Yumas [sic] Indians for not making 
the right landing.” This is the same kind o f  mistake made by the Spaniards when they attempted to 
establish a mission among the Yumas in 1781; on Jan. 27, 1853, Major Heintzelman wrote o f  the problem 
Indians were having with emigrants beginning to settle on their land: “Lt. O ’Connell is burning over the 
country between Cook’s W ells, the Algodones & Fr. Defiance. Jose [probably a Yavapai man] appeared 
to think it was someone who intended to settle there. He is afraid our [sic] cattle will destroy their 
gardens when they plant, 125.
Heintzelman,125.
^ U bid , 113.
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methods for acquiring domesticated animals, it should have come to no surprise that some 
were pilfering fattened sheep and cattle.”
After adopting raiding as a means to meet their nutritional needs, some Indians then 
began to trade or sell a portion of their “surplus livestock” to emigrants whose animals 
had broken down. In doing this, these native entrepreneurs gained access to coveted 
American trade goods either directly or through purchase with money they received for 
stolen animals.’  ^ Heintzelman did Iiis best to curtail what he saw as an illicit practice, yet 
he was hindered by an inability to addresses the underlying environmental factors driving 
Arizona’s hungry Indians to take American animals.
Along with the animal herders, miners and men exiled fi’om California for being 
habitual criminals also began arriving in Arizona in the 1850s. The miners were searching 
for the next bonanza where a man could strike it rich with just a pick and a pan, while the 
reprobates were eager to resume their illicit ways in any available town. For the 
prospectors Arizona seemed the perfect spot as the territory’s violent reputation had kept 
the area relatively clear o f miners, while the criminals would go anywhere they could find
Complaints to Heintzelman over stolen herds increase throughout 1853. An interesting and 
wonderfully candid recounting o f  interaction between Americans with cattle and hungry Indians come 
from the memoirs o f  Hank Smith, “M ining and Indian Fighting in Arizona and New M exico, 1858- 
1861,” Panhandle-Plains H istorical Review, vol. 1, no. 1, ed. Hattie M. Anderson (Amarillo, TX: Russell 
& Cockrell, 1928) 81. Smith wrote, “We signaled them [the Indians] to come to camp, which they did. 
They said they were hungry and wanted a beef, that there were twenty more Indians with them on the 
mountains that they were on their way to Sonora on a raiding expedition and they would pay back the beef 
we would let them have . . .  We finally concluded to give them the beef, provided they let the herd alone, 
which they promised.”
Hank Smith also provides insight into trading relations between Americans and Indians: “We 
found the White Mountains all r ig h t. . .  about 150 White Mountain Apaches rode up to our camp and 
wanted us to come to their camp . . .  for the purpose o f  trading some horses, mules, and calico, o f  which 
we always carried in good supply o f  the purpose [o f trading with the Indians.] Smith, “M ining,” 106.
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men laden with pockets o f gold and silver.”
At first, the prospectors kept to the Colorado River and its peripheral streams. With 
the Colorado Ferry Company and Fort Yuma established nearby, staying close offered 
them assured access to both food and military protection.’* Eventually, fi’om within this 
group grew a more organized effort to exploit Arizona’s mineral wealth. Some men had 
realized that real wealth was not to be found at the bottom of a rusted pan, but instead in 
the judicious cultivation o f political connections. These speculators looked to merge the 
knowledge and power of military men with the money of eastem investors to create an 
industrial mining complex.
Despite his early protests against profiting from his position. Major Heintzelman 
became the first military commanders to profit from insider investments in mining and 
transportation concessions in Arizona.”  On February 20, 1851, he had fumed: “I have 
never hinted to him the least desire to own any part [of the proposed steamboat venture.].
’^John Gregory Bourke, 119. For a detailed account o f  American discrimination against Hispanics in 
California please see Leonard Pitt’s The Decline o f  the Californios: A Social H istory o f  the Spanish- 
Speaking Californian, 1846-1890  (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1966). California’s territorial 
legislature passed the Foreign M iners’ Tax in 1850, which mandated that anyone not a U.S. citizen had to 
pay $20 per month to retain the right to prospect, “The people o f  Greenwood were about like those in any 
mining camp o f  the old days. They were largely mining men and adventurers from the old m ining camps 
in California and Nevada, though some were from Texas and New Mexico. Some were Americans, 
Germans, Irish, French, and M exicans. All in all, the men were more or less desperate in character.” 
Maguire, 54.
By 1863, this section o f  Arizona had many men who had “gone down to the new D iggins found on 
the tributaries o f  the Gila and others are leaving daily.” Letters o f  the Office o f  Indian Affairs, Extract 
from  letter o f  Gov. F. H ooper to  M ajor Heintzelman, San Francisco, Septem ber 24, 1863. Bureau o f  
Indian Affairs, 1821-1880, New M exico Superintendency, 1849-80, Roll 2 (Washington, National 
Archives and Records, 1956), Microform.
”  In a letter dated December 27, 1856, Captain R.S. Ewell wrote to his sister from Fort Buchanan 
that he wanted to “make some speculations here” in regard to his plan to invest in the Patagonia Mine 
near the fort. “Documents o f  Arizona History: An Arizona Letter o f  R.S. Ewell, ” in The Journal o f  
Arizona History, vol. 2, no. 7, (Summer) ed. Percy G. Hamlin (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1966) 
23-5.
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. .  I have not sunk so low yet as to sell my character for a few paltry dollars. 1 can 
advocate the interests o f the post without having at the same time a private interest.” Yet, 
the next year he was drawing dividends from his investment in that very steamboat 
operation. By November, 25, 1853 he had dropped all pretenses: “I gave Lt. McLean the 
gold Grinnel gave me, to send to Gen. Estel o f S. Francisco, to try & have something done 
in the way of farther [sic] exploration & in making up a company. We want to profit some 
by it if we can.”"*’
After leaving Fort Yuma, in 1856, Heintzelman joined with speculator Charles Poston 
to create the Sonora Mining and Exploring Company. Poston established the venture’s 
headquarters at the abandoned presidio o f Tubac, while Heintzelman went back east to 
raise money. The main thrust of their business plan was to reopen abandoned mines 
previously worked by Spanish and Mexican miners.^'
At first there was only a few Americans, such as Heintzelman and Poston, who striving 
to monopolize Arizona’s resources. It did not take long, however, before the U.S. 
government joined in the quest. Congress did so when it authorized two railroad surveys 
through the region. Eager to connect California’s booming markets to east coast centers 
of finance and manufacturing, lawmakers were stuck in a debate as to where to put a 
trans-eontinental rail line. Each time a representative attempted to authorize an 
exploratory expedition that would favor his own state, opposition invariably formed. To 
move forward, compromisers finally passed a bUl on March 3, 1853 to create multiple 
survey teams, so that the ultimate decision o f where to locate the rail line would result
Heintzelman, 11, 168.
Charles D. Poston, Building a State in Apache Land  ( Tempe, AZ: Aztec Press, 1894), 62-4, 72.
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from scientific data and not due to majorities running roughshod over minority interests/’ 
With a Congressional mandate. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis authorized now 
Major Wilham H. Emory to assemble surveying teams for possible southem routes along 
the 32"*' and 35* parallels. And the Texas Western Railroad Company financed a third 
team. The task for each group was to “provide exact data on elevations and grades of 
mountain passes, meteorological and astronomical observations, and reports on the 
availabihty o f water and timber as well as the nature o f mineral resources, rocks, and soil.” 
For Americans in Arizona, this was just the type of information they needed to begin 
laying claim to the best pieces of land."*’
These survey reports, which literally directed men to promising mineral sites, began to 
publicly circulate in the late 1850s. The following excerpt comes from the Gray Report: 
“The mountains in the neighborhood are filled with minerals, and the precious metals are 
said to abound.” And “. . .  [we] found the argentifeours galena ore and gold.”"*"* 
Unfortunately, in addition to being conduits for information, the survey teams were also 
responsible for stirring up ill feelings among Arizona’s Indians. During the Whipple 
expedition a man came down with smallpox at about the same time that the disease was 
killing hundreds o f Indians at the nearby Hopi and Zuni Pueblos. The Indians believed 
that man was to blame, as chronicler John P. Sherburne wrote, “Nothing could induce 
them [Indians] to come into Camp [sic]. They would take nothing to eat, drink, or smoke.
John P. Sherburne, Through Indian Country to California: John P. Sherburne’s D iary o f  the 
Whipple Expedition, 1853-1854, ed. Mary McDougall Gordon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 
5-9.
Ibid., 1-2
L. R. Bailey, ed.. Survey o f  a  Route on the 32'^ Parallel o f  the Texas Western Railroad, 1854, (Los 
Angels: Westernlore Press, 1963), 78-9.
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so great was their fear of catching the smallpox.” ’^
Members o f survey teams also found amusement in harassing Indians. To assure 
themselves o f keeping to the correct path, the men with Whipple captured an Indian man 
and forced him serve as their guide. When two Mexican runners arrived to take them to 
meet another team, they finally decided to let the humihated man go: “We had a message 
from Lieut. W. this morning advising us to move and, hearing that he had met Indians [to 
serve as guides], we concluded to let our captive go, so after amusing ourselves for some 
time by making him show the road, we unlocked the chains, loaded him with old clothes, 
blankets, etc., and sent him oflf.”"*’ As a result, by the time miners and ranchers began 
pouring over Arizona’s landscape, many o f the region’s Indians already held a very low 
opinion o f Americans.
Despite high expectations, none of the mining ventures begun before the Civil War 
turned into a bonanza. Placer finds stopped producing either when miners had taken all 
the easily gathered minerals or when water supplies dried up, thereby eliminating panning 
and sluicing as extraction methods."” Underground mining had its own problems related 
to access and ore refinement. Most underground claims required backbreaking work to 
expose buried veins as well as machinery for separating slag from ore. To meet their labor 
needs, mine owners often hired Mexican “peons” who would work cheaply without too
Sherburne, Indian Country, 136. 
‘'U b id ,  171-2.
47  <“Tucson Correspondence,” Tucson, Feb. 11, 1860, St. Louis Missouri Republican, reprinted in 
Thompson Turner’s Latest from  Arizona: The Hesperian Letters, ed. Constance Wynn Altshuler (Tucson; 
Arizona Pioneers’ Flistorical Society, 1969), 141; “All the placer mining hitherto attempted in Arizona, 
whether on the Gila, the Santa Cruz, or Bear Creek, has proved unprofitable to the miners on account o f  
the scarcity o f  water.” See also Maguire, 64-5.
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much complaint/* After extracting the ore, owners could then either resort to the time- 
consuming, yet inexpensive patio refining process/^ or they could import expensive 
machinery to do the job. Technology was obviously the better choice if one had the 
money. Yet, as a cross-country railroad did not yet go through Arizona, bulky items had 
to come up the Colorado River on a steamboat and then move overland by mule train, or 
they had to come across country fi’om the nearest eastern rail depot. Both options were 
time intensive and quite expensive.^®
A few miners and their investors were willing to risk the expense, but before any 
machines arrived in Arizona, the war between the Union and the Confederacy broke out. 
Southern sympathizers in Tucson and adjacent towns in New Mexico voted to support the 
Confederate cause, yet nothing of consequence came of this until Texans invaded New 
Mexico on July 24, 1861. Confederate Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Baylor was able to 
capture Mesilla, New Mexico, forcing Union commanders to order all loyal soldiers
Ibid., 20: Tubac, Nov. 24, 1859, “The Sonoran Exploring and Mining Company have an engine en 
route for the works, which will arrive early next year, and enable the company to reduce their rich ore in 
quantities to render it very profitable to shareholders;” Poston, State, 73, “As soon as it was known in 
Mexico that an American company had arrived in Tubac, M exicans Irom Sonora and the adjacent states 
came in great numbers to w ork .. A few straggling Americans came along now and th e n .. .[but] they 
were generally worthless, dissipated, dangerous, low white trash.”
In most cases, the patio process, which was developed in M exico, consisted o f  a mule harnessed to 
a grinding wheel that crushed large chunks o f  rock into finer sand. The sand was then mixed with 
quicksilver and then dumped into vats o f  water. The quicksilver amalgamated with precious ores, which 
could then be separated fi'om the slag.
The few men who succeeded in getting machinery into the region after the Civil War often 
abandoned mining themselves and went into the business o f  m illing as they could charge exorbitant 
prices. “The prices charged by the cormorants running the mill were so exorbitant that one-half the ore 
was left on the dump because it would not pay to crush it.” See Maguire, 48.
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west of the Rio Grande to abandon their posts and move to forts along the front line. ^ ' 
This troop withdrawal upset loyal citizens in Southern Arizona, as they were now to 
be without a defensive buffer from Indian attacks. On June 15, 1861, Samuel Robinson, 
who was an accountant with the Santa Rita Mining Company, wrote in his journal, “Fort 
Breckenridge is literally surrounded by Apaches and many of the troops at the Fort talk of 
leaving, so that the immediate future o f Arizona is not very bright.” And on July 2, 1861, 
“The infantry expects to get off by the 15'*' inst.. .It is said the cause of the troops being 
removed to the Rio Grande is that they expect an attack from the Texans.”^^
Arizonans were particularly worried at this time as a recent incident between the 
military and some Indians had caused a sudden increase in Apache attacks. A rift had first 
opened between the Americans and the Apaches m 1848 when military leaders attempted 
to fulfill a pledge made in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to keep Apache raiders out of 
Sonora and Chihuahua. Apache headmen could not understand why the Americans would 
want to protect an enemy that their military had just defeated. They also wanted to know 
why the Americans believed the U.S. government had a right to stop Apache warriors 
from avenging depredations perpetrated upon them by Mexican citizens.
Having lived for generations with Spaniards who monopolized scarce resources and 
often indiscriminately punished Indians, the Apaches had learned to meet mjustice with
Maguire, 1-3; John P. Wilson, When the Texans Came: M issing Records from  the C ivil War in the 
Southwest, 1861-2  (Albuquerque: University o f  New M exico Press, 2001), 25-6; Santa Fe June 22, 1861, 
J .L  Collins Superintendent o f  Indian Affairs to William P. Dole Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, Letters 
o f  the Superintendency o f  Indian Affairs, New M exico, Reel 5575 (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1923), Microform.
”  Samuel Robinson, 1825-1907: Papers, 1861: MS 1088 (Arizona Historical Society: Tucson, AZ); 
On July 10, 1861 Indian Agent C. Lennan wrote, “The withdrawal o f  the U.S. troops has removed every 
check upon the Indians o f  Arizona and the larger portion o f  this part o f  the Territory o f  New M exico is 
now entirely at the mercy o f  the most relentless o f  savages-the several tribes o f  Apaches.”
I l l
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injustice. When the Amerieans began to act in what they perceived to be a manner 
reminiscent o f the Spanish, Gila, Chirieahua, and Western Apache bands resisted by 
treating the Americans as they did their Hispanic enemies: an eye for an eye. Apache 
headmen believed to do otherwise would be tantamount to subordinating themselves to 
American power and eventually giving up their way of life.^^
Relations between Americans and Apaches worsened considerably on January 27, 
1861, when a band of Apaches stole livestock from a ranch near the Chirieahua Mountains 
and kidnapped a Mexican boy. In response, on February 4, the commander o f Fort 
Buchanan, Lt. Bascom, met with Apache headman Cochise to demand that he return the 
cattle and the captive. Cochise brought femily members with him and claimed that a band 
o f White Mountain Apaches had the boy and that he would try to retrieve him. Bascom 
was not convinced and seized the group as hostages to bargain for the boy’s return. 
Coehise escaped and demanded his relatives’ release. Baseom refused. In retaliation, 
Cochise attacked a Butterfield st£^e and captured an employee who he offered in 
exchange for his relatives. Bascom still refused. Two days later, Cochise burned a wagon 
train, which killed nine Mexicans, and he took three Americans prisoner.^"*
”  With man-on-the-ground clarity, Dr. Michael Steck, Indian agent assigned to the Apaches during 
the 1850s, wrote in a report that “The Apaches living upon the headwaters o f  the Gila are in a most 
destitute condition, they have lived principally from time immemorial, upon cattle, mules, & horses stolen 
either from this territory, or from the northern states o f  M exico, Sonora & C hihuahua.. .  at certain 
seasons they are in a starving condition, but such is the fact that the natural resources o f  the country 
cannot supply them with fo o d .. . They are then reduced to the absolute necessity o f  choosing between 
stealing and starving.. .Place a white man in the same position and I doubt whether he would consult the 
ownership or right to property more than these Indians.” National Archives Microfilm Publications, 
Records o f  the New M exico Superintendency o f  Indian Affairs, 1849-80, No. T21, Roll 1 (Washington 
D C.: National Archives and Records, 1956), Microfilm.
Turner, 271; Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest o f  Apacheria  (Norman University o f  Oklahoma Press, 
1967), 18-9.
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Finally Cochise made a direct attack, but Bascom repulsed the attempt. Fed up, 
Cochise killed all of his hostages. The Lieutenant then hung six o f the Apache men he was 
holding, including Cochise’s brother and two of his sister’s sons. As the Chirieahua were 
a matrilineal people, hanging Cochise’s nephews was tantamount to hanging his sons. 
Consequently, according to some reports, Cochise sought blood revenge by killing close 
to one hundred and fifty Americans in the ensuing weeks.^^
Less than two months later, in April o f 1861, Congress moved the Overland mail route 
fi-om its southern course to a central route so as to reduce travel time to San Francisco 
and to punish the south for seceding. When the Apaches watched the mail company 
remove its men and animals from their territory, they apparently assumed it was due to 
fear provoked by their efforts. After this, Apache raids increased even further.^* And 
finally, a few months later, U.S. soldiers stationed at Arizona forts, packed up, burned 
their remaining supplies, and marched east to turn back the Confederate invasion o f New 
Mexico. Not surprisingly, it was not long before Apache headmen began boasting that 
they had defeated the Americans and driven their soldiers from the territory.^^
While fear o f the Apaches was high among American and Mexican residents, it is 
misleading to assume that this was the only worry in Tucson and Tubac. With the soldiers 
gone, the kind of frontier violence that had plagued the region during the early years o f the 
gold rush returned with non-Indians involved in as many “depredations” as the Indians.
”  Ibid.
’"Turner, 212-3.
Upon being appointed Superintendent o f  Indian Affairs o f  the territory o f  Arizona, Charles Poston 
wrote a detailed report o f  the Indian in his jurisdiction, o f  the Gila Apaches he wrote, "... when our 
unfortunate civil war caused the withdrawal o f  the U.S. troops from the country they proudly boasted o f  
having chased the Americans from their domain never more to return.”
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Contemporary diaries and newspapers illustrate this, as they are filled not only with raiding 
Apaches, but also an assortment o f American and Mexican thieves, murders, and assorted 
other criminals/* In fact, local resident Samuel Robinson wrote to assure his family that 
he was not living in constant fear o f Indian raids: “It is true that we are always prepared 
for them, but we do not really fear them.”^^
Reality did not, however, stop Americans fi'om blaming the Indians whenever 
something or someone came up missing. The following report fi'om Fort Mojave 
demonstrates the generally irrational behavior o f Americans toward Indians during this 
period: “Se-rum [,] head chief o f the Hulapais who has been paying a friendly visit to this 
Post[,] was brutally Assaulted [5/c] this evening by a drunken man in the Street o f Mojave 
City.. .  The probabilities are that this aggressive act will lead to another war with the 
Hulapais.. The next incident, also occurred near Fort Mojave, and demonstrates the 
tendency of settlers to see Indians culprits behind every crime, regardless o f the evidence.
Some t wo weeks ago an Indian (Mojave) by name Toke-watha came to me and 
informed me that [Mr.] Goodrich was cutting his grass and refused to pay him for it, 
I sent for Goodrich and he and Toke-watha came up together about two days 
afterward when I ascertained that Toke-watha lived about four miles from where 
Goodrich was cutting, supposing that the Indian was simply trying to obtain some 
money I told him they would have to refer the matter to the Justice o f the Peace at 
Hardyvüle as it was not on the Military Reserve. Toke-watha had threatened three 
or four times to shoot Goodrich previous to this occurrence. Owing to the above 
facts I suspect that Toke-watha murdered Goodrich, he was killed by an axe, or
’*In his memoirs, Charles Poston wrote o f  this period, “The Vigilance Committee o f  San Francisco 
sent a considerable number o f  unsavory immigrants to Arizona, who with the refugees from M exico, 
Texas and Arkansas, render mule property rather insecure in the early days.” Poston, 100. And in an 
editorial written from Tucson on October 17, 1859: “What with Indians, revengeful M exicans and Border 
Ruffians, if  I mistake not, the history o f  Arizona, for the next six months will be written in blood.” Latest, 
15.
”  Robinson, MS 1088.
""Irene J. Brennan, Fort M ohave Letters o f  the Commanding Officers, 1859-1890  (Manhattan, KS: 
M A/AH Publishing, 1980) 50; Aug. 20, 1869.
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other sharp instrument when asleep . . .  A great many [citizens] are desirous of 
going down the valley in a body and taking the Indian [Toke-watha] by force, which 
would probably bring on a general skirmish. . .  I would respectfully state that if 1 do 
not receive the Indian today a mob will probably try to take him themselves..
This example also illustrates the fact that there were some parallels between the 
behavior o f frontier settlers in relation to Indians and southerners toward emancipated 
blacks following the Civil War.*  ^ Other such similarities would also begin to emerge 
between how the North defeated the South and then sought to reconstruct the region at 
the end of the Civil War, and how the federal government defeated Arizona’s Indians and 
then attempted to forcibly acculturate them.^^
Ibid., 81; Sept. 4, 1872.
Racially tinged comments such as that which follows were not uncommon in journals, newspaper 
articles, and military reports, “We read everywhere o f  the stoicism and gravity o f  the Indian, but my 
Apaches were merry as darkies, laughing, singing (but such singing) for hours at a time. The soldiers 
delighted in them— gave them tobacco and extra sugar and coffee, made pets o f  them, as it were and had 
nearly all o f  them rechristened.” Charles King, “On Campaign in Arizona,” Milwakuee Sentinel, March 
28, 1880, in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 165; similarly, “Here the meals were prepared, and they were 
brought hence by “our man” on a tray, into the “large house,” where the board was spread. . . ” Frank K. 
Upham, “Incidents o f  Regular Army Life in Time o f  Peace,” The O verland M onthly 5, 2"‘‘ ser. (April 
1885): 426-29, in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 87.
“  The animal-like view some Americans had o f  Indians comes out clearly in U.S. Army surgeon L. 
Y. Loring’s report on the Coyotero Apaches, “When they are housed and have beds t sleep in in place o f  
groveling in the earth like dumb brutes, when they have been taught to wear clothes and to keep 
themselves clean, when they have acquired industrious habits and the rudiments o f  civilized life, then will 
they be in a better condition to comprehend and accept the mysteries o f  the Christian religion.”
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CHAPTER 6
AMERICAN VICTORY: HEGEMONY ACHIEVED 
The events that led Arizona’s regular troops to pack up, bum their supplies, and head 
east in the summer of 1861 also caused settlers to shift their focus from provincial 
concerns to national problems. As a result o f this reorientation, citizens began to 
increasingly base their actions on factors not always evident to their Mexican and Indian 
neighbors. Without knowing this, it became much more difficult for these groups to 
respond to Americans in ways that did not jeopardize their own wellbeing. In fact, by 
1886, miscalculations on the part o f many Indians put them squarely at odds with the 
American settlers and ultimately cost them control over not only important resources, but 
also their lives.
In the years immediately following 1846, American emigrants and Arizona’s Indians 
came into sustained contact. During this time, however, they were able to co-exist 
without too much bloodshed, as neither group was willing to fight for control over the 
region. This did not mean that Native Americans merely stood by as Americans 
trespassed on their land and usurped their resources, as many took umbrage with travelers 
who refused to respect their territorial claims. What it did mean was that neither side was 
yet ready to go to war. Evidence of this state o f afifeirs comes from Indian agent John 
Greene in his 1852 report on the Gila Apaches: “The whole of this Country [sic] would 
soon be settled if the Indians would allow it but they are unwilling to part with their land
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without Êiir compensation.” ' Moreover, he wrote that settlers had repeatedly attempted 
to move into a verdant valley, but had “as often bëen driven away by the Indians who say 
they shall (emphasis in the original) not have them unless the Government pays for their 
country.”^
Indian agents such as John Greene also repeatedly warned federal officials that 
violence would erupt if the Indians, the Apaehes in particular, were not given the same 
consideration as citizens. They bluntly informed American officials that if they did not live 
up to promises made to the Indians, American settlers would pay a heavy price. In a 
report dated January 19, 1855, Indian Agent Michael Steck wrote, “1 hear complaints 
among them [the Apaches] of the bad faith of the Government towards them, they say 
they were promised assistance, but that they have waited two years and have not yet 
received it, and any one at all acquainted with the peculiar characteristic o f Indian 
character, will at once see the evil that would result from another years’ delay. .  
Unfortunately, federal officials were too busy or too little attuned to frontier life to take 
the agent’s warning seriously.
On the level o f the average American traveling through Arizona, most had some 
understanding o f the Indian way of life as well as the historic nature o f the ongoing battle 
between the southwestern Indians and Mexicans. This is evident in their journals and
‘ United States Bureau o f  Indian Affairs, "The Official Correspondence o f  James S. Calhoun while 
Indian Agent at Santa Fe and Superintendent o f  Indian Affairs In N ew Mexico," June 30, 1852 
(Washington D C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, microfilm). Reel 557 No. 5675.
 ^United States Bureau o f  Indian Affairs, Letters R eceived By the Office O f Indian Affairs, 1821-88, 
New M exico Superintendency, 1849-80, Roll 2 (Washington D C.: National Archives and Record Service, 
1956).
 ^ Ibid.
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letters when they condemn the Indians for their un-Christian ways. Yet most Americans 
were very willing to overlook these supposed character flaws as long as the Indians 
facilitated their ability to reach California by providing fresh draft animals, potable water, 
and supplies wholesome food.
Underlying tensions first came to the surfece in 1850 when Indian agents attempted to 
enforce a clause in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo obligating Americans to curtail 
Apache raids into Mexico. The agents quickly ran into determined resistance from 
Apache headmen such as Mangas Coloradas who demanded to know: “. . .  are we to 
stand with our arms folded while our women & children are being murdered in cold 
blood? The Sonorans beat out the brains o f fifteen of them with clubs. Are we to be the 
victims of such treachery—are we not to be revenged? Are we not to have the privilege 
of protecting ourselves?”  ^ As the War Department was unwilling to commit the resources 
needed to stop the raids, ^ en ts  ended up turning a blind eye to most cross-border activity 
and only half-heartedly reprimanded the Indians when Mexican authorities complained.^
Tempers again flared when the number o f emigrants passing through Arizona 
increased in the mid-1850s. One factor in this was the strain emigrants put on the 
environment, as the desert could only sustain so many extra mouths. The bovine 
merchandise stripped the ecosystem of the plants most Indians relied on as famine food, 
raising the specter o f starvation for more than just the nomadic groups. Boxed into a 
subsistence comer, some Indians decided to take matters in their own hands by helping
Ibid., August 13, 1851.
’ This is the main reason why the Gadsden Purchase Treaty, ratified in 1853, specifically released the 
United States from any further obligation to stop cross-border raiding by the Apaches.
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themselves to the resource the Americans relied on: the cattle. It was this low-level 
poaching and retaliation along with other forms of “frontier” lawlessness that had caused 
Washington officials to establish Fort Yuma.
Despite Washington’s intentions, military men, such as Major Heintzelman, only had 
enough power to keep local renegades on both sides from disrupting the flow of travel 
across the Colorado River. They did not, however, have the resources needed to secure 
the territory farther away from their posts. As long as American political leaders were 
unwilling to commit the money and manpower needed to undertake such an endeavor, 
military men could not effect a real redistribution o f power or resources.
Conflicts between Americans and Indians escalated further with the arrival of 
prospectors who came to pan for gold in the Colorado and its tributaries. As the number 
o f miners increased, so too did the burden o f the soldiers to keep the Indians and 
Americans from abusing one another. The men stationed at Fort Yuma struggled to 
maintain peace on their own until 1859, when increasing American complaints pushed 
national authorities to establish Fort Mohave up the river. At first, relations between 
miners and resident Pai-speaking Indians was peaceful, but as Fort Mohave’s commander 
understood, “Soon circumstances may cause the Indians to hesitate or object to making 
Treaties [5 /c]. Already the Indians are aware that the Mountains [i'zc] contain valuable 
ores, but when they leam more as to its value and mode of separating it from the earth, 
they will part with the mountain with more reluctance.”
When the Indians did begin to resist, it was not because they wanted to keep minerals 
for themselves, instead, it was due to the same environmental deficiencies plaguing other 
areas o f sustained contact. Under orders to suppress violent encoimters. Fort Mohave’s
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various commanders adhered to the same sort of pragmatism that Major Heintzelman
found so effective. The following report is indicative o f officers at Fort Mojave:
This year however there has been no overflow [of the river], the Mesquite crop has 
been a failure, the wheat crop was light and the flour made fi'om [it] is exhausted.. 
It is evident that something must be done, and that speedily. They [Indians] will 
soon reach the starving Point [5/c] and it is certain that depredations will then be 
Committed [5/c] on the settlers, and others traveling in the valley. This would lead 
to war, many Indians would probably be killed. They would be forced to submit, 
or else driven off to the Mountains [5 /c] to join the hostile bands. If they 
submitted, as many would do, for this People [^/c] is not warlike, the Government 
would have to feed them. Is it not better to assist them now?”*
The first fort commissioned east o f the Colorado, apart fi'om Fort Defiance, in the far 
northeast, was Fort Buchanan. It opened in 1857 and was located twenty-five miles east 
of Tubac, which was then the headquarters o f Charles Poston’s Sonoran Exploration and 
Mining Company. It was also just to southeast of Tucson, where a handfiil of American 
merchants were now established as local powerbrokers. With this new post, Washington 
continued a general pattern of stationing soldiers where miners and merchants needed 
security, yet at the same time not providing fort commanders with the manpower needed 
to seriously threaten Indian autonomy.’
For Mexican and Indian residents in Tubac and Tucson the arrival o f American miners, 
merchants, and soldiers was not troubling as circumstances merely reverted to the way
" Brennan, 53-4.
’ In a letter to his sister Private George H. Cranston wrote from Fort Grant in June o f  1867 that “It is 
useless to follow them [the Indians] with a small party o f  men because nine times out o f  tem you will 
either fall into an ambuscade and [be] killed or taken prisoner.” And on September 23, 1868, he wrote to 
her from Camp Crittenden, south o f  Tucson, “We have been at this post now for nearly 7 months, and 
dureing [sic] that time there has been a great amount o f  scouting done. The Indians are more troublesome 
this summer than ever before. They have killed several o f  the settlers and drove o ff their stock, and 
driveing [sic] the settlers into the fort, what were left o f  th e m .. The Indians never do run from no troops 
in their own Country [sic]. They only laugh at our ap[pe]arance.” Bruce J. Dines, ed., “A New York 
Private in Arizona Territory: The Letters o f  George H. Cranston, 1867-1870,” The Journal o f  Arizona  
H istory  75, no. 4, (Fall, 1994), 135.
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they had been under Spanish and Mexiean rule. For Mexiean workers, American 
employers were not that much different from Mexican haciendados and mine owners.
Both paid the same low wages for similarly harsh and degrading work. For the Pimans, 
the Americans offered protection from Apache and Yavapai raids and created a market for 
their surplus agricultural produce.
Relations between groups living in Arizona took a decided turn for the worst in 1861. 
In that year Lieutenant Bascom executed Cochise’s relatives; the Congress moved the 
overland mail route; and the regular troops retreat eastward. Taken together, these events 
caused the Chirieahua Apaches to reclassify Americans from periodic annoyance to 
committed enemy. Not only did these events cause the Apaches to view the Americans 
differently, but they also made the Indians believe they could dominate over the remaining 
settlers. When the Superintendent o f Indian Affairs in Arizona, none other than Mr. 
Charles Poston, relayed this information to Washington he wrote, “These lordly 
mountaineers tauntingly say ‘The Americans are their husbandmen and the Mexicans are 
their herders. Why should they labor? When they want they will gather in abundance’.”*
* Charles Poston, Report to the Office o f  Indian Affairs, April 22, 1863, United States Bureau o f  
Indian Affairs, Letters R eceived  by the Office o f  Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, Arizona Superintendency, 
1863-1880, Roil 3 (Washington D C.: National Archives and Records Services, 1956); in a similar vein, 
in 1868 O verland M onthly reporter John Cremony spent time among the Apaches o f  Arizona and relates 
this exchange that followed Cremony showing an Apache headman pictures and models o f  American 
technology: “You desire our children to leam  from books and say that, because you have done so, you are 
able to build all those big houses, and sail over the sea, and talk to each other at any distance and do many 
wonderfiil things; now, let me tell you what I think. You begin when you are little to work hard, and 
work until you are men in order to begin fresh work you say that you work hard in order to learn how to 
work well. After you get to be men, then you say, the labor o f  life commences; then, too, you build big 
houses, big ships, big towns, and everything in proportion. Then, after you have got them all, you die and 
leave everything behind. Now, we call that slavery. You are slaves from the time you tiegin to talk until 
you die; but we are as free as the air. We never work, but the Mexicans and others work for us.” In 
Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 
2001.
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As the Chirieahua Apaches and Americans drew their battle lines, the Piman peoples 
decided to bind themselves closer to the Amerieans. In doing this they hoped to 
strengthen their proteetion from Apache and Yavapai raiders and gain the ability to appeal 
to white settlers as allies. While making perfeet sense at the time, this deeision, however, 
bode ill for the friture as the Pimans did not foresee that the defeat o f the Apaches and 
Yavapais would mean an increase in the number of settlers, many of whom would 
expropriate Piman land and water.
Americans such as Superintendent Poston also blundered when they supported arming 
the Pimans. He seems to have not taken into consideration possible long-term 
eonsequences o f this aetion.^ It apparently never crossed his mind that armed Pimans 
eould turn their weapons on Americans. Instead, he and others like him falsely assumed 
that the more “eivilized” Pimans had always befriended intruders o f European deseent, so 
they therefore could always be inqjlicitly trusted. This, however, was not historically 
accurate as various Piman groups had resorted to armed attacks against Spaniards, 
Mexicans, and American frir traders when circumstances led them to believe their 
resources were being threatened.'*
 ^ The O’Odom o f  the Gila and Santa Cruz both received reservations in the late 1860s; according to 
merchant Don Maguire, “[Amos] Carroll and the Pimans carried on a sort o f  contraband trade; that is he 
sold them wine and whiskey and playing cards and other means o f  gambling, contrary to the wishes o f  the 
nearby Indian agent. The agent told me that Carroll purchased horses, mules, and donkeys furnished to 
the Indians by the government, paying them not more than one-third their value and reselling them to 
travelers or Mexican traders at high prices.” In Maguire, 75.
Letter to Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs P. Dole from Indian Agent Charles Poston, August 19, 
1864; These Indians have always been friendly to the whites, and have served as a bulwark against the 
Apaches, the great scourge o f  our Territory.. .it is considered as a matter o f  vial importance to conciliate 
them , and retain their good w ill.” Officer, 99; see also The personal Narrative o f  Jam es O. Pattie, ed. 
William Goetz man (Albuquerque: University o f  N ew  M exico Press, 1962) for a detailed account o f  Pima 
and Maricopa Indians attacking American for traders.
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When Confederate and Union forces began battling each other, Apache headmen 
appear to have surmised that American political power was fracturing, just as it had in 
northern Mexico following Mexican independence. They probably also assumed that they 
could pit opposing factions against one another just as they had done with Hispanic 
residents o f Sonora and Chihuahua. This line o f reasoning is probable as it most cogently 
explains Apache aggressiveness and bravado during the Civil War. Why else would they 
begin to behave as if they had nothing to fear?
While, this assessment o f American politics certainly made sense from the Apache 
perspective, in a broader context, it was disastrous. The Apaches could not understand 
that the events shaping American behavior were occurring hundreds o f miles away and 
that these events were in fact strengthening American resolve to crush any and all 
rebellions. What this meant for the Apaches was that they would pay dearly once the 
Americans decided to commit the resources necessary to defeat them."
American resolve to pacify the west arrived on the Great Plain almost a decade before 
it arrived in Arizona. Eager to apply the total war strategies that had defeated the South 
to the West, Generals Philip H. Sheridan and William T. Sherman swept the Plains with a 
vengeance. Their greatest problem was not that a scorched earth, no holds barred strategy 
was ineffective against the Indians, but that it was too successful. When news arrived in
" Between 1866 and 1868 regular army forces again manned the posts in Arizona and many o f  these 
soldiers were veterans o f  the Civil War. They learned lessons o f  warfare from this experience, and then 
applied to the frontier context. First Lieutenant Camillo C. C. Carr related this in his diary, “When 
possible we carried salt pork and hard bread, which were made to last without reference to the number o f  
days or rations. That trick we learned well in the Army o f  the Potomac.” See Cozzens, 32; “Letter o f  
January 23, 1866 to Commissioner Cooley from Special Agent,” in Letters Received from the Office O f 
Indian Affairs: “when the troops were withdrawn in 1861, the whites settlers were all driven o ff  by the 
wild A paches.. .Since the return o f  the troops, during the last year the settlers have come back, unless a 
reservation is soon selected, the poor Indians [Aravapai Apaches] will have no chance.”
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the East of military massacres of Indian women and children, reformers involved with 
uplifting ft-eed slaves were aghast. Their protests'resulted in a reconfiguration of the army 
back to its pre-Civil War strength and the removal o f Civil War military commanders from 
the Plains. Consequently, in Arizona the voluntary California Column, which had 
occupied the territory after the Texans invaded New Mexico, mustered out in 1864.
Some of the soldiers returned to California, while others stayed to prospect, and a few 
organized vigilante groups to bring “justice” to Indian raiders."’ Territorial governor John 
Goodman replaced the Californians with a volunteer regiment consisting mostly of 
Mexican and Piman men, yet they only served one year before the governor received 
orders from Washington to disband his militia.’’
Between 1862 and 1871, the army established nine military forts and camps in three 
strategic zones in Arizona: in the northeast near the Navajo, in the southeast near the 
Chirieahua Apaches, and in central Arizona in Yavapai country. As before the Civil War, 
these new posts were only minimally staffed with soldiers and supplies." Commanders
Some men stayed to return to promising mineral deposits they had previously located while on 
reeonnaissance m issions under Carlton; see Ted Cogut and Bill Conger, H istory o f  A rizon a’s Clifton- 
M orenci M ining District-A Personal Approach  (Thatcher, AZ: M ining History, 1999).
Edward Palmer, “A Great Slaughter o f  Apaches,” Prescott, Arizona Miner, February 28, 1866, in 
Eyewitness to  the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books,
2001
In a letter to the editor o f  the N ew  York H erald  Sylvester Mowry bitterly complained that the lack 
o f  supply and foresight by military leaders in Washington was leading to the unnecessary deaths in 
Arizona: “This all-powerful and beneficent government sends a young man like my dear friend 
Cushing— poor, dear fellow, a man the army could not afford to lose— with tw enty men to fight the 
bravest, wildest Indian ch ief on the continent, Cochise, with 150 warriors entrenched in a mountain 
range, every foot o f  which is as familiar to the Apache as your own doorstep is to you. It is not simply the 
killing o f  an officer. It is an officer’s duty and expectation every time he goes out to be killed, for in 
Arizona the troops always fight at a disadvantage in numbers and position.” Quoted in Eyewitness to the 
Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001, 69: “in 
December o f  1868, Indian Agent Post complained that “The military force now in Arizona is inadequate 
to the protection o f  the M ining Settlements [sic] and public highways So [sic] that the progress o f  the 
Country [sic] and development o f  the precious metals are very much retarded.”
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did their best, but their men spent most of their time fiitilely chasing Indian warriors who
stealthily raided and then disappeared into their mountain fortresses. Without training in
guerilla tactics, or more recruits to lay siege to Indian hideouts, there was not much more
the soldiers could do." In feet, there was such a lack of coordination among the outposts
that in at least one instance, an Apache headman tried to lure soldiers from one fort into
participating in a raid against soldiers at another fort. According to first lieutenant
Camillio C. C. Carr,
Another result was that in a day or two after our return to Fort McDowell,
Delshay, the chief of the Coyoteros, to which tribe the Indians we had killed 
belonged, came to the post to make peace, bringing with him several hundred of his 
people. He made the most liberal promises as to future good behavior, and as an 
unquestionable guarantee o f his good feith offered to bring all his warriors, about 
three hundred, and join the troops of our garrison for the purpose of attacking and 
capturing Canqj Grant. This offer was declined with thanks, but it showed that the 
Apaches had no idea that the troops o f different posts belonged to the same army, 
but were regarded as independent bodies hostile to each other and simply holding 
places in the country for their own profit and advantage."
Unbeknownst to Arizona’s Indians, in Washington D C., a battle between advocates of 
relentless war as a means for defeating recalcitrant Indians and proponents o f a negotiated 
peace came to a head when Ulysses S. Grant, victorious Union general, became president 
in 1869. Upon his inauguration, a group of influential reformers requested that he create a 
peace commission for rooting out the corruption and brutality plaguing the military and
”  When possible, scouting parties did what Major John Green ordered his men to do when they came 
upon an A pache cam p, “W hilst on the m arch, the captive squaw inform ed me that there was a cornfield 
about three miles from the trail, on one o f  the small tributaries o f  the San Carlos. 1 sent Corporal M iles 
and twelve men o f  the Thirty-second Infantry with the scouts to destroy it. On his return he reported he 
had found and destroyed about four acres o f  com .” And , “Believing that many o f  these Indians, if  not all, 
had been guilty o f  marauding, I instructed Captain Berry, if  possible, to exterminate the whole village but 
gave no positive order.. . ” John Green , “Interesting Scout among White Mountain Apaches Some o f  
Whom Sue for Peace and a Reservation,” in Cozzens, 42-4.
1 6 ,Carr, 3 1.
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Indian Bureau. They argued that fraud and a complete disregard for the Indians’ 
wellbeing were causing the ongoing Indian wars, and that the extirpation o f these moral 
failings would bring peace to the West. And with peace would come the ability to bring 
the same benevolent policies that were uplifting freed slaves to the Indians. Grant agreed, 
yet in doing so did not completely abandon his commitment to proving the effectiveness of 
the total war strategy.”
During the Grant administration, then, competing Indian policies of peace and war ran 
on parallel tracks until they collided in Arizona in 1871. On April 30 of that year, a 
vigilante mob from Tucson, consisting mostly o f Mexican and Papago men, but led by a 
handful o f Americans, arrived at Camp Grant in the early morning ho urs and bashed in the 
skulls o f a group of sleeping Aravapai Apache women, children, and old men."
According to supportive newspaper editorials, these men carried out this heinous act 
because the camp’s commander. Lieutenant Royal Whitman, was allowing a duplicitous 
band of Apaches to live at the camp and receive rations while they were simultaneously 
conducting nocturnal raids against local citizens.”  In a deposition. Camp surgeon Dr.
C.B. Biesly recounted in stark terms the result o f this act o f vengeance.
On my arrival 1 foimd that 1 should have but little use for wagon or medicines. The
work had been too thoroughly done. The camp had been fired, and the dead
" See: Robert H. Keller, Jr., “Shrewd, Able, and Dangerous Men: Presbyterian and Dutch Reformed 
Indian Agents in the Southwest, 1870-1882,” in The Journal o f  Arizona H istory 26, no. 3, (Autumn, 
1985,) 243-257.
'* According to testimony taken by Peace Commissioner Vincent Colyer, the Papagos took 28 Apache 
children from Camp Grant and “that the majority o f  them have been carried ordered into Sonora by the 
Papagoes [sic] and sold to the M exicans.” Colyer, 15.
19 O f Arizona’s newspapers, Colyer, 19, wrote, “But I am told that these papers only reflect the 
opinions o f  the traders, army contractors, bar-rooms, and gambling-saloon proprietors o f  those two towns, 
who prosper during the war, but that the hardy frontiersmen, the miner, poor laboring men o f  the border, 
pray for peace and I believe it.”
126
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
bodies o f some twenty-one women and children were lying scattered over the 
ground; those who had been wounded in the first instance had their brains beaten 
out with stones. Two of the best-looking o f the squaws were lying in such a 
position, and from the appearance of the genital organs, and of their wounds, there 
can be no doubt that they were first ravished, and then shot dead. Nearly all of the 
dead were mutilated. One infant, o f some ten months, was shot twice, and one leg 
nearly hacked off.’*
By feeding the Indians, Lt. Whitman had not violated established policy; in fact, he 
was carrying out approved strategies o f the peace plan, which included feeding Indians 
who promised to renounce raiding and settled down. This, however, did not sit too well 
with Tucson’s leading men, and it was they who organized the citizen’s militia that had 
marched on Camp Grant. After an investigation, the Grant administration demanded that 
the men involved be prosecuted, but as a leading Aravapai headman Eskiminzin said, “I do 
not expect ever to see any of them punished, for they will never punish a white man for 
killing an Indian. . . ” He was right.”
In the middle o f the Camp Grant scandal a man who represented the war policies of 
the Grant administration arrived in Arizona. His name was General George Crook.
Crook had been temporarily stationed in San Francisco after successfully fighting Indians 
on the Plains and in the Northwest and was looking forward to a respite. It was not long, 
though, before his superiors began asking if he would consider going to Arizona. He 
refused until he felt he could no longer do so without jeopardizing his career.”
Ibid.. 17.
”  Quoted in Andrew H. Cargill, “The Camp Grant Massacre,” Arizona H istorical Review  7, no. 3 
(July 1936): 73-79, Eyewitness to  the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 2001, 63-6.
”  George Crook, G eneral G eorge Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman: 
University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1960), 160-3.
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After touring southern Arizona, Crook wasted no time in devising a pragmatic plan for 
defeating and relocating all hostile Indians. First, he would give his adversaries an 
ultimatum; they could choose either to remove to a reservation where they could live in 
peace or they could remain hostile and be hunted down and killed. To enforce this threat 
he decided to assemble a fighting force that could move swiftly and match the Indian’s 
guerilla tactics. He understood and respected Indian fighting strategies, remarking that the 
Indians were adept at launching “A number o f simultaneous attacks . . .  at points widely 
separated, thus confusing both troops and settlers, spreading a vague sense of fear over all 
the territory . . . ”
To create his fighting force. Crook first followed in General Kearny’s 1846 footsteps 
by jettisoning his supply wagons and adopting the mule train. Then he hired Mexican and 
Indian scouts who understood Apache warfare and knew the location o f Apache and 
Yavapai hideouts.”  Crook and many others called these scouts “Apaches,” but those with 
a better femiliarity with the region’s cultural geography noted that these Indians were 
“Tonto Apaches,” meaning Yavapais, or “Apache -Mojaves” and “Apache-Yumas,”
From descriptions o f  the higher elevation Apache hideouts it is possible that they were using the 
same defensive sites that native groups used during the violent 14"" century. The following quote is 
representatives, “We had then an opportunity to examine the locality, so much dreaded by the Pimans, 
used as one o f  the strongholds o f  the Apache-Mojaves [sic] and Tontos. Situated upon the crest o f  a very 
elevated range, it was difficult o f  access to large parties from all sides except that upon which we had 
com e and even here the character o f  the sold was such that a footstep, unless made in the most cautious 
manner, would be heard for m iles.” John G. Bourke, “The Salt River Cave Fight,” John G. Bourke Diary 
1; 68-92, United States Military Academy Library, in Eyewitness to  the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter 
Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001, 149.
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meaning Mojaves and Yumas/'*
Once on the trail. Crook admonished his men that none should wantonly destroy life 
and property, yet he also granted them leeway to use whatever means necessary to force 
the enemy to surrender. Just as he was beginning to implement his plan, however, officials 
from the Grant administration ordered the General to temporarily halt. By this time, news 
of the Camp Grant massacre and the perpetrators’ rigged trial had reached the Board of 
Indian Commissioners. Incensed, they recommended that peace advocate Vincent Colyer 
go to Arizona and undertake an investigation. President Grant finally agreed to send 
Colyer in September o f 1871.”
So, just as Arizona’s Indians were about to see a more determined and organized side 
o f the American military, the President intervened, and in doing so confirmed their belief 
that the Americans were divided. Crook referred to Colyer as a member o f the “Indian 
Ring,” meaning he was nothing more than a naïve and meddlesome outsiders.’* But as the 
General wrote in his autobiography, “I had no faith in his enterprise, but I was afraid if I
John Gregory Bourke, On The Border with Crook  (Chicago: The Rio Grande Press, 1962), 98, 101, 
150; John F. Finerty, “On Campaign after Cibicue Creek,” Chicago Times, September 18 to October 21, 
1881, in Eyewitness to  the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 2001, 238. Various commanders at Fort Mojave had already been enlisting the Hualapais as 
scouts against the Mojave and Yavapai Indians. “Letter to Commissioner Mowry from Acting Indian 
Agent for the Arizona Indians, Tucson, December 25, 1859, 58-9,” Letter o f  the Office o f  Indian Affairs, 
Superintendency o f  Indian Affairs, New M exico, 1821-80, Roll 2 (Washington D C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1956) :“The name Apache includes a branch o f  the Yuma family called the Tonto 
Apaches, who speak an version [?] o f  the Yuman language.”
Colyer, 6-7.
Later, members o f  the Society o f  Arizona Pioneers had much worse to say o f  the Peace 
Commissioners: “The President and Congress o f  the United States, have apparently, ever been guided in 
their treatment o f  hostile Indians, by religious sentimentalists and romantic female emotionalists, who 
have derived their knowledge o f  Indian character from a perusal o f  the novels o f  Fenimore Cooper and 
other hypochondriac fiction ists, and who believe that the bible, done up in a wrapper o f  kindness and 
sweetmeats, is the only instrument which should be used in the subjugation o f  the ‘savage, but noble red 
man o f the forest.” Society o f  Arizona Pioneers Memorial, 1885 ( Tucson: Arizona Historical Society).
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continued my operations and he was to fail, I would be charged with interference.” 
Consequently, Crook dutifully suppressed his incredulity long enough to serve as 
Commissioner Colyer’s escort.
Crook correctly predicted that Co Iyer’s visit would not significantly change 
circumstances in Arizona, yet he wrongly assumed that Colyer’s failure would be due to 
his naivety. The real cause was instead the unwillingness of Congress and the military 
leadership to follow through on his recommendations. In his detailed report, Colyer 
correctly explained why Arizona had “suffered” for so long from Indian depredations. 
According to Colyer, the Indians were starving because settlers had usurped their 
subsistence resources. On top of this, Americans often cheated and physically abused the 
Indians, which then created an endless cycle o f retribution and revenge. He wrote, “I ask 
them, ‘Why are you so poor?’ and the answer invariably is, ‘How can we be otherwise? 
We had not much originally, and now we can get nothing; we do not steal; we cannot go 
to the mescal country, as we are liable to be met and killed by scouting parties.’ I know 
myself this to be the case, hence they have either to starve or steal, or we must feed them 
until they can raise enough for themselves.””  Thus, his remedies included creating 
reservations with sufficient subsistence resources in each Indian group’s home territory; 
ensuring that peacefiil Indians received adequate rations until they could support 
themselves; and restraining settlers fi'om abusing the Indians. In the end, Colyer placed 
blame for the ongoing conflict squarely on the shoulders o f  the Americans. In his report
Vincent Colyer, 12.
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he concluded that,
When the Americans first came among them bringing better traditions . . .  and 
treating them as a people whose rights to the soil not having yet been extinguished 
by treaty . .  . were entitled to some respect, and so treated them kindly, the Apaches 
received them as fiiends. But [when the Americans] began to treat the Apaches as 
incumbrances to be exterminated.. .  They reaped the bloody finits of that policy in 
a war which has cost us thousands of lives and millions o f dollars.”’*
Some military officials, such as Captain J. J. Van Horn, agreed with Colyer’s 
assessment: “I am of the opinion that if the whites would deal fairly with the Indians and 
when they have any transaction with them and were as well disposed to keep peace as the 
Indians are, there would be but very little Cause for Complaint [ric].”’* Many other 
officials, however, dismissed the commissioner’s interpretations as being overly 
sympathetic to the Indians. This view was especially prevalent among white settlers. On 
July 30, 1871, Judge B. Hudson of Grant County, New Mexico, sent the Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs in Arizona a series o f resolutions signed by local citizens as well as a 
personal message that read in part: “What we want to know is, whether our stock can be 
recovered or not fi'om Indians on your reservation . . .  or are we forever at the mercy of 
these thieving murderous Apaches . .  .if so, the sooner we know the better, because the 
citizens o f this county are determined to put a stop to it, and if they carry out their 
program the Camp Grant massacre will be thrown entirely in the shade, and Alamosa will
^*Vincent Colyer even quotes agent Steck in his introduction to his official report: “In 1857 M. Steck, 
the Apache Indian agent for New M exico, which then included Arizona, wrote, ‘In my last annual report I 
urged the necessity o f  liberally supplying the Indians o f  my agency with food. Another year’s experience 
and close observation has still more forcibly impressed me with the conviction that this is the only means 
o f  effectually controlling the Apache tribe.” In Colyer, 4-5; see also Thomas Alexander, The Federal 
Frontier: Interior D epartm ent P olicy in Idaho, Utah, and Arizona, 1863-1896  (Ann Arbor, Mich.: 
University Microfilms, 1974).
Brennan, 103.
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stand next to Sand Creek (Emphasis in the original.)
Many members o f Congress shared Judge Hudson’s sentiment, but most did not want 
to look as if they were rejecting Colyer’s plan outright. Reformers still held enough 
political power to make reelection troublesome, so a coalition formed to allow the 
implementation of any o f Colyer’s suggestions that did not interfere with Crooks’ plans. 
Consequently, once Colyer left Arizona, Crook received the green light to resume his 
efforts, but before he could get under way, he once again received orders to stop. 
Refusing to be dallied with, influential reformers had convinced the Grant administration 
that military interference underlay Congress’ refusal to accept Colyer’s whole plan. As 
such, they demanded another investigation to be done by someone who could stop any 
further military insubordination. Their man tfiis time was peace advocate Major-General 
Otis Oliver Howard.”
Howard was an ideal candidate not only because of his military credentials, but also 
due to his exemplary record as a reformer. Before coming to Arizona, Howard had just 
recently been Commissioner of the Bureau of Freedman and Refiigees. For his part, 
General Crook was not any more impressed by General Howard than he had been of 
Commissioner Colyer. In his autobiography Crook wrote o f Howard, “I was very much 
amused at the General’s opinion of himself. He told me that he thought the Creator had 
placed him on earth to be the Moses to the Negros [sic]. Having accomplished that
As quoted in Colyer, 74-5.
”  Major-General O. O. Howard, M y Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians: A R ecord o f  
Personal Observations, Adventures, and Cam paigns Among the Indians o f  the G reat West With Some 
Account o f  their Life, Habits, Traits, Religion, Ceremonies, Dress, Savage Instincts, A nd Customs in 
Peace and War (Hartford, Conn.: A.D. Worthington & Company, 1907)122-3.
132
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
mission, he felt satisfied his next mission was with the Indians.” As credulous as Crook 
was, he nevertheless suspended his operations and stoically served as Howard’s guide.
As had Vincent Colyer, General Howard met with a number of aggrieved Indian 
bands, acknowledged their suffering, and promised that he would attempt to fairly 
reconcile Indian and American interests. His mission seemed doomed, however, as 
Cochise’s band of Chirieahua Apaches continued raiding throughout his stay. Try as he 
might, he could not find anyone willing to take him to the headman’s mountain fortress. 
Finally, while meeting with the Mimbres Apaches on the Rio Grande, fate intervened and 
brought him an Indian guide named Tom Jeffords.
As Jeffords was a confidant o f Cochise, Howard believed “it a good providence which 
now threw him in my way.””  Jeffords agreed to take Howard to Cochise and after an 
extended stay with the Chiricahuas, the General consented to establish a reservation in the 
southern Dragoon Mountains with Jeffords as the agent.”  Cochise then promised that his 
people would no longer be at war with the Americans. The Chirieahua’s kept that pledge 
until their beloved leader died.’'*
After General Howard departed Arizona, General Crook resumed his grand plan for 
winning the peace through war. By this time, though, many Indian groups now doubted
32 Ibid., 187.
The Tucson C itizen  (Tucson), October 12, 1872.
Cochise did not, however, promise to keep his men from raiding into M exico as he believed that 
the Americans and M exicans were two separate political entities. O f this Crook’s aide-de-camp John G. 
Bourke wrote, “In reference to the M exicans, he [Cochise] said he considered them as being on one side in 
this matter, while the Americans were on another. The former had not asked him for peace as the later 
had done. He did not deny that his boys were in the habit o f  raiding on M exico, but this he could not 
prevent as it was no more than was done from all the reservations.” Cozzens, 152; Howard made the 
treaty with Cochise on October 13, 1872.
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the Americans’ word. General Crook had threatened war if they did not submit; yet 
Colyer and Howard had agreed to resolve the problems between the Indians and settlers in 
the Indians’ favor. And, least they forget, there was also the very clear message sent to 
the last group who had agreed to settle near Camp Grant and accept American 
benevolence. Consequently, while some bands decided to take Colyer, Howard, or 
Crook’s messages seriously and settled down on reservations, others chose to continue 
raiding, believing that the Americans were too divided to be able to follow through on any 
one plan.”
Once Crook swung into action, he ended up fulfilling not only his own promises, but 
also many of those of Colyer and Howard. By the middle of 1874 he had successfully 
forced the surrender o f virtually all the renegade bands operating north o f the Gila and Salt 
Rivers, just as he said he would. Then, he placed each group on a reservation set aside 
within their homeland, just as Colyer and Howard had promised.’* Had everything 
continued on a natural course. Crook would have then swung through southern Arizona, 
and at least for a time, Arizona’s “Indian problem” would have been resolved.”  This, 
however, was not the case as Crook’s initial victories opened the way for the Indian 
Bureau to try to reassert its authority. Of this Crook >\Tote, “As soon as the Indians 
became settled on the different reservations, gave up the warpath, and became harmless.
”  An editorial dated October 26, 1872, the newspaper The Tucson Citizen  complained that “there 
must be unity and consistency in the course the Government toward the numerous and treacherous tribes 
who are classed under the name in Arizona.” See Dan Thrapp for a detailed description o f  Crook’s battles 
with different Indian groups.
Colyer, 11, 18; The Tucson Citizen, (Tucson), October 26, 1872.
”  The Tucson Citizen, (Tucson), September 6, 1871, Colyer reported that the Apaches at the White 
Mountain Camp “furnished on hundred and ninety tons o f  h a y . . .  They [also) supplied the garrison with 
al the wood they used. . .”
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the Indian agents, who had sought cover before, now came out as brave as sheep, and 
took charge of the agencies, and commenced theif game of plundering.” *^
In fact, by the end of 1874, Indian policy in Arizona was once again in a state of 
disarray due to conflicts among warring American factions. The first faction consisted of 
General Crook and the military leaders and civilian reformers who now supported him.
The second faction was the Indian Bureau and its San Carlos agent John P. Clum. Bureau 
officials resented any usurpation of their patronage powers and saw Crook as an obstacle 
to reestablishing a toehold in the Southwest. And the last faction was the Democratic 
Party, members o f which had recently regained a majority in the House of Representatives, 
who planned to cut the monetary lifeblood to all Republican reform programs. This 
politically motivated stinginess was not a new weapon as Agent John Gregory Bourke 
attested to in 1872: “Just as soon as a few of the more progressive people begin to 
accumulate a trifle of private property, to raise sheep, to cultivate patches o f soil and raise 
scantly [sic] crops, the agent sends in the usual glowing report o f the occurrence, and to 
the mind of the average man and woman in the East it looks as if all the tribes were on the 
highway to prosperity, and the first thing that Congress does is to curtail the 
appropriations.”*^  But this time the cuts in funding were so deep that it soon became 
virtually impossible to provide for even Indians’ basic needs.
In the impending battle. Agent Clum made the first move. To ingratiate himself with
Crook, 184. John Gregory Bourke told o f  how one agent was shorting the Hualapais supplies to 
sell the surplus to local miners: “Nearly the whole amount o f  the salt and flour supply had been sold to the 
miners in the Cerbat range, and the poor Hualpais, who had been such valiant and efficient allies, had 
been swindled out o f  everything but their breath, and but a small part o f  that was left,” 163.
Bourke, 223.
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the local “best citizens,” and cultivate a patronage base, Clum began consolidating the 
Yavapai and Apache bands onto the San Carlos reservation. This move benefited Tucson 
merchants, as they were now the closest suppliers for Indian provisions. Consolidation 
also made it easier for Clum to keep watch over the Indians as the reservation lay on the 
broad lowlands near the Gila River.'*®
For the Indians, this reorganization was not welcomed. With agent Clum and the 
Tucson merchant vested in supply contracts for San Carlos, more money went to pay for 
contractors’ services than was devoted to purchasing Arming implements. As a result, the 
Indians received little that would help them become self-sufficient farmers. The second 
problem lay in San Carlos’ environmental setting. The flat lowlands, which covered most 
o f the reservation, did not have a sufficient carrying capacity for the number of Indians 
confined within its boundaries. On top o f this, it was horribly hot in the summer and 
desolate in the winters. Crowded conditions also only facilitated the spread of disease, 
and reservation living put lifelong adversaries into close contact, which resulted in 
numerous assaults and even some murders'**
General Howard had created San Carlos by moving the old Camp Grant north onto 
the Gila River so that it abutted the southern perimeter of the White Mountain 
Reservation. Clum saw the adjacent land as an opportunity to consolidate the Indians in 
his jurisdiction, saving him time and aggravation. He first marched the Yavapai fi-om the 
Fort Verde Reservation to live at San Carlos with the Aravapai Apaches. In the next year
John Dibbern, “The Reputations o f  Indian Agents: A Reappraisal o f  John P. Clum and Joseph C. 
Tiffany,” Journal o f  the Southwest, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer, 1997), 204-5; Alexander, 29-30.
Bourker, 224.
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he then ordered the relocation of the White Mountain Apaches. By 1876, Cochise had 
died and his band had split into factions, one of which decided to resume raiding into 
northern Mexico. As Indian agent Tom Jeffords was unable to mend the fracture, Clum 
obtained permission to also move the Chiricahuas north to his agency. He finished his 
consolidation in 1877 by bringing Apache bands living along the Rio Grande to San 
Carlos.'**
With each move. General Crook watched, impotent to stop the impending disaster.
He understood that the consolidation at San Carlos had placed various unrelated kin
groups together who now lacked the option of moving away when disagreements broke
out. He also knew that trouble was sure to erupt once the summer heat arrived as the
Indians would request, but be denied, permission to go into the cool mountains, as was
their custom.'** Crook’s fears turned into reality when Indian men began to chaff under
Clum’s regimented system of control, and families openly complained about starvation and
disease. With each passing month, “fiscal conservatism” and civil corruption pushed the
reservation dangerously close to catastrophe as supplies shortages and overcrowding
resulted in high levels o f malnutrition and epidemic disease. According to an editorial
published in the Globe newspaper the Arizona Silver Belt on February 7, 1879,
Flour is still not as abundant, by any means, at the San Carlos Indian Agency as it 
ought to be! The contractor is derelict as usual and if the weather continues rainy he 
will find it impossible to get supplies forward in time to prevent starvation from
Frederick G. Hughes, “The Military and Cochise,” Arizona Star, (Tucson,) January 27 and 31, 
1886; Cozzens, 136; C.L. Sonnichsen, “Tom Jeffords and the Editors,” The Journal o f  Arizona History, 
vol. 29, no. 2, (Summer, 1998), 118.
Bourke, On the Border, “The Apache-Mojave and the Apache-Yuma belonged to one sock, and the 
Apache or Tinneh to another. They speak different languages, and although their habits o f  life are almost 
identical there is sufficient divergence to admit o f  the entrance o f  the usual jealousies and bickerings 
bound to arise when two strange, illiterate tribes are brought in enforced contact,” 217.
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ensuing amongst the wards o f the Government. The consequences of 
mismanagement in this matter o f  Indian affaires are fearfiil to contemplate. I f  the 
Indians are starved they will ‘break out’ and himdreds o f white men will be 
slaughtered.'*'*
In May of 1878 The Weekly Miner, a Prescott newspaper, reported that seventeen 
Indians fled the San Carlos Reservation due to the fact that “small pox was spreading at 
the Agency and they had left to escape its ravages.” *^ All Crook could do was lament the 
shortsightedness o f such a policy, “Their removal was one of those cruel things that greed 
has so often inflicted on the Indian. When the Indian appeals to arms, his only redress, the 
whole country [will cry] out against the Indian.” ®^
Despite simmering tensions, for a short time, an uneasy peace settled over Arizona. 
This lull emboldened miners, farmers, and ranchers to swarm over the once dangerous 
eastern sections of the territory. Mormon settlers migrated down the Little Colorado 
River, encircled San Carlos, and began irrigating farms with water fi-om the Salt and Gila 
Rivers. The result was water shortages on the reservation as well as downriver for the 
Pima and Maricopa.'** In fact, the Mormons drew off so much river water that the Pimans 
began raiding white settlements to acquire enough food to keep their families from 
starving. They were obviously dismayed to discover that they were no longer trusted
Arizona Silver Belt, (Globe), February 7, 1879; see also, Arizona Silver Belt, (Globe), February 28, 
1878: “We hear very general complaints o f  Indians robbing miners’ cabins in the district. The truth is the 
poor wretches are starving, and a kind hearted victim does not like to punish them as they deserve. We 
learn that except lean beef they now get very little in the way o f  food at the San Carlos Indian Reservation, 
and are sent out to do the best they can in keeping bodies and souls together. We hope that some means 
will be adopted to give the Indians their rights.”
The Weekly (Prescott), May 31, 1878 
^  Crook, 184; Dibbern, 203-5; Alexander, 124.
A Pima ch ief told General Howard that one the Mormon farmers began drawing water from the 
Gila and Salt Rivers “the poor Pimans and Maricopas lose their water and their crops.” Quoted in 
Cozzens, 117.
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allies now that the Apaches were pacified, and had instead become mere impediments to 
progress. Settlers quickly forgot their praise for these industrious Indians and instead now 
routinely argued that their once loyal Piman allies should be removed to some other 
location. Some Americans even make the ease for sending the Pimans to Indian Territory 
in Oklahoma.'**
An editorial in the Prescott newspaper The Daily Miner, January 30, 1879, read in 
part: “The Pima Indians should be taken fi-om their present location on the Salt River, and 
placed by themselves, where they will not come in contact with white people. The lands 
they are settled upon are owned by bona fide  citizens, who located them, and are kept 
fi-om peacefiil occupation by old Chin-chi-a-cum, one of the meanest old wretches on the 
face of the earth.” ®^ By the end of the year, voices such as this, clamoring for displacing 
the Pimans, grew exponentially.
In response to such hostility, the Pimans did not immediately fights back, but instead 
revived an older form of defense. An editorial in December of 1879 made it clear that the 
Pimans were responding with a strategy similar to one pioneered by their Hohokam 
ancestors: increasing their fighting force through alliance building. “For several years a 
large number of citizens living at the Tempe Settlement, which by the way, is the best 
portion o f the Salt River, had been annoyed, plundered and harassed by the Pima Indians, 
who live opposite on the north side o f the River. From a small number, these Indians had 
increased by recruits from the Gila [River], until now  they have 1,000 souls.” ®^
' Pimans living along the Gila River told Commissioner Colyer that “They were always led to 
suppose that the white men wanted them to kill the Apaches . . . ” Colyer, 75.
The D aily M iner,{ Prescott), January 30, 1879.
The Arizona Miner, (Prescott), December 18, 1879.
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In a letter to Commissioner Colyer, Special Indian Agent to the Pimans J. H. Stout 
reported that.
The time for preparing their land is now at hand, but having no water they can 
do nothing . . .  On Sunday Morning last, Chin-kun . . .  came to me and said that for 
many years he and his people had ‘lived from what they planted,’ but now they had 
no water; white men up the river had taken it from them, & etc. After spending a 
few moments in telling me of his wrongs, he made known the object o f his visit, 
which was to obtain leave to take the warriors o f his village . . .  and by force o f arms 
drive the whites from the river.”*'
Military advisor General McDowell also noted the Piman’s destitution and petitioned 
the federal government to assist its former allies: “They are now suffering, and are likely 
to suffer, from no act o f their own but by reason o f settlements of whites on the Gila river 
above their farms, and the diversion of the water which they have heretofore been 
depending upon to irrigate their ground, for the land will produce no grain without 
irrigation.”**
On the San Carlos Reservation, upriver, in addition to the serious lack of water, the 
Indian also faced encroaching prospectors who stirred up trouble as they searched for 
mineral wealth. The miners were especially eager to access reservation land, as soldiers 
serving under General Crook had included the hunt for minerals into their daily, scouting 
missions. According to soldier John Gregory Bourke, “We were among the very first to 
come upon the rich ledges o f copper which have since furnished the mainstay to the 
prosperity of the town of Clifton, on the border o f New Mexico, and we knocked off 
pieces o f  pure metal, and brought them back to Tucson to show to the people there . . .”**
"Colyer, 21.
”  The Arizona Miner, (Prescott), November 22, 1878.
”  Bourke, 98-9.
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Lured by such reports, miners three times located ore deposits within the reservation’s 
boundaries and three times were able to convince territorial officials and businessmen— 
including agent Clum—to lobby the President to contract the reservation’s boundaries.
Not only did this shrink the amount o f land available to support the Indians, but it also put 
Americans on the doorsteps o f bands who were already seething with anger over 
government duplicity.*'*
Due to building pressure, tension flared into conflict at San Carlos after 1875, causing 
both the Chiricahua and Güa Apaches to flee the reservation. It was especially galling to 
the Chiricahuas to be treated as defeated prisoners as they saw themselves as conquerors. 
Both groups of Apaches had apparently reasoned that the Americans were still internally 
divided, which Clum’s actions seemed to confirm, and therefore would be unable to mount 
an eflective efibrt to force them back to the reservation. They were incorrect in this 
general appraisal, however, as army soldiers did come to return them to San Carlos. At 
the same time, they were correct in assuming that division within the American ranks had 
weakened the military, because once they were back on the reservation, the soldiers were 
stretched too thin to keep the Apaches fi-om fleeing again.**
According to Captain Charles B. Gatewood, Apaches such as Victorio left the 
reservation due to “restlessness, caused by robbery and mismanagement by their agents 
(the same old story the West over) and innate desire to slay, pillage, steal, and create
Ibid., 434: “It was openly asserted that the Apaches were to be driven from the reservation marked 
out for them by Vincent Colyer and General O. O. Howard, upon which they had been living for more 
than eleven years. N o one ever heard the Apache story, and no one seemed to care whether they had a 
story or not;” by 1878, an editorial celebrated the resulting pacification o f  the Indians in the Tucson 
newspaper The C itizen, August 30, 1878, called for a program under which Americans could now “utilize 
the labor o f  these Indians to our great benefit.”
"  The Citizen, (Tucson), June 17, 1876.
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havoc generally, summed up in the word 'revenge. (Emphasis added.) By 1882 
conditions on the reservation had gotten so bad that Cochise’s former band fled once more 
and declared war on the Americans.**
Fearful Arizonans called for General Crook to return and once again manage their 
Indian problem. Bolder citizens dismissed using the military and argued that if the troops 
could not settle the Indian problem permanently then “the so-called army be withdrawn 
from the Territory and settlers be permitted to defend themselves.”** In a column that 
appeared in the Arizona Weekly Star, in Tucson, Charles Poston took an opposing view 
and placed blame not on the military, but instead on the Indian Bureau: “The only honest
Charles B. Gatewood, “Campaigning against Victorio in 1879,” in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars,
1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001, 231; Victorio also told E C. 
Kemble, an inspector for the Bureau o f  Indian Affairs, “A good many years ago, before my hair was gray, 
and when the Americans first began to come into this country, we were sitting in a room like this eating 
your bread and drinking coffee. We had had some trouble with your people, but we thought it was all 
ended when they asked us to come to a feast. We left our guns and bows and were ready to smoke with 
your people. In a moment, and while we were eating, the house was surrounded with soldiers, who put 
their guns through the windows and shot down all but five o f  our party. I was one who escap ed .. .Since 
then I cannot lie down beside the road and not be afraid.” E. C. Kemble, “Victorio and His Young Men,” 
New York Time, November 28, 1880; Cozzens, 207.
According to relevant sources-newspapers, governor’s reports, journals-the people o f  Arizona were 
having as much if  not more difficulty with non-Indian robbers and outlaws as they were with the Apaches. 
Salesman Don Maguire wrote in his journal, “I was very anxious to reach Prescott, which was yet sixty 
miles away. I was doubly anxious, as we were in bandit-infested country and also in a region were there 
were yet straggling Apaches watching that they might waylay and murder solitary travelers.” Maguire,
58; also, according to the Tucson newspaper The Citizen, December 11, 1875, Arizona settlers had filed 
claims with the federal government for damages caused by “Indians” totaling over $5,000,000.
"  The tone o f  a Tucson editorial published on April 22, 1876, indicates an acceptance o f  Crooks 
tactics for “pacifying” the Apaches. Instead o f  resorting to a call for extermination, which was usually the 
case before the Camp Grant Massacre, this directive calls for the military to bring all its forces to bear on 
renegades, including the use o f  Apache scouts, but the avoidance o f  harming peaceful Indians; in a 
memorial, the Society o f  Arizona Pioneers appealed to President Grover Cleveland “for relief from the 
curse o f  the Apache Indian depredations that [had] been allowed to rest upon them so long by previous 
administrations.” Tucson, Arizona, June 25, 1885, Arizona Historical Society; an article even appeared 
in the San Francisco newspapers claim ing that “troops are required in the neighborhood o f  San Carlos 
reservation to protect the Indians from a threatened attack by the lawless white element,” telegraph from 
Governor Zulick o f  Arizona to the Secretary o f  the Interior, Decem ber 30, 1885, Interior Department 
Territorial Papers Arizona, 1868-1913, roll \ ,  Executive Proceedings and Official Correspondence: July 
1, 1887-Decem ber 31, 7903 (Washington D.C., National Archives, 1963).
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remedy [to the problems caused by corrupt Indian agents] is to turn the Indian business 
over to the War Department. There is some honor in the military service—not much in 
the civil.”*®
General Crook did return to Arizona in 1882 to once again put the territory’s house in 
order. After arriving, Crook negotiated an agreement with Mexico to allow his men to 
cross the international border. Then, reviving his strategy of offering the Indians a clear 
choice between war and peace, he underscored his ultimatum with relentless pursuit. 
Understanding the importance of backing his threats with actions, he even pursued the 
Chiricahuas through the Sierra Madre Mountains twice, once in 1883 and again in 1886. 
After negotiating a peaceful return the second time with Chiricahua leader Geronimo, the 
deal fell apart before Crook could deliver his band back to San Carlos. Hoping that 
government officials would have patience and continue to support his efforts. Crook 
offered to resign, assuming they would decline. Instead, military leaders accepted and 
replaced him with his rival General Miles Nelson.*®
Nelson ultimately received credit for ending the Chiricahua standoff, yet he did so only 
by adopting Crook’s methods. First, he hired Apache scouts to locate the renegade band; 
then. Miles engaged Geronimo in negotiations just as Crook would have. Where he 
departed from Crook’s plan was in not offering the Chiricahuas a diplomatic avenue for 
resolving the standoff. Instead, Miles informed Geronimo that he had already arranged for 
the deportation o f  all Chiricahuas to Florida and that he would only accept Geronimo’s
Arizona Weekly Star, (Tucson), May 20, 1880.
** Joe A. Stout, Jr., "Soldiering and Suffering in The Geronimo Campaign: Reminiscences o f  
Lawrence R. Jerome," Journal o f  the West 11, no. 1 (January 1972): 156.
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surrender if he agreed to willingly follow his kin. Crook was heartbroken to learn of this 
as he had promised Geronimo that he would not be exiled. With his only other alternative 
being continued flight, Geronimo finally agreed to Mile’s terms and led his band back 
across the U.S. border.*’ Then, on September 4, 1886, soldiers loaded the Chiricahuas 
onto railroad boxcars, and with one motion o f the conductor’s hand, the U.S. military 
shipped Arizona’s Indian problem away to a prison camp in Florida.**
The departing railcars marked two important turning points in Arizona history. First, 
the territory moved fi-om an era of negotiated compromise in which the worldviews of 
Americans and Indians co-existed, to a new era in which Americans alone set the standard 
for social relations and resource consumption. And second, the fi-eedom minority groups, 
such as Mexican and Chinese settlers, derived fi-om Indian violence, that limited Euro- 
American emigration to the territory, quickly disappeared. Consequently, no longer 
deterred by Indian raids, large numbers o f Euro-American settlers began arriving who 
would now relegate minority groups to more typical, subordinate positions.
The North Americans becoming the hegemonic power in Arizona was clearly not the 
first time a cultural group had succeeded in seizing the region’s resources for their own 
desires. But this last cycle o f conquest did mark the first time that a society had so 
completely taken control and the first time that the area has been almost completely 
integrated into a larger socio-political system. It seems clear fi-om historical precedent.
Arizona settlers supported this plan as is evident in the June, 1886, memorial complied by the 
Tucson Arizona Society o f  Pioneer in which they wrote: “The Society o f  Arizona Pioneers again propose 
to appeal to the National Government, to obtain the only effective remedy for all time to come, namely: 
the speedy and absolute removal o f  the Apache Indians from our Territory.” Memorial, 1886 (Tucson: 
Arizona Historical Society) MS.
Stout, 168-9.
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though, that the Americans will mostly likely follow in the footsteps o f their predecessors 
and will eventually fail in their efforts to tame the Southwest. Just as the Hohokam, the 
Spanish, and Apaches were unable to extent their power over both nature and other 
cultural groups for long, the Americans will also one day learn that technology and 
political power alone cannot save them from the next devastating drought or the arrival of 
newcomers from distant lands who have their own ideas about how Arizona and her 
resources should be managed.**
Shaw and Ciolek-Torrello, 7, write: “Historical land-use practices (e.g., rapid withdrawal o f  
groundwater, grazing , wood cutting, and land clearing for urban expansion), possibly in combination 
with natural climatic change, have caused environments in southern Arizona to become seriously 
degraded. Prior to the 1850s, southern Arizona drainages were characterized by greater surface water, 
cienegas, and dense stands o f  riparian vegetation .. .  Over the last century, dense riparian communities 
along most large drainages in the Tucson Basin have largely been eliminated.”
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